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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Child psychotherapists regularly find themselves working across ‘cultural difference’, 
yet this is given little thought in trainings, be it in supervision, teaching or in the 
training analysis.  A growing body of literature in the psychotherapy professions 
emphasises the great anxiety provoked by ‘cultural difference’ and ensuing defences 
that are ordinarily employed by the individual; this literature identifies an urgent need 
for psychotherapists to find more consistently thoughtful ways to engage with issues 
of race, culture and social class differences.  Using Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ to 
build a working definition of ‘cultural difference’ and a psychosocial methodology, I 
interviewed eight child psychotherapists to ask what fantasies about working with 
‘cultural difference’ we might hold.  Thematic analysis identified two fantasy 
structures: ‘difference as dangerous’, in which ‘cultural difference’ is variously 
associated with all kinds of badness, including sexual perversion, violence, child 
abuse, neglect and shame; and ‘the profession in peril’, in which it was felt that the 
child psychotherapy profession is threatened by ‘cultural differences’, both from 
without and from within.  Discourse analysis examined two further fantasies: 
‘neutrality’ in the therapist, in which the therapist is imagined to transcend ‘cultural 
difference’; and ‘the location of difference’, in which it was imagined that one person 
in a pairing contained all the ‘difference’ and its negative associations, while the other 
is felt to be ‘normal’.  These four fantasies show how powerful projections are able to 
enter the consulting room.  There is an urgent need for the child psychotherapy 
profession to give thought to ‘cultural difference’ in order to avoid reproducing 
prejudiced stances; this becomes imperative as issues of ‘cultural difference’ become 
more politically explosive.  ‘Cultural difference’ was found to be a ‘slippery’ term, 
which carries different meanings at different times.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis examines the fantasies child psychotherapists have about working with 
‘cultural difference’.  My interest in ‘cultural differences’ stems both from working 
for many years in a clinic in a diverse, multi-cultural borough and from my own 
family background.  I initially set out to ask ‘how’ child psychotherapists work with 
‘cultural differences’, but this question shifted after the first three interviews, due to 
my increasing interest in the fantasies about working with ‘cultural difference’ that 
were emerging in the data.  In my field-notes, I noted that, immediately after the 
dictaphone was switched off, the second interviewee commented, “What we think is 
easy; what we actually do is more difficult”.  The question of  “how” we work with 
‘cultural difference’ was, I felt, producing rather sterile answers in the data, where the 
discussions around fantasy were rich and fascinating.  The main focus of the research 
therefore shifted to include the question: “What are child psychotherapists’ fantasies 
about working with ‘cultural difference’?”. 
 
My working definition of ‘fantasy’ includes consciously held beliefs and ideas.  These 
were manifest in the interview data.  I hold that the possibility of encounters with 
‘cultural difference’ is one that generates a great deal of unconscious fantasy 
(phantasy), and understand the term ‘fantasy’ to cover both conscious and 
unconscious material; I explore the literature on fantasy further below.  However, for 
methodological reasons, I limit myself in this study to exploring those fantasies that 
are manifest and explicit in the interview data. 
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Child psychotherapists are likely to spend much of their careers working across 
‘cultural differences’ of some kind or another.  However, very little has been written 
on our fantasies about ‘cultural difference’ from within psychoanalytic clinical 
literature.  Where fantasy is explored in the social sciences, this appears to have made 
few inroads into clinical writings: attempts for dialogue between psychoanalysis and 
academic fields in this area are only just beginning to bear fruit (Auestad, 2015) and 
child psychotherapy appears to lag behind adult psychoanalysis in these endeavours.  
As is apparent in the following section, most psychoanalytic literature on difference 
focuses on racial differences.  Morgan (2014) explains that she chooses to focus on 
differences of race, rather than culture, because it is so visible and yet so empty a 
concept, having no biological basis.  She argues that where discussions of race are 
broadened to include other kinds of difference, there is a risk that they become 
“swallowed up in a generality of difference” (p.57).  However, it is precisely the 
difficult-to-define invisibility of ‘cultural difference’ that interests me.  Moreover, 
Barker (1981) attests that ‘culture’ has become the focus of modern racist discourses: 
where ‘classical’ racist theories of the superiority and inferiority of ‘races’ are 
discredited, discourse has shifted to the compatibility of cultural groups and their 
ability to ‘fit in’.  A call for a critical rereading of ‘culture’, as the site of the most 
fraught area of this debate in the social sciences (Donald & Rattansi, 1992) must now 
be echoed within child psychotherapy: we lack a rigorous model for thinking about 
‘cultural difference’ and thus risk unconscious reproduction of prejudice in the 
clinical situation. 
 
Lowe (2014) attests to the absence of thinking about issues of race, culture, difference 
and diversity on psychotherapy trainings and the tendency, when it does take place, 
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for the teaching to take the form of one-off tokenistic events.  He views this to be a 
consequence of the extreme discomfort caused by the complexity of these issues: the 
internal and external dimensions involved; the difficult feelings and states of mind 
that they arouse, including the need to bear one’s own destructiveness and tolerate 
high levels of anxiety.  I argue that this difficulty in engaging with difference extends 
to clinical literature, particularly in the field of child psychotherapy, where 
discussions are both infrequent and rather ‘thin’.  This is in contrast to the social 
sciences, where in both sociology and cultural studies there is considerable debate on 
culture and ‘cultural difference’. There is thus a gap between the psychotherapy 
professions and the academy (Rustin, 2007) and begs the question: Could greater 
dialogue with the social sciences enrich the clinical thinking of child 
psychotherapists?  Those clinicians who do write about race, ethnicity and culture 
tend to conflate these terms and treat them as synonymous.  These are all contested 
terms, and I found ‘cultural difference’ to be a ‘slippery’ term, saturated with fantasy, 
and with much slippage occurring between the concepts of ‘culture’, ‘difference’ and 
‘racism’.  My working definition of ‘culture’, however, understands our cultural 
identities to be complex, multiple and fluid (Keval, 2016).  I keep the term ‘cultural 
difference’ in inverted commas in recognition of this fluidity, the slippery, mutable 
nature of this term, which appears to mean different things at different times.  
Through the lens of ‘intersectionality’, I understand that ‘culture’, ‘race’, racism, 
gender, social class and sexuality are among many axes of difference that form the 
multidimensionality of individual lives and are inextricably linked (Ahmed, 
Castañeda, Fortier & Sheller, 2003; Crenshaw, 1989; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; 
Marriott, 2007).  I explore how culture is defined in the social sciences in more detail 
below. 
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Through conducting the interviews, I was struck by how fascinating and powerful the 
emerging fantasies about working with ‘cultural difference’ were.  Psychotherapists 
are accomplished at thinking about the effect that projections from the patient have on 
their clinical thinking; however, strikingly little space is given to thinking about what 
projections might come from the therapist themselves – perhaps this stems from a 
fantasy that psychotherapists’ own ‘issues’ will have been dealt with in a training 
analysis and that the clinical setting would therefore be free of these (discussed by 
Berman, 2017).  Debates that dominated the 1950s concerning the nature of counter-
transference have been little employed in considering the experience of ‘cultural 
difference’ in the transference–counter-transference relationship (Bonovitz, 2005).  
This study finds ‘cultural difference’ to be a concept saturated in fantasy: I show how 
these fantasies enter the consulting room and therefore the people in it; the absence of 
attention given to this within the child psychotherapy profession is greatly 
concerning, not least as issues of ‘cultural difference’ become ever more explosive 
politically. 
 
Various research studies, including those that make use of qualitative methodologies, 
have examined the attitudes of therapists toward a number of things, such as religious 
belief, homosexuality, or specific pathologies, such as paedophilia or borderline 
personality disorder (Jahnke, Philipp & Hoyer, 2015; Hayes, Nelson & Fauth, 2015; 
Rosmarin, Green, Pirutinsky & McKay, 2014; Jobst, Hörtz, Birkhofer, Martius & 
Rentrop, 2010; Davids, 1970).  However, I have found no such studies within child 
psychotherapy and none that examine the fantasies held by therapists per se, or those 
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that look specifically at fantasies about ‘cultural difference’.  This topic is therefore 
under-researched in both the clinical literature and in empirical study.  
 
This project, through interviews with child psychotherapists and analysis of these 
using a psychosocial method, seeks to explore both what fantasies child 
psychotherapists might hold about working with ‘cultural difference’ and the 
implications of these for the therapy and patients.  Hayes’ et al (2015) study of 
therapists’ counter-transference feelings was able to link these to whether a treatment 
went on to be successful or unsuccessful.  Fanon (2008 [1952]) discusses the violence 
done to the other when those in power are able to insert the ‘imago’ they hold into the 
mind of the other: he particularly stresses the need for the analyst not to insert his own 
unconscious imagos into the mind of the patient.  There is thus an awful lot at stake 
for the child psychotherapy profession if those who are in a position of power – both 
holding the status of trained professionals with service users, and as adults with child 
patients – bring into the therapy their own unexplored fantasies about ‘cultural 
difference’.  Ultimately, this project also asks whether debates within the social 
sciences and cultural studies might help inform or enrich our clinical thinking.  Unless 
we come to theorize our work with ‘cultural difference’ in child psychotherapy, we 
risk reproducing colonial, racist stances in our work with our child patients. 
 
Culture and its Definitions 
This project seeks to examine therapists’ views on working with ‘cultural difference’.  
It therefore needs a definition of ‘culture’ and for this, explores how the term is used 
in psychoanalytic literature and seeks to draw from the area of Cultural Studies, 
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which itself forms a broad and diverse field (During, 2007; Hall, 2007) containing 
many different definitions of culture. 
 
Culture and Psychoanalysis 
Psychoanalytic writings about culture tend to focus on two areas: one is to collapse it 
into the concepts of race and ethnicity and to focus discussion on these instead.  The 
other is to consider ‘culture’ in terms of creativity, the individual’s engagement with 
the wider world and their self-expression through the arts. 
 
Drawing a distinction between ‘race’ and ‘culture’ is not straightforward as both are 
contested terms: Lewis (2000) goes further, arguing that it is difficult to separate 
issues of ‘race’ from those of gender and social class; I acknowledge the intersection 
of these axes of difference.  Morgan (2008), when writing about difference within the 
profession, chooses to focus on racial difference as it is so visible, whilst having no 
biological basis (Rustin, 1991).  The assumption here appears to be that racial 
differences are always visible, and probably refers primarily to skin colour.  Rustin 
asserts that racial differences are dependent on the definition given to them by the 
other.  Similarly, Lewis (2000) argues that categorizations of race are usually 
externally generated and that these tend to treat ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ as though social 
groups were self-evident and identity were static.  Moreover, she reminds us that 
classifications of ‘race’ have historically had areas of amnesia or forgetting and that, 
as such, those of Irish or Jewish descent have often been left out of professionals’ 
thinking.   
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Dalal (2002) goes further: he asserts that ‘race’ has no meaning outside of racism and 
that attempts to define the terms of the debate are thus immediately found wanting.  
Whilst I acknowledge that ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’ are not simple or neutral or 
satisfactory terms (Lewis, 2000), I wish to examine how ‘culture’ has been theorized 
in psychoanalytic writings and in the social sciences. 
 
There is a long history of psychoanalytic engagements with ‘culture’ in the sense of 
the arts, in terms of a psychoanalytic exploration of aspects of literature, theatre, art, 
film and aesthetics.  These debates continue apace and are well documented 
elsewhere (Segal, 1952; Bell, 1999) 
  
 
Culture and Cultural Studies 
Early theories in cultural studies draw on Marxism and discuss culture in terms of 
‘mass culture’ and the ‘culture industry’ (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997 [1947]): the 
early forms of cultural studies therefore have much to offer on art, art-forms, and the 
highly developed arts industries, which they discuss in relation to established forms of 
power.  Cultural studies in its contemporary form continues to discuss art and the arts 
industries, yet it also encompasses vast areas, such as postmodern and postcolonial 
theories, theories of globalisation, multiculturalism, feminism and a great many more 
besides. 
 
“Culture” in its everyday usage clearly encompasses something about race, ethnicity, 
language, heritage, social class; something about particular social groups and their 
practices, norms, and forms of art; Lewis (2007) describes it as a “profoundly 
congested concept” (p. 867).  The difficulty for this project is neither to define it so 
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narrowly as to make it synonymous with something else, such as ethnicity, nor to 
broaden the definition so far as to empty it of all real meaning.  Stuart Hall (2007) 
describes a parallel problem in cultural studies – the difficulties of neither opening, 
nor restricting, the field too far.  Dalal (2002) is more critical: he asserts that in 
broadening discussions of difference from ‘colour racism’ to include other forms of 
difference, we not only risk “dissolving it in a larger generalised sea” (p.2), but are 
motivated by our difficulties engaging with the subject of racism, which we thus seek 
to evade.  This is clearly a pertinent challenge to my task: the psychoanalytic 
literature on culture tends to conflate ‘culture’ with ‘race’.  Here, I am tasked with 
neither ignoring racial difference – as cautioned by Dalal, nor by collapsing the two 
terms into one and the same thing.  Lewis (2007) discusses the ordinary way in which 
‘culture’ becomes racialised in our discourses – and the racism that runs through this 
process – and also reminds us of the political aspects of the concept of ‘culture’, as it 
becomes the subject/object of normative political and social policy. 
 
Litowitz (2003) argues that Bourdieu offers psychoanalysts a framework for thinking 
about sociocultural context.  Bourdieu conceives of culture as being comprised of 
several key concepts: habitus, field, capital and doxa.  Bourdieu sees the individual as 
inhabiting many different “fields” simultaneously.  These fields might constitute 
private life, work, school, peer groups and so forth. Each field has its own “signifying 
practices” (During, 2007) or rules (Thomson, 2008): the individual might behave 
differently in different fields; his position might be static or changing.  The inter-
subjective processes or ‘games’ (Thomson, 2008) that take place within fields revolve 
around the accumulation of ‘capital’, which represents things of value and status for 
the individual: money, knowledge, affiliations and so on.  Field and capital intersect 
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with the concept of ‘habitus’.  This is loosely defined as our way of being: of 
thinking, feeling and acting (Maton, 2008); it incorporates our patterns of behaviour 
that might be unreflected, unconscious or taken for granted, our ‘way-of-being-in-the-
world’ (Litowitz, 2003).  Bourdieu terms the learning acquired through these ways of 
being ‘doxa’.  Doxa is a sort of “knowledge without concepts” (Krause, 2014, p.114); 
it is that which is “undiscussed and undisputed” (Bourdieu, 1977[1972], p.168), an 
inheritance of knowing ways of being and ways of doing. 
 
Bourdieu seems to offer a rich and complex definition of culture, yet one that might 
prove intuitive for the child psychotherapists, whose patients might move between 
their mother’s and father’s homes, their school, place of worship and social networks, 
as well as attending a clinic, and whose behaviours are influenced by internal and 
external factors.   In short, children inhabit a number of fields and might behave 
differently in each: child psychotherapists are accustomed to thinking about the many 
different areas of a child’s life and functioning (Parsons, Radford & Horne, 1999).  
Bourdieu’s thought about culture proves intuitive for psychotherapists in other ways, 
in that it takes in both conscious and unconscious aspects of cultural experience – 
both that which is known and that which is undiscussed, taken-for-granted, not 
thought about.  Moreover, the function of ‘capital’ within Bourdieu’s theory allows us 
space to think about what is valued by the individual in the many fields which he or 
she occupies.  I am thinking here of a teenager, for example, who might value, or seek 
status, from quite different things whether at home, at school, or communicating with 
peers through social media. 
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My question later in this project will be to consider whether use of concepts, such as 
Bourdieu’s, from the social sciences can enrich our clinical thinking about ‘cultural 
difference’ in child psychotherapy.  Through this research, I have found ‘cultural 
difference’ to be an ideologically-fuelled and fantasy-laden concept and, as such, 
prone to ‘slippage’ in that it carries different meanings at different times, particularly 
with ‘culture’, ‘difference’ and ‘racism’ fluidly shifting and slipping into one another: 
this is true both in the interviews in this project and in the literature more broadly.  
My understanding of a psychosocial methodology is that it brings together a theory of 
the internal world, from psychoanalysis, and of the external world, from the social 
sciences.  It thus involves a two-way exchange between the clinic and the academy.  
As such, I argue both that understandings from the social sciences, such as 
Bourdieu’s, can give child psychotherapists a theoretical framework in an area that 
has received too little attention.  However, an understanding of just how fantasy-laden 
and ‘slippery’ this concept is can help to conceptualise ‘cultural difference’ as a 
mutable term within the social sciences.   
 
Within the child psychotherapy profession, there is largely “silence” about the “noisy 
problem” of difference and asymmetric power relationships (Morgan, 2008), despite 
excellent recent publications in this area: Auestad (2015), Davids (2011), Keval 
(2016) and Lowe (2014) have greatly assisted me in trying to understand ‘cultural 
difference’; it is high time these became a mainstay of the syllabus in the child 
psychotherapy trainings.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
‘Working with Difference’ 
Within the broad area of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and child psychotherapy, 
there is increasing focus on issues of Equality and Diversity, as these gain more 
importance politically, notably in the Equality Act of 2010.  This act of parliament not 
only refocuses or reignites debate around issues of equality, but also has implications 
for employers: there is therefore a legal obligation to consider these issues for those 
therapists working within the NHS.  The Equality Act identifies areas of difference, 
where discrimination is illegal.  These include: race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, 
disability, age, marital status, pregnancy and parenthood and transsexuality (Equality 
Act, 2010). 
 
The literature on difference and diversity in mental health is more likely to focus on 
the following areas: race, gender, culture, social class and disability.  Debates around 
gender are so well documented that Gender Studies has found a place of its own in the 
social sciences and, within psychoanalysis, there are whole journals dedicated to the 
subject (Gender and Psychoanalysis; Studies in Gender and Sexuality).  Other areas, 
such as working with disability in psychotherapy, are considered ‘specialist’ work 
within the profession: the Association of Child Psychotherapists runs a “special 
interest group” for psychotherapists interested in this area of work.  There is a long 
history of child psychotherapy work with disabled children (Sinason, 1999), a small 
body of literature being built up in this area, and a relatively large amount written on 
particular conditions, such as autism (Alvarez, 1992; Tustin, 1981; Rhode & Klauber, 
2004), including child psychotherapy research in this area (Alvarez & Lee, 2009). 
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Where it comes to other kinds of ‘difference’, the literature tends to focus on race and 
ethnicity.  “Race and culture” are often terms that appear together and are used 
synonymously, to refer to, again, race and ethnicity.  Differences in social class also 
appear in these discussions of racial difference (Gibbs, 2009).  Within a wider body of 
literature, including psychotherapy with adults and other forms of mental health 
treatment, there are some discussions of the implications of social class difference 
(Altman, 2010; Layton, Hollander & Gutwill, 2006; Ryan, 2006, 2014) and how these 
can be addressed within adult psychotherapy (Samuels, 2006). 
 
‘Race and Culture’ 
Writings on race and culture in child psychotherapy are situated in a broader literature 
on psychoanalytic psychotherapy more generally (with adults) and in other mental 
health professions. In the wider mental health professions, there is a relatively long 
history of interest in transcultural issues: the journal Transcultural Psychiatry has 
been in print since the early 1960s and recently ran a special issue on child and 
adolescent psychiatry (November 2010).  Similarly, a dedicated journal The Journal 
of Multicultural Counselling & Development has been in print since the late 1980s.  
There is a significant body of literature on transcultural work in the psychiatry and 
counselling professions (Bhui & Bhugra, 2007; Cox, 1986; Fernando, 1995, 2009, 
2010; Palmer & Laugani, 1999; Pederson, Lonner, Draguns & Trimble, 2008) and in 
systemic family therapy (Mason & Sawyer, 2002).  The literature often focuses on 
some more specific aspects of the work, such as working with refugees (Blackwell, 
2005), working therapeutically through interpreters (Tribe & Raval, 2003), legal 
issues and the Mental Health Act (Bingley, 1995; Browne, 1995), incidence of illness 
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and epidemiology (Ramchandani, 2004) or specific intercultural therapy services 
(Thomas, 1995) to name a few.  Other writings explore mental health approaches or 
healing practices in other parts of the world and implications for training and 
supervision (Lago, 2006). 
 
The body of literature in the wider mental health professions seems to be growing, 
with a worldwide review of the state of counselling and therapy provision recently 
published (Moodley, Gielen & Wu, 2013).  Interest in ‘cultural difference’ has also 
grown in the field of family therapy, with the Journal of Family Therapy running a 
special issue on ‘cultural difference’ and cross-cultural issues, debated from a 
systemic point of view (2014).  Although the rapid growth of literature in this area in 
the last five years is an exciting development, it is striking how many articles appear 
in special issues, special supplements of journals or special editions, with the 
implication that this is somehow a ‘specialist’ subject, perhaps one that not all 
clinicians need consider or engage with.  This is beginning to change: the British 
Psychoanalytic Council (BPC) recently published a bibliography of suggested 
readings on psychoanalysis and race, extending to no fewer than 38 pages, on its 
website (British Psychoanalytic Council, 2015).  This was compiled by the BPC’s 
Ethnicity, Culture and Racism Task Group.  The existence of a ‘task group’ suggests 
that there is a task at hand: work to be done in order to engage with issues of 
difference and, arguably, that this task can be delegated to a select few.  The readings, 
however, are recommended to all professional members of the BPC. 
 
Working with racial and ‘cultural difference’ is now beginning to emerge as an area 
of discussion in its own right within adult psychoanalytic psychotherapy (Kareem & 
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Littlewood, 2000; Davids, 2011; Lowe, 2014) and child and adolescent psychotherapy 
(Andreou, 1999; Gibbs, 2009), but remains a small and recent body of literature. 
 
‘Race and Culture’ in Child Psychotherapy 
Within child psychotherapy, this literature focuses on racial difference in the 
consulting room and how the therapist might work with this.  Though the Association 
of Child Psychotherapists has its own journal (the Journal of Child Psychotherapy), I 
would understand most child psychotherapists to be accessing the literature of the 
psychotherapy professions more broadly: indeed, many child psychotherapists 
undertake additional trainings to work with couples, groups or individual adults 
(Rustin, 2000).  It strikes me, however, that there are features of working with 
‘cultural difference’ that are specific to the work of child psychotherapy: one perhaps 
being the complexity of working with two generations at once – with a young person 
and their parents – and the different experiences of culture that generations might 
have (Davids, 2016a).  There is the additional feature of the generational difference 
between the therapist and the child patient.  Moreover, Akhtar (1995) explores the 
complexities of cultural identity at different developmental stages.  He asserts that the 
experience of migration, or of the immigrant experience, depends on a whole host of 
factors, including a child’s age, the parental experience of migration and the parents’ 
ensuing psychic state; and the fantasy structures of the child according to their 
developmental age.  A young, pre-Oedipal child might depend largely on its mother’s 
psychic state in order to process the experience of migration, where an Oedipal child 
might build more specific fantasies about the parents’ prerogative to move the family.  
In adolescence, there is a psychic reworking of fantasy, of familial relations and this 
includes a reprocessing of cultural experience (a ‘second individuation’, following 
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Blos, 1967).  Akhtar argues that migration in adulthood (in the parents) represents a 
third ‘individuation’ insofar as it precipitates a state of psychic flux and a reworking 
of previous internal relationships, experiences and fantasies.  These represent just a 
few examples as to how working clinically with ‘cultural difference’ might have 
particular meanings or features when working with children and families: it should 
therefore be of particular interest to child psychotherapists.  However, it appears that 
the divide between the clinical literature and academic psychoanalysis is particularly 
wide in the field of child psychotherapy. 
 
Gibbs (2009) highlights a number of issues that should be addressed within child 
psychotherapy around working with racial or cultural differences.  She, like most 
other authors, tends to use ‘race’ and ‘culture’ as broadly interchangeable.  Gibbs 
writes about the need to bring ‘cultural difference’ into the consulting room: to 
discuss it openly with the patient, if it pertains to the patient’s material, but not to 
force a discussion of it at other times.  Bringing the difference out into the open 
allows for a better exploration of what belongs to the patient’s internal and external 
worlds.  Gibbs also writes about what the therapist needs to keep in mind: this 
includes the effect of the working with difference on the therapist, on the therapeutic 
relationship and on the patient.   
 
Gibbs (2009) stresses the need for therapists to examine their own racial and cultural 
understandings, prejudices and fantasies in their own analysis.  Morgan (2008) 
describes how subtle racist defences are: the guilt and shame aroused by racist 
thoughts will often keep these from emerging in the therapy, or they might be kept out 
of the mind altogether.  Gibbs writes that the better able the therapist is to confront 
 22 
their own prejudice in their own analysis, the more they are able to attend to the 
patient’s particular needs.  She also describes the professional doubts and anxieties 
that might be experienced by the therapist from a minority background.   
 
Gibbs (2009) emphasises the impact of ‘cultural difference’ on the therapeutic 
relationship: this might start from before the first meeting, as both therapist and client 
have an image of what they expect from the other (Bhugra & Bhui, 2006; Suman & 
Brignone, 2001), which might involve cultural stereotypes.  Difference can elicit very 
primitive anxieties and projections, which the therapist will need to work with 
(Andreou, 1999; Gibbs, 2009) and which can affect both the transference and counter-
transference.   
 
Gibbs’ exploration of working with ‘cultural differences’ in child psychotherapy 
strikes me as both the most subtle and the most thorough to date.  However, she does 
not elaborate on what the nature of images, fantasies or preconceptions might be: the 
form they take or role they play in the inner world.  She gives clinical examples of 
working with patients’ fantasies about the (racially different) therapist in child 
psychotherapy, but, other than stressing the need to explore one’s prejudices in a 
training analysis, she does not elaborate on what the consequences might be on the 
therapy if such fantasies are held by the therapist.    
 
Reference to the counter-transference is under-developed in Gibbs’ writings.  Ojumu 
(2012), similarly, alludes to the thoughts and feelings held by the therapist, but like 
Gibbs, emphasises the need for these to be “worked through” in the training analysis 
or in supervision in order that they should not “interfere” with the work (p.153).  In 
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none of the writings from the field of child psychotherapy are these thoughts explored 
further: in what way might the therapist’s own feelings ‘interfere’?  And what is the 
likelihood that these prejudices will indeed have been explored thoroughly in a 
training analysis?  Morgan (2008) makes her views plain here: most analysts will not 
have examined their own ‘internal racism’ (Davids, 2011) in their training analysis, 
nor will they seek to do so once a training analysis has ended.  Gibbs (2009) and 
Ojumu (2012) make explicit the possibility of preconceptions entering the counter-
transference, but place rather high hopes on the training analysis to ‘deal’ with this.   
 
What remains implicit in Gibbs’ and Ojumu’s accounts is a fantasy that, with 
prejudices ‘dealt with’ in training analysis, the child psychotherapist would be able to 
maintain some kind of neutral position.  This also implies a silent consensus, where 
the issue has also been ‘dealt with’ in the writings on the subject and the authors 
move on.  Levy-Warren (2014) highlights the therapist’s own ‘racial cultural self,’ 
and the deeply personal meanings attached to this, as a commonly overlooked factor 
in the work.  Levy-Warren makes explicit that she refers to counter-transference “in 
the 1951-Annie-Reich-sense” (p.134), in other words, the existing ideas, fantasies and 
feelings that the therapist brings into the consulting room with them.  Part of the 
confusion in writings about issues of difference in the transference–counter-
transference relationship is that different authors have rather different understandings 
(usually not made so explicit as in Levy-Warren’s writing) about what the counter-
transference is.  This goes back to the heated debates of the 1950s; I return to the 
implications of these differences later. 
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More attention is given to thoughts, fantasies and feelings about difference in the 
transference.  Both Ojumu (2012) and Gibbs (2009) stress the need to address these 
sensitively.  Ojumu stresses that in order to work ‘effectively’ with the client, the 
therapist must give thought to what preconceptions the child might hold about the 
therapist.  Bonovitz’ (2005) critique is helpful here.  He argues that the transference-
counter-transference relationship is co-constructed by both patient and therapist and 
that, in reality, it is impossible to assess where one ends and the other begins: in other 
words, he views the transference relationship as one relationship, not two separate 
phenomena.  Moreover, Bonovitz views the cultural elements of the transference-
counter-transference as an essential part of this relationship, not something to be 
“peeled away” or ‘dealt with’ in order to reach ‘deeper’, more important, layers 
beneath.  Bonovitz also argues that therapists operate from a cultural position, which 
they cannot transcend: this implicitly suggests a fantasy within the profession of a 
position of neutrality, which Auestad would dub, “the view from nowhere” (Auestad, 
2015, p. lxvii).  I discuss this further later. 
 
Authors discussing ‘cultural difference’ highlight the need not to ignore the reality of 
racist experiences in the patient’s external world, that is, not to focus solely on 
internal reality, or to view the internal world as more relevant to the work than the 
external (Andreou, 1999; Gibbs, 2009): this would both disregard the importance of 
the patient’s culture for his or her identity and ignores the impact of the therapist’s 
race or culture on the patient (Liggin & Kay, 2006).  However, the therapist needs to 
avoid moving to the other extreme, where focussing on racial material allows 
uncomfortable feelings to be ignored, or where the therapist colludes with the 
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patient’s fantasies about the world – this might be particularly a risk where therapist 
and patient share the same culture (Andreou, 1999). 
 
Gibbs (2009) discusses some technical difficulties with working cross-culturally, 
including losing the subtleties of meanings where either patient or therapist is 
working in a language not their mother tongue, including loss of non-verbal cues 
(Basch-Kahre, 1984); working in a second language has been discussed elsewhere 
(Jiménez, 2004).  The value of working with ‘cultural difference’ is also highlighted, 
such as the window onto the unconscious it might provide.  Again, however, Gibbs 
does not elaborate here: the positive aspects of working cross-culturally are under-
developed both in Gibbs’ arguments and elsewhere. 
 
‘Race and Culture’ in Psychoanalysis 
There is a bigger body of literature on ‘cultural difference’ within the field of 
psychoanalysis or psychotherapy more generally – as opposed to child psychotherapy 
specifically – and much of this work is very recent, having been published in the 
years that this project was underway.  Contemporary writings about difference tend, 
once again, to focus on racial differences and consider the power relations between 
black and white therapists within the profession and the effects of racial difference on 
our professional thinking. 
 
Difference within the Profession  
White Centre, Black Margins 
Morgan (2008), conceptualizes the psychoanalytic profession as being comprised by a 
‘core’ of white therapists, with black therapists existing at the margins.  This 
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configuration is useful for thinking about the processes of racism in a number of 
ways.  Firstly, Morgan raises the question of “Whose problem is it anyway?” and 
shows that, while the causes of the marginalization of black colleagues might lie at 
the white ‘centre’ of the profession, the problem is made to belong to those at the 
margins.  Morgan explores Dalal’s concept of “whiteness as an organising principle in 
the unconscious” (Dalal, 1998) and suggests that the whiteness at the centre of the 
profession becomes invisible and that only blackness at the margins can be seen.  This 
causes white therapists to feel ‘assailed’ from without and leads to great persecutory 
anxieties. 
 
The notion of the ‘invisibility’ of whiteness is closely related to Lewis’ (2000, 2007) 
argument that the majority become de-ethnicized: thus, whiteness is set up as a 
‘neutral’ category: “ the universal ‘human’ category” (Lewis, 2007, p.874).  She 
argues: 
“First, that racializing culture is ordinary and saturates the everyday in 
multiple and complex ways.  Second, that despite constructing asymmetrical 
power relations, in a racially ordered social formation, we are all racialized 
and implicated in the dynamics of racializing culture. Third, that ‘whiteness’ 
should be seen as a constructed category of belonging and social position, and 
that it needs to be ‘outed’ and dislodged as a position of dominance.” (p.884) 
 
Likewise, Auestad (2015) argues that prejudices are largely unconscious to the 
majority population, who come to define ‘normal’, while others are forced to own all 
the consequences of ‘difference’: 
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“There is a sense in which there is systematically unequal distribution of 
subjectivity itself, in that socially marginal positions are denied a space for 
articulation, and also in being forced to hyper-reflectivity about qualities a 
majority member is free to unconsciously neglect… A central point here has 
been to indicate how what is taken to be an attitude of ‘neutrality’ may 
reproduce, or finalise, an already existing violence, and how, tragically the 
ability to spot such processes is limited in all of us” (p.14) 
 
Auestad argues the absolute impossibility of taking up a ‘neutral’ position from which 
to address prejudice (the ‘view from nowhere’) and that attempts to take up such a 
position lend themselves to the reproduction of social violence.  I examine the 
concept of ‘neutrality’ later, but consider Lewis’ and Auestad’s arguments that 
whiteness comes to stand for neutrality a crucial point that must be borne in mind 
throughout this discussion of the literature. 
 
Colour Blindness 
Morgan (2008) explores the ‘silence’ in the profession about the ‘noisy problem’ of 
asymmetrical power relationships between black and white – in particular, about the 
lack of diversity within the profession.  She argues that failure to see or recognise 
difference – ‘colour blindness’ – serves a number of purposes for white members of 
the profession and leads to a number of consequences. 
 
Firstly, it allows white members of the profession to avoid the shame involved in 
acknowledging any racist thought, fantasy or feeling; it also allows them to maintain 
the status quo (Lowe, 2006).    
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Secondly, ‘colour blindness’ creates a number of problems.  For black members of the 
profession, it requires them to deny their blackness and any important aspects of their 
experience associated with this.  For the profession more widely, or for the “white 
psyche” (Morgan, 2008, p. 35), it causes an emotional and intellectual 
impoverishment of the mind  - a deadening of creative thinking. 
 
Millar (2014) criticises the binary nature of the discourse around racial difference in 
psychoanalytic writings: the focus on ‘black’ and ‘white’ ignores the complex 
experience of being mixed race, both for the therapist and the patient, and the many 
meanings this might have.  The complexity of the cultural experience of being mixed 
race is explored in detail: Millar explores this for the therapist and child patient, while 
Lewis (2009, 2012) reflects upon the many cultural experiences of family life.   
 
Theorizing discrimination 
Psychoanalytic authors theorise the processes of exclusion, either in the individual 
therapist, the professional group or in society more broadly (Dalal, 2006, 2008, 2011).  
Dalal emphasises the need not to lose sight of the power relations involved in forming 
and maintaining social groups and to remember that these are always active in an 
engagement between Self and Other and in shaping cultural practices.   Dalal (2011) 
sees tolerance as an uncomfortable process: an ongoing state of discomfort due to 
something that disturbs one’s own equilibrium.  He argues that a meaningful 
encounter with otherness is terrifying, as it opens the individual up to the possibility 
of having to change – this carries with it the potential for hopeful gain or profound 
loss.  One potential gain is the possibility of seeing what is taken for granted, or 
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otherwise invisible, to the self.  Dalal’s work is helpful in reminding psychotherapists 
not to overlook the social and political dimensions of inequality: to keep power 
relations in mind.  However, his work has also been criticised (Davids, 2003, 2011) as 
offering too thin an argument as to how racism or discrimination operate in the inner 
world of the individual.  Dalal (2006, 2011) skips over this, arguing that 
psychoanalysis can only offer an explanation about the individual, where his interests 
lie more in the processes taking place in society.  He goes further, asserting that 
theorizing discrimination in terms of the individual, or of the internal world, prevents 
us from engaging with the social phenomenon of racism (Dalal, 2002).  Auestad 
(2015) makes a related point, that psychoanalytic accounts fail to see that prejudice is 
founded on a “silent social consensus” (p.1) and fail to grasp the reality of social 
violence: she therefore argues that psychoanalysis could usefully be enriched by 
critical social studies. Auestad also argues, however, that psychoanalysis is uniquely 
placed in offering the social sciences an understanding of the unconscious processes 
involved in prejudice.  She makes a strong and convincing argument of the need for a 
psychosocial approach to understanding prejudice: the need to draw on 
understandings of both the internal and social features of prejudice.  This argument is 
in fact prefigured in Dalal’s writings (2002), arguing as he does for a complex 
approach, that is neither purely psychological, nor purely sociological, yet he appears 
to contradict this with assertions that a focus on internal mechanisms detracts from 
our grasping social realities.  At any rate, the sort of complex approach he advocates 
is better offered in Auestad’s work.  Dalal’s use of psychoanalysis is also primarily 
theoretical, exploring the contributions of key psychoanalytic theorists.  Davids 
(2003) offers a critique here, emphasising the need for psychoanalysis to offer a 
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theory rooted in clinical practice, and not in over-arching social theory.  He does just 
this in his 2011 book Internal Racism, discussed below. 
 
Morgan (2008) considers the defences involved in professional thinking, arguing that, 
in examining the issues of racial exclusion frankly, therapists open themselves up not 
just to shame, but also guilt, envy, denial, defiance and the fears of exposing oneself, 
or saying something unforgiveable.  The “silence” in the profession therefore serves 
to defend against a number of intolerable feelings.  Davids (2014) also finds this 
silence striking.  He contrasts how much has been written on certain forms of 
difference – such as the gender differences and generational differences of the 
Oedipus complex – with how little has been written on race, culture and social class, 
in particular.  Several authors discuss the painful feelings that need to be avoided or 
defended against, in evading issues of difference: Auestad (2015) emphasises the 
transfer of shame and guilt onto others, whilst Keval (2016) frames the discussion in 
terms of a failure to tolerate anxiety, loss and mourning. 
 
Morgan (2008) turns to Bion to conceptualise the processes of racial exclusion.  She 
argues that his concepts of K and –K (Bion, 1962) are particularly helpful here: K is 
involved in getting to know somebody in an emotional sense and –K represents the 
drive to remain actively in ignorance.  Lowe (2014), too, turns to Bion in his 
foundation of a ‘Thinking Space’ in which differences of experience and opinion are 
understood to be a necessary part of conversation, and of thinking together, and in 
which the ‘different other’ can safely come to be known, in Bion’s sense.  Lowe 
emphasises the need for containment in the group for this process to take place 
successfully.   
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Internal Racism 
Davids (2011) argues a strong case for a better psychoanalytic understanding of 
racism.  He offers a theory of “internal racism”, which he believes to be a normal and 
universal feature of the mind.  Unwanted parts of the self are split off and projected 
into the other (the ‘racial other’); the self is then felt to be free of these hated aspects 
and the other is felt to contain them.  Davids’ theory is distinguished from other 
theories of splitting and projection because he goes a step further: a defensive 
organisation in the mind, an ‘internal template’, is then set up to govern the 
relationship between this unburdened self and the other, now containing the hated 
aspects.  Davids states that this defensive organisation is set up to govern 
unmanageable and overwhelming anxiety.  The defensive organisation is threatened 
and the anxiety provoked anew should the other ever step out of their prescribed role 
and be seen, even momentarily, as ordinary; it is crucial that the other always be seen 
as different.  Davids’ theory strikes me as the most original development in the 
psychoanalytic literature to date: he reached this point both by an extensive review of 
literature and through detailed clinical case examples, including thoughtful analysis of 
his counter-transference.  Davids’ presents two clinical cases, described at length, 
such that the reader might evaluate his analysis of the material; he also incorporates 
short vignettes from his personal life, which are helpful in highlighting his points, but 
otherwise serve as anecdotal evidence.  Davids’ ideas are borne out by my own 
findings in this project – though these were reached independently – and his 
description of an internal racist defensive organisation is helpful in thinking about 
these, as I argue later. 
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Universalism and Relativism in Psychoanalytic Theory 
Some debate within contemporary psychoanalytic writings concerns whether 
psychoanalytic theory is universal, and can be applied to all, or whether there needs to 
be room for cultural relativism, adapting theory accordingly. 
 
Lowe (2014) writes that the profession easily dismisses issues of cultural and racial 
differences as irrelevant as they are ‘political’ and therefore ‘external’, where 
psychoanalysis should concern itself purely with the internal world.  Lowe argues that 
this is a fallacy as it assumes that there is no relation between the internal and external 
worlds; he goes further, arguing that issues of race, culture, class, sexuality and so 
forth are in fact “vibrant” aspects of the internal world, affecting feeling, fantasy, 
identity and relationships (Lowe, 2014).  He argues that this position within the 
profession is a defence against having to live with the realities of race and class and 
all that these imply.  Lowe’s arguments are convincing and, moreover, are consistent 
with debates from within the social sciences: these argue against universalism in 
psychoanalysis on the basis of differences of gender, sexuality and social class, as 
well as race and culture (Seu & Heenan, 1998). 
 
Morgan (2008) argues that psychoanalytic theory is indeed universal and robust 
enough to open itself to debate and criticism.  She asserts that it can withstand both 
external attack and internal angst.  Morgan goes further, arguing that it is anxieties 
about being racist that lead analysts to abandon their analytic frame inappropriately 
and that good clinical practice is eroded as a result.  Unless I misunderstand her 
meaning here, Morgan appears to have fallen into the trap that she herself warns 
against: that in theorizing racism, one can unwittingly reinforce it (Kovel, 1988).  
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Morgan herself asserts that she believes that psychoanalytic theory does attempt to 
put forward a universalist position; Auestad (2015) goes further, calling it a ‘master 
discourse’.  Both Morgan and Auestad imagine that, if marginal voices were more 
heard, psychoanalytic theory and discourse would be changed, yet enriched: in other 
words, a change for the better.  However, Dalal (2011) highlights the profound loss 
and terror involved in facing change.  Krause (2014) debates the extraordinarily 
strong pull of the universalist-relativist debate – the constant tug towards taking up 
one or other position, rather than maintaining the tension between the two.  Perhaps it 
is this that led Morgan to make an assertion that appears otherwise at odds with her 
writings.  I believe that these authors are trying to grapple with a fantasy that, were 
psychoanalytic theory to become more engaged with discourses about difference, 
clinical practice would become diluted, eroded, polluted: it is this that leads authors to 
reassert the primacy of clinical boundaries and the psychoanalytic frame. 
 
Binary Thinking and Third Positions 
Krause (2014) explores the tension between universalist and relativist positions.  She 
holds that both positions can be equally discriminatory: universalism obliterates 
difference, while relativism exempts the majority from having to engage with 
difference.  Krause argues that there is a constant pull, when theorizing, toward one 
position or the other: either we are all fundamentally the same or we are all 
fundamentally different.  The universalist-relativist debate causes complexity and 
tension from which there is no escape.  Dalal (2009) makes a similar point: people are 
not just either similar or different, they are both similar and different at the same time, 
all the time.  Hoggett (1989) writes about our difficulties in tolerating tensions in our 
understanding of things: bearing the disappointment that our understanding can only 
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ever be ‘good enough’ and the depressive anxieties aroused by ‘letting go’ when we 
loosen our ‘grip’ on understandings that do not conform to hoped-for clear-cut truths.  
There is a lot involved in tolerating both ‘not knowing’ and the tensions caused by 
complex realities. 
 
Krause’s solution is to suggest a ‘third’ position, in which one takes up neither a 
universalist, nor a relativist position, but from which one is able to keep the 
complexity of the two in mind, bear the tension this causes, and thereby stay with 
thinking and making links.  Her argument is that it is extremely difficult to ‘stay with’ 
this thinking and particularly to reflect upon the links between internal processes and 
social contexts.  In suggesting a third position, Krause references Britton (1989), for 
whom the oedipal triangle and particularly the opportunities both to be an observer of 
a relationship and be observed in return, create an internal (triangular) space in which 
thinking is possible.  Krause suggests two other theorists, namely Winnicott and 
Bourdieu, whose work she sees as complementary and whose theories can help us 
hold on to a ‘third position’: here, she is particularly referring to Winnicott’s (1971) 
understanding of culture being located in transitional space and transitional 
phenomena and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus.  For Krause, these offer more detailed 
thinking on the internal (Winnicott) and social (Bourdieu) dimensions of culture and 
can assist our clinical thinking insofar as they help us resist the pressure of the either-
or, binary thinking involved in relativism or universalism. 
 
I broadly agree both with Krause’s argument and her choice of theorists to inform this 
debate.  However, a useful caution comes from Auestad (2015), that a ‘third position’ 
is not a ‘view from nowhere’.  Auestad’s writings are also concerned with the pull of 
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either-or binary thinking and the need to find an alternative position.  Though Auestad 
draws on different thinkers, and writes from a different perspective (namely, giving a 
philosophical argument, rather than theory informed by clinical work), there are many 
similarities between Auestad’s arguments and Krause’s.  Auestad, however, goes into 
more detail here: a third position cannot be a view from nowhere, for this pulls us into 
a fantasy about a neutral position from which to take up reflections either on this 
debate or in clinical psychotherapy.  Auestad argues that there is frequently a wish to 
take up such a position in psychoanalysis; she criticises this both as an impossibility 
and as ultimately contributing to violence, that is to the very phenomena it wishes to 
theorize and avoid. 
“A seemingly “neutral” third-person perspective easily lends itself to support 
for violence perpetuated by a majority towards a minority representative in a 
way that is habitual, unspoken and unthought.  This contention is linked with 
the point that the relevant area of investigation is not just verbal or physical 
attacks or harassment, what would strike an observer as more than the 
average, as abhorrent, but also the ordinary, implicit, habitual, traditional 
and often unconscious, which most often does not come into view at all.” 
(Auestad, 2015, p.xxiv). 
Auestad’s arguments are philosophically coherent and particularly helpful in 
understanding the findings from my interview data, as I argue later.  
 
 Kovel (1988) and Brooks (2014) both issue similar warnings: Kovel asserts that the 
psychology of racism is itself created by racism and, in theorizing it, we risk 
reinforcing racism.  For Brooks, when we think about racism, there is a risk that we 
might not be thinking at all: the creation of theories about racism can easily become a 
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defensive means of avoiding and evading thoughtful engagement with the concepts of 
race and culture, allowing us to protect our own ways of thinking and being.  For 
Auestad, the either-or binary thinking that impoverishes the debates on prejudice and 
difference within psychoanalysis is one of subject and object: too much emphasis is 
placed on the subject and not enough on the subject-as-object.  The subject-as-object 
is both subject and object simultaneously: the subject-as-object is the recipient of 
projections from the social world and these shape the subject’s attention to, and 
discovery of, the object. 
 
Auestad (2015) turns to Hannah Arendt (1958) in order to offer an alternative to 
binary thinking.  Arendt’s perspectivism emphasises a plurality of perspectives, the 
multiplicity of experience, including the multiple identities of the individual.  For 
Auestad, Arendt’s perspectivism is about making room for others and for many points 
of view.  The ‘space’ it offers is the ‘in-between’, unique and precious, that can exist 
between the self and others.  This in-between is, in her terms, not so much for thought 
(as in Krause’s and Britton’s work) as it is for the creation of meaning. 
 
The consequence of using Arendt’s perspectivism and its emphasis on plurality or 
multiplicity is a ‘messiness’ to theory.  In trying to ‘tidy up’ theory, we lose 
something.  Sinason (1989, 1992) draws our attention to attempts to ‘tidy up’ 
language with euphemism when debating areas of life that are particularly difficult, 
painful or arouse political and social fears.  Inclusion of Arendt’s ideas, then, requires 
an ability to tolerate theory that does not provide answers or clear-cut ways of 
understanding. 
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Implications for Clinical Practice 
Morgan (2008) takes up the concept of “internal racism” (Davids, 2011) and argues 
that this has implications for both training and practice.  In terms of training, she 
argues that most analysts will not have examined internal racism in their training 
analyses and that it therefore remains an unknown area of mental life.  It is also 
unlikely that professionals will seek to explore this once a training analysis has ended. 
 
Morgan (2008) argues that black trainee therapists are likely to have much more 
knowledge of race and racism than their white analysts or white supervisors.  This 
puts the patient or student in the position of knowing more than the clinician or 
teacher.   If these positions are not addressed, then the ‘problem’ becomes that of the 
trainee, who must hold all the difficulties of their experience.  If the supervisor or 
analyst is particularly invested in remaining in the position of ‘knowing’, there is a 
risk of a destructive process taking place.  For true learning, supervisors and analysts 
must recognise their own not knowing their internal racism; however, this is very 
difficult because of the need to maintain an idea of a benign self.  Where this is not 
possible, ignorance and incompetence must be projected into the trainee, thus 
reinforcing the dynamics of internal racism itself. 
 
Lowe (2014) makes a compelling argument for on-going, regular spaces in which 
members of the psychoanalytic (and other) professions can think about ‘cultural 
differences’ – and other forms of difference.  He argues that, despite the increasing 
amount of space given to thinking about difference on psychoanalytic trainings, these 
events tend to stand alone: a tokenistic gesture is not the point.  Lowe, like Morgan 
(2008), turns to Bion in thinking about difference – this time with respect to learning.  
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Lowe founded the Thinking Space at the Tavistock Clinic, a regular multidisciplinary 
meeting for considering a broad variety of issues around difference.  His idea was to 
use Bion’s concept of containment in order to create a space safe enough in which to 
explore these issues: the aim is for the learning in these meetings to stay true to 
Bion’s concept of K, that is, not as an abstract intellectual activity, but a genuine 
knowing of self and other – getting to know “the self and the different other” (Lowe, 
2014, p.5). 
 
‘Neutrality’ 
The idea of the analyst’s ‘neutrality’ crops up again and again in writings about race, 
culture and difference in psychotherapy (Auestad, 2015).  Auestad critically dubs this 
the desire to take up a ‘view from nowhere’.  Ideas, or fantasies, about neutrality have 
a long history in psychoanalysis and are also closely linked to how the concept of 
counter-transference is theorized.  Crucially, as I have argued before, neutrality 
becomes synonymous with whiteness (Lewis, 2000, 2007): the inability to recognise 
whiteness as a racialised category means that the very concept of ‘neutrality’ becomes 
complicit with the perpetuation of racism (Auestad, 2015). 
 
The idea of the analyst’s being ‘neutral’ or maintaining a neutral stance can be traced 
all the way back to the writings of Freud.  Freud describes the state of mind that the 
clinician must maintain as “evenly suspended attention”, (1912, p.111), which he 
defines as “not directing one's notice to anything in particular” (1912, p.111).  The 
reason he gives for this is that in being drawn to focus on a particular aspect of the 
patient’s material, the analyst risks missing other communications and thus allowing 
his own expectations or inclinations to shape the patient’s material, thereby 
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“falsifying” it.  He describes keeping “an open mind, free from any presuppositions” 
(1912, p.114).  In these early writings, Freud advises an “emotional coldness” (1912, 
p. 115), like that of a surgeon, who puts aside all his feelings, including his ‘human 
sympathy’, in order to perform his work.  Freud’s argument here is that this coldness 
will protect the analyst’s own emotional life from the resistances of the patient and 
will provide the patient with the best course of treatment.  Moreover, the analyst must 
also be capable of listening with his own unconscious to the unconscious material of 
the patient.   He must therefore be able to listen to his unconscious whilst listening to 
the patient, and avoiding any resistances this might cause within himself: failure to do 
so would distort the patient’s material.  Freud therefore emphasizes the importance of 
the analyst’s having first submitted to his own psychoanalysis, in order that he might 
be well aware of the sorts of conflicts that arise in relation to his own unconscious 
material.  This is put into very stark terms:  “It may be insisted, rather, that he should 
have undergone a psycho-analytic purification” (1912, p.116).  The word 
“purification” here seems particularly strong, as though one could become rid of, or at 
least familiar with, all of one’s unconscious conflict.  
 
Freud warns against any self-disclosure on the part of the therapist, arguing that this 
only increases the patient’s difficulty in uncovering his unconscious and overcoming 
his resistances.  Freud’s recommendation is that the analyst maintain anonymity: 
“The doctor should be opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should show them 
nothing but what is shown to him.” (1912, p.118).  Interestingly, Freud here digresses 
to say that, in practice, many analysts might stray from this technique and use 
suggestive methods successfully, and especially in particular circumstances, such as 
when working in institutions.  However, this is not to be regarded as ‘true’ technique:  
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“But one has a right to insist that he himself should be in no doubt about what he is 
doing and should know that his method is not that of true psycho-analysis.”  (1912, 
p.118).  This would take us into the debates around what counts as ‘proper’ analysis 
and what is seen as “applied” work (Blackwell, 2005). 
 
The term “neutrality” appears only once: 
“In my opinion, therefore, we ought not to give up the neutrality towards the 
patient, which we have acquired through keeping the counter-transference in 
check.” (Freud, 1915, p.164) 
This term, however, is Strachey’s translation, since the term Freud uses is 
“Indifferenz”.  He quickly goes on to say that the analyst must practice “abstinence” 
in the treatment.  Here, he is discussing quite specifically the circumstance of an 
erotic transference from patient to analyst and warns against both returning the 
patient’s feelings and avoiding them: the transference is to be treated as such and 
worked through. 
 
Though Freud did not use the term “neutrality” in his own writings, it seems from the 
above that he gives a lot of indications as to what the stance of the analyst in relation 
to the patient ought to be.  Several authors assert that Freud had little to say on the 
matter and that it was Anna Freud (1993 [1936]), who first ‘defined’ neutrality 
(Goldstein & Goldberg, 2004; Greenberg, 1991; Spector Person, Hagelin, & Fonagy, 
1993).  However, Anna Freud does not in fact use the terms ‘neutral’ or ‘neutrality’.  
She describes the stance of the analyst thus: 
“He directs his attention equally and objectively to the unconscious elements 
in all three institutions.  To put it another way, when he sets about the work of 
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enlightenment, he takes his stand at a point equidistant from the id, the ego 
and the superego”  (Anna Freud, 1993 [1936], p.28). 
 
Anna Freud goes on to argue that analysts ought not to privilege unconscious material 
at the expense of looking at other parts of the mind: in particular, she draws attention 
to the functioning of the ego and the defence mechanisms it employs.  Though 
“neutrality” here is my term, not Freud’s or Anna Freud’s, both describe a ‘pure’ or 
‘objective’ stance.   
 
Khanna (2003) draws attention to the colonial, Enlightenment context for Freud’s 
views and his attitude to science and the scientific and how poorly these treat ‘other’ 
peoples.  Layton (2012) reminds us that both analyst and patient are placed in 
particular social contexts; she argues that the disavowal of this, or the attempt to 
separate psyche and the social, as she puts it, contribute to “perverse pacts” in the 
analysis (p.62).  By this she means, missed opportunities and periods of stuckness in 
the analysis, with which the analyst colludes. 
 
Ideas about a pure, objective or ‘neutral’ stance in psychoanalysis persist, however.  
Other authors also describe the analyst’s stance: Bion (1967), describes the state of 
mind needed for undertaking clinical work as avoiding both “memory and desire”.  
He emphasises to the reader that the crux of psychoanalytic work is to attend to what 
is happening in the session now – to work in the here and now.  References to past 
sessions or hopes for future ones interfere with the analyst’s ability to attend to any 
moment-by-moment evolution in the session.  He describes the state of mind the 
analyst must achieve in order to carry out clinical work: he must have had a thorough 
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analysis and must “discipline his thoughts” (p.244).  He adds:  “Every session 
attended by the psychoanalyst must have no history and no future.  What is `known’ 
about the patient is of no further consequence: it is either false or irrelevant.” 
(p.244).  Though Bion does not refer here to the social or cultural contexts of patient 
and analyst, it is hard to see what room there could possibly be for these in Bion’s 
model.  Mitrani (2011), in her discussion of Bion’s (1967) Notes on Memory and 
Desire, however, emphasises the importance of tolerating ‘not knowing’ in order to 
be able to hold this state of mind in practice.  Accepting what one does not know has 
been stressed elsewhere (Gibbs, 2009) as an important feature of working with 
difference. 
 
Mitrani (2011), in her discussion of Bion, also draws direct parallels to the interaction 
between mother and infant, where the mother/analyst contains the unprocessed or 
unbearable feelings of the infant/patient.  She argues that Bion’s model of working 
without memory or desire best equips the analyst to receive these feelings (beta-
elements) and contain them accordingly.  This maternal metaphor is also employed in 
Winnicott’s model (Slochower, 1996), where the analyst must be attuned and 
receptive to the patient in order to provide a maternal ‘holding’ function.   
 
Raphael-Leff (2010) provides a feminist critique to these models of psychoanalytic 
theorizing, whereby the mother-infant relationship is taken as a model for the 
psychoanalytic setting.  She argues that heterogeneity is missing from psychoanalytic 
theory: particularly, where ordinary maternal negativity is missing from theory, it 
allows the mother-infant relationship to be idealised; where this forms the basis for 
theorizing the clinical situation, it provides a distortion, allowing the analyst to be 
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seen as a blank screen.  Raphael-Leff argues that Freud, Bion and Winnicott all fall 
into this trap, despite Winnicott’s having given thought to ordinary maternal hatred 
(Winnicott, 1947).   
 
I cite Raphael-Leff’s critique as I believe her point about the over-valuation of the 
maternal model in psychoanalytic thought to be an important one.  Feminist theory 
has also been particularly helpful in reminding the profession of the social and 
political situatedness of therapist and patient (Brown, 1994).  I do not intend to 
explore feminist critiques in more detail, however, simply as this represents such an 
enormous body of literature and an area of study in its own right (Heenan & Seu, 
1998). 
 
Many authors argue that analytic neutrality is, in fact, impossible to achieve 
(Goldstein & Goldberg, 2004; Greenberg, 1991; Renik, 1995, 1996), but that it is still 
seen as an ideal to strive for (Goldstein & Goldberg, 2004).  Arguments against 
neutrality are not new: Balint & Balint argued in 1939 that the analyst must in fact 
impact on process in countless different ways.  Renik (1996) argues that attempts at 
neutrality are actually counter-productive, or counter-therapeutic, as they render the 
analyst too inactive in circumstances where interpretation would have been helpful to 
the patient. 
 
Goldstein and Goldberg (2004) go so far as to state that neutrality is “uniformly” 
viewed as impossible to achieve.  Eickhoff (1993) calls it a “utopian ideal” (p.40).   If 
this were so, it is curious that it is still so widely seen as an ideal to strive for 
(Goldstein & Goldberg, 2004).  Perhaps one difficulty here is that some authors pit 
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‘classical’ psychoanalytic neutrality against other ‘dynamically oriented’ or 
‘relational’ models of psychotherapy, where self-disclosure from the analyst is seen as 
helpful.   
 
Goldstein and Goldberg (2004) rather sit on the fence here, presenting two very 
different approaches and concluding that different treatment modalities are helpful to 
different kinds of patient.  However, underpinning this is the idea that to accept a non-
neutral stance, therapists become involved in self-disclosing and that this represents a 
different ‘modality’ of therapy.  Renik (1996) makes this complaint: that to present a 
non-neutral, subjective concept of the analyst brings on accusations that the treatment 
in question is not analysis, but ‘counselling’.  Renik makes the case for a boundaried 
analyst, but one who nevertheless understands themselves as making use of a non-
neutral, subjective self in the process of the analysis.  Greenberg (1991), also tries to 
find a middle ground.  Where Renik rejects the concept of neutrality, Greenberg states 
that the concept of neutrality is still useful: he argues that there is a helpful stance for 
the analyst to adopt, which he calls “impartial”.  In his view, the analyst is non-neutral 
and does participate in the process of psychoanalysis, but maintains enough 
‘impartiality’ in order to make room for both a negative and a positive transference 
from the patient. 
 
Given that these more balanced views, where ‘real’ psychoanalysis can be done by 
non-neutral subjective analysts, who nonetheless do have some kind of clinical 
‘stance’, are not new, it is striking that ideas of classical ‘neutrality’ persist in the 
literature, or that these continue to be placed in a false dichotomy with other therapy 
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modalities, which focus less on transference and more on the maintenance of a 
positive working alliance. 
 
Counter-transference 
I believe that one reason why the fantasy of the neutral analyst persists despite 
widespread acceptance of the cultural and social positioning of the therapist is that an 
idea of ‘neutrality’ is so closely tied to the concept of counter-transference. 
 
Discussions of counter-transference characterize theories as ‘classical’ or ‘totalistic’ 
(Kernberg, 1975; Lanyado 1989).  Briefly, theories are seen as either understanding 
counter-transference to refer to the analyst’s own feelings, which might interfere with 
the patient’s treatment if not kept in check, or the totality of feelings experienced by 
the analyst, which principally emanate from the patient and serve as a crucial tool for 
understanding the patient and the process of therapy. The latter view is largely 
attributed to Heimann (1950).  Holmes (2014) argues that this characterization of the 
debates is in fact an over-simplification and that there is evidence from Freud’s 
correspondence that he was coming to see counter-transference as an essential 
component of the analytic process.  The nature of counter-transference was hotly 
contested through the 1950s, with authors forming groups around Paula Heimann’s 
(1950) ‘totalistic’ and Annie Reich’s (1951) ‘classical’ positions. 
 
An enormous amount has been written on the nature of counter-transference; I raise it 
here because it has such a close tie to an idea of neutrality.  There is much confusion 
here: criticism of the notion of a ‘total’ counter-transference includes the worry that 
the analyst would be shifted from a neutral position, allowing the personality of the 
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analyst to interfere in the treatment (Lanyado, 1989).  However, proponents of the 
‘classical’ view use the concept of counter-transference as ‘that which the analyst 
brings with them’ to argue that neutrality is a myth, tied up with a fantasy of a 
‘perfect’ analyst (Reich, 1951). 
 
Bonovitz (2005) does not hold with such a clear cut distinction: he argues that 
counter-transference is the totality of feelings and impressions held by the analyst, 
including the analyst’s own internal conflicts and real relationship to the patient.  It 
seems that there is some agreement here in explicitly acknowledging that one’s 
cultural situatedness and all that this carries with it forms part of the counter-
transference – and, moreover, that this view can be held on both sides of the 
classical/totalistic debate.  More specifically, Bonovitz argues that the counter-
transference in child psychotherapy is different to that in adult psychotherapy in so far 
as it often reawakens childhood memories in the analyst.  Bonovitz also emphasises 
the sensory aspects of working with children – more noise, more smells, use of the 
body in play, use of all senses in art works and in handling toys – in short, the 
physicality and sensory nature of the work arouses further memories and sense 
impressions in the therapist.  Lewis (2012, 2009) explores the importance of the 
sensory world in transmitting cultural experience in childhood and between 
generations.  Bonovitz argues that work with children presents the analyst with rich 
opportunities for engaging with childhood through memories.  Following Lewis, 
however, I would take Bonovitz’ argument further and suggest that it also affords 
plenty of opportunities for engaging, or re-engaging, with our own cultural 
experiences. 
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Authors exploring issues of ‘cultural difference’ specifically are well aware of its 
impact on the transference-counter-transference relationship.  Akhtar (2006) and 
Eleftheriadou (2010) assert that the relationship is highly charged with racial, cultural 
and historical dynamics from the outset. A claim to cultural neutrality on the 
therapist’s part then robs the analytic couple of abilities to make cultural connections, 
positive or negative, and robs the patient of the ability to make speculations or 
observations of the therapist (Thomas, 1995): it thus impoverishes the thinking that 
can take place. 
 
Unconscious Fantasies 
Gibbs (2009) and Krause (1998), writing about child- and adult psychotherapy 
respectively, highlight the importance of the therapist’s awareness of and examination 
of his or her own unconscious fantasies, assumptions and prejudices about ‘cultural 
difference’.  Perhaps the fullest exploration of the unconscious processes present in 
cultural phenomena, race relations and, in particular, racism is offered by Fanon 
(2008 [1952]). 
 
Fanon’s (2008 [1952]) key argument is that the white man holds an ‘imago’ of the 
black man and vice versa.  These imagos are born of the collective unconscious – 
inherited from the cultural and political structures of society.  Therefore, when the 
black man and white man meet, they do so with inherited unconscious cultural 
preconceptions of the other.  The white man considers himself superior; the black 
meets in the white man not just the ‘other’, but the master.  For both, whiteness is 
associated with civilization, ‘culture’ in the sense of high culture, goodness, purity, 
virtue.  Blackness is associated with ugliness, ignorance, simplicity, virility, sin.  Both 
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the white man and the black man are equally ‘enslaved’ by these rigid positions that 
they take up.  There is therefore an internal process of identification with these 
positions of superiority and inferiority.  The creation of these positions is two-fold: 
both economic – the reality of economic superiority and inferiority in social structures 
– and their internalization (or “epidermalisation”). 
 
For Fanon, the role of the psychoanalyst is to help the patient examine his 
unconscious conflicts, such that he becomes able to make a choice in relation to the 
true source of his conflict, which is the social structure.  Fanon also stresses the care 
needed for the analyst to avoid inserting his own unconscious imagos into the mind of 
the other. 
 
Fanon (2008 [1952]) particularly explores how parts of white sexuality are split off 
and projected into the black and how both races then respond to this.  Davids’ (2011) 
also draws our attention to the violence, also split off and projected, in Fanon’s 
examples.  Fanon (2008 [1952]) explores unconscious fantasy through two 
hypothetical sexual couplings: that of a black woman with a white man and that of a 
black man with a white woman.  His exploration of fantasies of superiority, inferiority 
and power are therefore bound together with fantasies of attractiveness, promiscuity, 
virility and procreation, such as those of the black woman, who, in fantasy, can 
become ‘whiter’ through bearing mixed-race offspring.  Or for the black man, who, in 
entering a white woman sexually, has the fantasy of being white, of having his body 
transformed into that of a white man through union with a white woman.  Fanon pays 
much less attention to what the fantasies of these white sexual partners might be, but 
it does appear that, in his work, white fantasies of lust, sexual prowess, sexual 
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appetites, fornication and adultery are conveniently projected into the black, allowing 
their whiteness to be associated with chastity, honour, beauty and genetic superiority.  
This is consistent with Auestad’s (2015) emphasis on the need to transfer guilt and 
shame through racist thinking. 
 
Kovel (1988), like Fanon, emphasises the sexual nature of racist fantasy.  He argues 
that hatred is always tied to love, that is, infused with sexuality.  Where Fanon 
particularly theorizes colonialism, Kovel focuses on slave-owning societies, namely 
the American South.  Kovel asserts that “Sexuality in racism is not an isolated 
phenomenon, but is intimately connected with power and dominance” (p.68).  Kovel 
also describes fantasies of blackness as dirt, contagion or even ‘devilment’.  He 
emphasises the role of gender in these fantasies, where there is a fantasy of “purity” in 
the white, female body.  Kovel discusses the strictures on white women in the 
traditional American South, including the deprivation of their sexuality both in the 
requirements of chastity, and that they should not nurse their own infants; excessive 
sexuality is then attributed, in fantasy, to the black woman and wet nurse.  Lewis 
(2000) and others (Marriott, 2007) remind us how interconnected issues of race, class 
and gender are: this intersectionality is pertinent when considering Kovel’s 
contributions. 
 
Keval (2016) also emphasises the sexual nature of racist fantasy: for him, the racist 
feels him- or herself to have been robbed or cheated by an imaginary (sexual) couple.  
There is thus a “racist scene” that is closely linked to fantasies of a primal scene.  In 
this fantasy, the potent couple is imagined to produce interlopers who rob, deplete and 
contaminate what was imagined as ‘pure’; moreover, this couple enjoys pleasures 
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from which the individual is excluded. This is clearly bound up with Oedipal conflicts 
and, as such, racism involves a regression to a pre-Oedipal fantasy of a pure, 
uncontaminated maternal space, which is not intruded into by complexity, difference 
and diversity.  A move to a more mature, three-dimensional thinking necessitates the 
recognition of the sexual and generational differences that are present in the Oedipal 
situation: it is these that Keval holds to be the basis for diversity.  Keval argues that 
racist fantasy seeks purity in the form of certainty and is not able to bear the anxiety 
aroused by not knowing and by the fluidity, hybridity and connectedness of human 
nature.  Keval’s arguments are based on a mix of personal reflection and clinical 
evidence – these are presented as many short clinical vignettes, which arguably both 
provide plenty of examples to his reader, whilst perhaps giving too little clinical detail 
for the reader to evaluate the evidence base for his claims.  However, he presents a 
coherent argument and his ideas about ‘purity’ and a ‘pure maternal space’ are 
particularly helpful in relation to the findings of my study, as I argue later: these ideas 
were not used in generating my findings, but in order better to understand the data. 
 
Khanna (2003), writing from a non-European, post-colonial, feminist point of view, 
holds psychoanalysis to be a masculinist and colonialist discipline: psychoanalytic 
theory came about through – and remains rooted in – Western thought traditions and 
Western politics, specifically the emergence of the European nation state.  She 
describes the unconscious processes involved in psychoanalytic thinking.  She argues 
that the concept of the self – the individual’s way of being – which lies at the heart of 
psychoanalysis, is a European self, which can only exist in opposition to a primitive 
(non-Western, colonised, feminine) other.  Following Heidegger (1936), Khanna uses 
the concept of “worlding” and holds that the European self is worlded – it is brought 
 51 
into the world, into ‘unconcealment’, into being-in-the-world, into language, through 
a process in which the other is “earthed”; the primitive, the colonised, the feminine 
are forever banished into the earth, into timelessness and concealment.  This allows us 
to understand events: the production of language brings something into the world and 
simultaneously traps something else in the earth; it is a violent process. The European 
self, and with it psychoanalytic thought, can exist only through strife and only at the 
expense of those banished as primitive.  Moreover, the psychoanalytic tradition has 
formalized and normalised an idea of ‘being’, which is in fact constituted of colonial 
politics.  This presents psychotherapists working with ‘cultural difference’ with a 
great challenge to the theoretical framework they employ. 
 
Khanna’s ideas are consistent with the writings of other theorists here, though they 
might employ very different language.  Kovel (1988) considers blackness to be 
“banished from sight” in racist fantasy (p.63).  Hillman (1986), using Jungian terms, 
considers that the white casts its shadow into the black.  Morgan (2008), taking up 
this idea and using Kleinian terms, frames this in terms of projection and highlights 
that with all projections, something is lost.  The theme of loss here is important – 
writers struggle to name what it is that is lost.  Similarly, my interviewees claimed 
that therapists ‘gain’ much by undertaking work across ‘cultural differences’, but 
could not say what might be gained.  Perhaps we do not know exactly what has been 
lost: Khanna’s notion of banishment into the earth is useful here as it emphasises the 
loss.  How can we know about ideas and experiences that will never see the light of 
day? 
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Keval (2016) also emphasises loss and mourning.  For Keval, it is the 
acknowledgement of difference and diversity that involves loss: in giving up a racist, 
regressive fantasy of a pure, uncomplicated space, there is the loss of the “sense of the 
familiar” (p.xix).  This loss must be mourned, and the fluidity, hybridity and 
complexity of thought that this then ushers in arouses anxiety, which must further be 
processed.  Keval uses the term “the racist imagination” to emphasise that racist 
fantasies are states of mind that individuals move in and out of.  Racist fantasies limit 
the functioning of the mind, yet in order to enjoy the spontaneity of thought processes 
that occur within an Oedipal, triangular mental space, we must bear the painful 
processing of loss and anxiety that go hand-in-hand with these gains. 
 
I have relied heavily on Auestad, Keval and Davids: the latter two present arguments 
that are based in clinical practice and systematic theoretical reflection, while Auestad 
adds a philosophical dimension.  Their coherent arguments form a useful basis for the 
theorisation of my own data. 
 
Having reviewed the literature on the most important terms and ideas in the area of 
‘cultural difference’ within child psychotherapy, I now turn to exploring empirical 
research in these areas and to considerations of methodology.  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Researching Fantasy 
The unconscious as conceived by psychoanalysis is rather difficult to get to know, 
being not only inaccessible to conscious thinking, but actively repressed and defended 
against.  Freud (2001 [1901]) describes many situations in which the unconscious 
makes itself known and knowable, outside the clinical setting, through parapraxes, or 
ordinary ‘Freudian’ slips of the tongue, slip-ups in actions or significant things 
slipping the mind.  Rustin (2007) describes how the unconscious makes itself known 
only in disguise: “in dreams, in symptoms, through the body, by displacements and 
condensations of meaning” (p.1).  Psychoanalysis traditionally considers the 
unconscious to become knowable through the analytic setting, with the exploration 
both of clinical material and the transference-counter-transference relationship.   
 
Even so, it is clearly not an unproblematic proposition to examine fantasy, and with it 
perhaps unconscious fantasy, through interview-based research.  I would argue, 
however, that this does not mean that it cannot be attempted.  Indeed, there are a 
number of studies making use of qualitative interview data that draw out themes or 
conclusions relating to fantasy and unconscious fantasy (Cartwright, 2004; Frosh, 
Phoenix & Pattman, 2005; Hadge, 2012; Senet, 2004).  Frosh, Phoenix and Pattman 
(2005) used a psychosocial methodology (open, narrative-style interviews) and two 
forms of data analysis – both thematic analysis and narrative analysis – to examine 
various aspects of boys’ construction of masculinity.  Here, the data analysis drew out 
themes relating to unconscious fantasy.  Similarly, Cartwright (2004), though he does 
not use the term ‘psychosocial’, seeks to establish a very similar methodology: he 
argues that psychoanalytic techniques can helpfully be employed in research to assist 
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both data collection and data analysis.  As such, his ‘Psychoanalytic Research 
Interview’ uses open, narrative-style interviews and the data analysis pays attention to 
transference and counter-transference.  This was with an explicit aim of paying 
attention to unconscious fantasy and unconscious meanings in the resulting data.  
Senet (2004) uses a very different methodology to examine children’s fantasies about 
gender and the body.  She presented three- and four-year-olds with ‘puzzle’ dolls and 
tasked them with constructing a boy and a girl.  She makes explicit reference to 
fantasy in her results, particularly regarding bisexuality and genital envy; she draws 
the distinction between what small children know about the body and their fantasies. 
 
It is encouraging that these creative methodologies are emerging in order to broaden 
research to take in such concepts as fantasy.  However, these studies all draw 
inferences about fantasy from their data as though this were unproblematic and do not 
acknowledge the contested area that they find themselves in.  None of these authors 
has particularly distinguished between fantasy and unconscious fantasy and, as such, 
they have not engaged in debates about how unconscious fantasy might be explored.  
However, their psychoanalytic theory of mind clearly informs a research 
methodology, in which fantasy is understood to be an important and interesting 
feature of lived experience and therefore of research data. 
 
If one accepts a psychoanalytic view of the unconscious as knowable only indirectly, 
it is not clear to me how one would set about to research unconscious fantasy 
explicitly.  As such, I limit my own study to fantasies that are manifest and explicitly 
referred to in the interviews.  I discuss the methodology and its implications in more 
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detail later.  However, it is important to note the precedent for using psychosocial 
methods to examine fantasy in qualitative interview data. 
 
Empirical Research 
The existing literature in the areas of cultural, racial or class difference includes a 
number of qualitative research studies.  Several studies examined the experience of 
therapy of particular adult client groups, such as immigrant survivors of political 
violence (McKinney, 2007): this used ethnographic observations informed by 
counter-transference.  Other studies have researched the effect of ‘cultural difference’ 
in the therapies of Korean-American patients (Cynn, 2005) through interviewing 
therapists and conducting a thematic analysis; this study concluded that therapists 
need to “be mindful” of ‘cultural difference’ and it examined more closely the 
concept of “hope” in these therapies.  An interview-based study of therapists’ 
experiences of working with older adults (Atkins & Loewenthal, 2004) used a 
heuristic approach and found ‘cultural difference’ to be one theme that emerged.  
Research into the impact of ‘cultural difference’ in psychotherapy with Chinese 
clients (Jim & Pistrang, 2007) also used semi-structured interviews and thematic 
analysis, but was based on interviewing the clients themselves.  Research into cross-
cultural work with the Orthodox Jewish community (Loewenthal & Rogers, 2004) 
used interviews with therapists, clients and members of the community and examined 
several different treatment modalities.  The study highlighted the need for greater 
vigilance about confidentiality for this client group.  Other studies have used one 
single case, such as the experience of a Jamaican mother of filial therapy (Edwards, 
Ladner & White, 2007) or the experience of an African-American man of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy (Qureshi, 2007).  Qureshi uses a hermeneutic 
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phenomenological approach and concludes that there was an “absent presence” of 
issues of race in the therapy.  Cultural issues and those of trust were identified and 
these were found to contribute to both the positive and negative aspects of the client’s 
experience of therapy.  More recently, a comparative study of the perspectives of 
clients from different cultures (comparing US with Argentine psychotherapy patients) 
on their experience of psychotherapy (Jock, Bolger, Gómez Penedo, Waizmann, 
Olivera, & Roussos, 2013) used semi-structured interviews and a consensual 
qualitative research methodology.  In this method, interviews are coded 
independently, but the researchers then come together to reach consensus on the 
coding.  This study found considerable difference in how the North- and South-
American patients experienced the therapeutic setting, interventions and change.  The 
authors argue that this has implications for the validity, cross-culturally, of current 
definitions of treatment efficacy. 
 
One qualitative study focussed specifically on the experience of using child and 
adolescent mental health services (CAMHS) for members of the Gujarati community 
(Dogra, Vostanis, Abuateya & Jewson, 2007).  The study used semi-structured 
interviews with parents and young people from the Gujarati community and related to 
all mental health treatments offered by the clinic.  It found the quality of service to be 
more important to the clients than the service’s responsiveness to culture.  The study 
concluded that further research was needed to consider whether ethnic minority 
families should be considered a homogenous group. 
 
One research study examined psychotherapists’ views on working with differences in 
social class (Ryan, 2006, 2014).  This made use of semi-structured interviews and a 
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grounded theory approach to data collection and analysis.  Ryan chose to inform the 
participating therapists in advance about the interview questions, as she found them to 
need more time to think in detail about their clinical work than it was possible to give 
during the interview itself.  Her findings suggest that many questions can be raised 
about how social class differences affect transference, counter-transference, anxieties 
and projections.   
 
Only recently have studies of difference begun to appear within the field of child 
psychotherapy: these are qualitative research studies from clinical doctoral work.  
Watt (2015) used Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis to examine the kinds of 
concerns that led Bangladeshi families in London to seek help and what form of help 
was sought.  Her findings suggest that the parents she interviewed found it easier to 
access outreach-style mental health services, based in children’s centres, which she 
suggests are able to serve an important social function as an alternative ‘village’ for 
those having to parent far from their country of origin.  Millar (2014) used Grounded 
Theory to examine a single case study, in which both patient and therapist had similar 
mixed-race heritage.  He argues that the counter-transference was particularly useful 
in understanding issues of identity, race, gender and attachment; Millar uses Money-
Kyrle’s (1978 [1956]) understanding of counter-transference as both introjective and 
projective. 
 
There are thus a number of very different empirical research studies from within the 
psychotherapy professions, or that make use of psychoanalytic thinking.  My own 
study uses a psychosocial methodology and I explore this in more detail below. 
 
 58 
Qualitative Research in Child Psychotherapy 
Research within the field of child psychotherapy has gathered pace considerably in 
recent years (Midgley, 2009; Midgley & Kennedy, 2007).  A decade ago, use of 
qualitative research methods in this field was sufficiently novel that Midgley wrote: 
“To my knowledge, virtually no child psychotherapists have, up until now, published 
research making explicit use of qualitative methodologies." (Midgley, 2004, p.93).  
He makes a strong argument for the complementary nature of qualitative methods and 
the field of child psychotherapy research; this is echoed in the area of qualitative 
research methods in other therapy modalities (Burck, 2005).  In a footnote to his 
statement, Midgley acknowledges studies using qualitative approaches that were 
published as his own 2004 article appeared, which stemmed from clinical doctorate 
work.  Indeed, the inclusion of research teaching and clinical doctorate programmes 
on all child psychotherapy trainings means that the “gap” between research and 
practice (Midgley, 2004) is rapidly closing and that the use of qualitative approaches 
is no longer considered controversial (Willig & Stainton Rogers, 2008).  Indeed, 
qualitative studies are now frequently being used to contribute to areas previously 
dominated by quantitative research methods, such as in the medical sciences (Leung, 
2015) and their findings are included in the guidelines of the National Institute of 
Clinical Excellence (Willig & Stainton Rogers, 2008).  Qualitative methodologies 
allow more interesting questions to be asked, putting the ‘flesh on the bones’ of 
research (Target, 2014): qualitative approaches allow meanings, especially subjective 
meanings, to be explored, without compromising the richness, detail and 
dimensionality of the data (Leung, 2015).   
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Psychosocial Approaches to Research 
Psychosocial approaches to research now form not only a field in their own right 
(Frosh, 2010), but a rapidly expanding one at that (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009).  
Psychosocial approaches inform both the epistemology underpinning the research and 
the methodologies chosen and do so using psychoanalytic concepts.  
Epistemologically, there is an acceptance that people are influenced both by the 
internal world of their psyche and by the external world: hence the elements ‘psycho’ 
and ‘social’.  Like all academic fields, Psychosocial Studies encompasses a range of 
divergent views and is not without its debates, disagreements and controversies 
(Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Hollway & Jefferson, 2013).  Despite the ongoing lively 
debate about methodology, it is possible to outline certain ideas central to a 
psychosocial approach. 
 
One key concept is that of a “defended subject” (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009; Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2013).  This uses the psychoanalytic idea that the internal world is complex 
and that unconscious defences will be mobilised against painful, uncomfortable or 
intolerable ideas, thoughts, experiences and fantasies.  For the research subject, this 
means that the participant might not hear the question through the same ‘subject-
frame’ as the interviewer, or as the other participants (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013); 
and that the participants are unconsciously motivated to disguise certain feelings or 
meanings.  Further, participants are invested in particular positions within a discourse.  
The same is clearly true of the researcher (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009; Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2013).  Thus, epistemologically, there is a broad acceptance of the idea that 
the researcher and participant together co-construct the research process and its 
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meanings (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009; Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Hollway & Jefferson, 
2013). 
 
The epistemological commitment to the interaction of the internal and external worlds 
and to co-construction in the research situation leads to broad acceptance among 
psychosocial researchers of Bourdieu’s notion of “reflexivity” in practice (Bourdieu, 
1990 [1980]).  This acknowledges the researcher’s own social situatedness, 
responsiveness to the ideas encountered and the inability therefore to be truly 
‘neutral’.  The researcher must therefore acknowledge and examine his or her 
contribution to, and influence on, the research process (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). 
 
Methodologically, a key feature of a psychosocial approach is therefore to examine 
the researcher’s own emotional responses to the data (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013; 
Walkerdine, 2008; Willig, 2012).  Put differently, the researcher’s counter-
transference can be seen as a research tool in itself (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013; 
Jervis, 2009).  Here, ‘counter-transference’ is used rather more loosely than in 
psychoanalysis, referring to the researcher’s subjective responses to the participants, 
the interview situation and to the data; there is not the same understanding, as there is 
in the psychoanalytic professions, of there being an ongoing transference relationship.  
Use of counter-transference in research is a controversial move away from accepted 
understandings of ‘reflexivity’ within the social sciences and I discuss this below. 
 
Other examples of features of psychosocial methodologies are seen in such ideas as 
the use of open-ended questions to encourage free association and elicit narrative 
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2013), and the use of observational methodology, such as that 
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of infant observation (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009; Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Urwin, 
2007). 
 
Controversy 
There are several controversies within the field of psychosocial studies.  Of most 
relevance to this project, there is significant debate around the use of ‘counter-
transference’ data and its validity.  In psychosocial literature, debates from within 
psychoanalytic theory around how broad or narrow the definition of ‘counter-
transference’ should be (see Heimann, 1950; Hinshelwood, 1991) are largely ignored. 
Some researchers avoid this rather loaded term and speak more generally of using 
‘emotional responses’ (Urwin, 2007) or their ‘subjectivity’ (Hunt, 1989).  In 
acknowledgement of this contested area, I have chosen to use the term ‘subjective 
response’. 
 
There is much disagreement in the field about the use of counter-transference data.  
Clarke and Hoggett (2009) view it as creating an inherent “paradox” within 
psychosocial methodology as the approach emphasises minimal structure, to allow for 
the participants’ freedom of expression, and yet also allows the “gross intrusion” of 
the researcher’s counter-transference (p.18).  Further criticism of the use of counter-
transference data is the risk of circularity: the researcher projects their own views on 
the data and this method is used to justify precisely those findings.  Criticisms of 
psychoanalysis for circular methodology, whereby the method proves the findings and 
the findings are used to justify the method, are certainly not new (Popper, 2002 
[1963]).  The uncertainties about use of counter-transference are put slightly 
differently, namely, the use of a “top-down” approach (Clarke & Hoggett, 2009; 
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Frosh & Baraitser, 2008) of imposing the researcher’s own views on the material, or 
‘having words put in our [the participants’] mouths’ (Wetherell, 2005 p.169).  
 
Frosh & Baraitser (2008) argue that use of counter-transference should not be seen as 
simply equivalent to the use of reflexivity in the social sciences; however, they do 
little to expand this view.  Elsewhere, Frosh (2010) draws particularly on Bourdieu 
(1990 [1980]), whereby the researcher has an impact upon the research process, 
which then needs to be examined in its own right.  For Frosh, the crucial difference is 
that Bourdieu’s focus is on positioning within a social structure, whereas counter-
transference is used as an indicator of unconscious states of mind.  The psychosocial 
literature often ignores this distinction, however, and the terms ‘reflexivity’, 
‘subjectivity’ and ‘counter-transference’ are used more-or-less interchangeably.  
 
Advocates of the use of counter-transference in the research methodology see it not 
only as valid, but crucial (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013). Jervis (2009) argues that, 
particularly where the researcher is able to uncover some of their own more disturbing 
responses to the data, the research findings can be particularly rich.  Parker (2005) 
argues that the enhanced use of subjectivity through the researcher’s examining their 
own subjective response is a strength in the research process: the researcher should 
not seek to be “objective”, but instead allow their emotional investment in the data to 
lend greater interest to their research findings.  Elliott (2011) argues that use of 
counter-transference data acts as a safeguard in the research process: where subjective 
responses are not engaged with explicitly, they might be expressed in other ways, 
such as how the researcher writes about the participants. 
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Given the central importance that the use of counter-transference has in clinical 
technique in psychoanalysis (Freud, 1910), it strikes me that to leave it out of a 
psychosocial research process would constitute a serious omission.  The basic 
‘project’ of psychosocial studies, and psychosocial research methodologies, seems to 
be to bring together the understanding of the inner world, from psychoanalysis, and 
the external world, from the social sciences.  To leave a consideration of counter-
transference out of a psychosocial methodological process would therefore be to miss 
the point.  The difficulties that this throws up, methodologically, must therefore be 
grappled with, rather than avoided through omission. 
 
 
VALIDITY 
Authors on both sides of this debate acknowledge the need, however, for psychosocial 
researchers to consider the validity of their findings.   
 
Debates about qualitative methods have long been concerned with validity, given that 
findings would never be replicable in the same way as in quantitative methods 
(Leung, 2015).  There is broad agreement that there could never be established criteria 
for determining the validity of a qualitative study, given the multiplicity of methods 
(Leung, 2015; Gee, 1999); and that this pluralism of new methodologies, far from 
problematic, is something to be celebrated (Smith, Harré & Van Langenhove, 1995). 
 
Fahrenberg (2003) discusses interpretative methodologies using text: he asserts 
(rightly) that there will always be multiple meanings to a text and there could 
therefore never be a ‘correct’ interpretation.  The process of interpretation is 
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impossible without both personal and temporal ‘colouring’ of the outcome 
(“individuelle Färbungen” – 2003, p.5).  Frosh (2010), discussing Bourdieu, argues 
the same point: that knowledge becomes temporally and interpersonally positioned. 
 
Despite broad consensus that strict validity will never be established, most authors do 
suggest criteria for attempting this.  Fahrenberg (2003) argues that validity is 
primarily to do with transparency: the context for, and process of, interpretation must 
be made explicit, or there must be a ‘community’ for interpretation 
(Interpretationsgemeinschaft).   
 
Fahrenberg’s suggestions meet broad agreement.  Meyrick (2006) suggests similar 
criteria, namely transparency and systematicity.  She emphasises the need for each 
step of the research process to be made explicit and transparent.  However, Meyrick 
also acknowledges the limitations of this approach, asking “How much transparency 
is enough?” (2006, p.799).  Leung (2015) emphasises consistency within the 
qualitative research process and the ‘interactive’ nature of qualitative work: he argues 
that it is for the reader to judge the validity and quality of research findings “at the 
receiving end” (p.326) and not the work of the researcher alone.  Gee (1999) argues 
that the validity of the findings comes not from whether or not they ‘reflect reality’ as 
he would see reality as constructed through language and, moreover, the validity of 
qualitative research can never be “once and for all” (p.94).  Instead, he holds that 
validity, or the ‘trustworthiness’ of the findings comes from convergence in the data: 
an internal coherence to the data.  That is, whether the data offers “compatible and 
convincing” answers to the questions the researcher asks of it, which might include 
examining the identities, roles, positions and meanings taken up.  He, too, emphasises 
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the acceptance of the research by a community of practice.  Here, Gee does not refer 
to a ‘group’ approach, but rather the ultimate fate of the research when appraised by 
colleagues. 
 
I agree with the above points: namely, that validity will never be established 
sufficiently to address the more philosophical, epistemological concerns, yet the 
researcher can place importance on certain qualities.  These, I believe, are:  
(1) transparency of the research process;  
(2) interpretation should be demonstrably rooted in the text; and  
(3) research should ultimately be appraised by a community of practice.  
 
Transparency 
In the interests of maximising the transparency of this project, I have made reference 
to my subjective responses to the data, as I believe this makes explicit choices and 
processes that qualitative researchers make ordinarily.  I have quoted directly both 
from field-notes and from the interview texts in the hope that it should be transparent 
to the reader where my ideas, interpretations and inferences have come from.  
Furthermore, I have included all transcripts in full in the appendices, such that the 
reader might see that quotes from the interviews have not been taken out of context. 
 
Interpretation ‘rooted’ in the text 
Like many authors, I argue that interpretations must be demonstrably ‘rooted’ in the 
original data (Frosh, 2010; Hollway & Jefferson, 2013).  However, this phrase is used 
to cover a broad range of different approaches to interpretation.  Emphasis is given to 
keeping the data ‘whole’ and not ‘fragmenting’ it through such forms of analysis as 
 66 
coding (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013).  Clearly, any form of interpretation will 
privilege certain aspects of the data over others.  Gee (1999) acknowledges that a 
discourse analysis will always choose to look at certain passages of a text in greater 
depth, but cautions that, for the sake of validity, the ‘whole picture’ must be borne in 
mind.  What constitutes a fragmentation of the data is then a moot point.  I have 
sought to analyse the data both across the ‘whole’ dataset, using thematic analysis, 
and also examining two ideas through discourse analysis, in the hope of being able to 
fulfil this dual task of looking both at detail and keeping the ‘whole’ picture in mind. 
 
Both Gee (1991, 1999) and Hollway (2015) favour a poetic approach to data analysis: 
Gee organises discourse into poetic stanzas (a group of lines about one specific topic) 
and strophes (larger units, made up of several stanzas, that organise the story as a 
whole) in order to examine patterns within a discourse, to see how meaning is 
constructed.  This approach usually leads to a tabular presentation of the strophes and 
stanzas (Gee, 1999; Emerson & Frosh, 2004).  In this approach, the words used 
remain those of the participant, but structure is imposed by the researcher and the 
final organisation of discourse could be argued to represent a fragmentation of the 
data (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013).  Burck (2005) similarly follows Gee’s approach of 
breaking the original transcript into single lines, in order to form a poetry-like text, 
allowing patterns to emerge.  Burck prefers the approach of identifying ‘refrains’ in 
the text, like in a song, in order to draw out features of the discourse without 
fragmenting it.  Hollway (2015) uses ‘rough verse’, the words based on interview 
transcripts and observer’s notes.  This is used to convey affect to the reader, yet is 
essentially fiction based upon the interview data.  I do not doubt that all these authors 
would argue that their analyses were ‘rooted’ in the data, but have chosen these 
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examples to highlight, despite the similarities in approach, how different the modes of 
presenting the interpretations are: apparently straightforward statements about 
‘rooting’ analyses in the data are therefore more complex than they appear.  I prefer 
Burck’s method of drawing out refrains, in order to highlight detail, whilst keeping 
the fragmentation of the text to a minimum, in comparison with a more ‘tabular’ 
approach. 
 
Communities of Practice 
Several authors refer to a ‘community of practice’ (Gee, 1999) or a group method 
(Thomas, in press) as a way of addressing these difficulties with validity, or offering 
‘triangulation’ (Clarke and Hoggett, 2009).  On closer examination, however, they use 
the term to refer to very different things.  For Gee (1999), this group is a loose term – 
it refers to the fact of different researchers adopting similar ways of doing things, such 
that their methods and inferences can be accepted within that group.  I argue that this 
already exists within psychosocial studies: the influence of Hollway & Jefferson’s 
methodologies on debate within this field has been considerable (Thomas, in press), 
and its controversies examined in detail (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008).  
 
Others use the term in different ways.  For Fahrenberg (2003), the community of 
interpretation – Interpretationsgemeinschaft – is both a loosely conceived group of 
practitioners who might reach some consensus about methodologies (particularly that 
a ‘correct’ interpretation could never exist), and also a literal group who might meet 
to interpret a text together or review interpretations of a text together.  Others draw a 
comparison here to the ‘clinical group’ supervision that is familiar to psychotherapists 
(Thomas, in press). 
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The ‘group approach’ has been criticised for a number of reasons.  Frosh (2010) 
argues that group approaches do not solve the problems about validity because 
people, especially those who subscribe to similar ways of thinking, might look at the 
data and see the same thing – this is not tantamount to ensuring validity.  Hook 
(2008), too, asserts that the opinions of others are not able to provide ‘triangulation’ 
as these do not constitute a sufficiently distant viewpoint from which to take a 
perspective on the work: he argues that something much more radical would be 
required and suggests that the greatest value that psychoanalysis has to offer research 
is in fact the value of tolerating ‘not understanding’.  I find Hook’s view here of great 
interest; in reply to Frosh’s criticism, I would say that these group approaches should 
not seek to ‘establish validity’, as there is widespread agreement that this would be 
impossible: instead, I see a ‘group’ as contributing to the multiplicity of opinion that 
is so valued by Auestad (2015) and Arendt (1958), as a way of combatting prejudice.  
This would involve tolerating the ensuing ‘messiness’ of theory, which is broadly 
consistent with Hook’s point. 
 
There are two studies that have taken a group approach, which I wish to mention as 
particularly interesting.  Marks & Mönnich-Marks (2003) developed a group 
methodology in order to process the researchers’ very strong responses to interviews 
on support for Nazism.  This study used group listening to recordings, group- and 
individual supervision and developed secondary research questions: that is, the nature 
of the counter-transference reactions became an object of study in its own right.   
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Second, a study led by Urwin, Phoenix and Hollway (Urwin, 2007) used a mixed 
methodology to research maternal identities: this included observational and interview 
data; it made use of subjective responses as an instrument of knowing and, like Marks 
and Mönnich-Marks, also used a group approach to examining these.  The group took 
its format from the infant observation seminar approach used in psychotherapy 
trainings and involved listening together to material read aloud.  A further part to this 
study involved the establishment of a ‘working group’ – a group of researchers from a 
number of academic disciplines (Urwin, 2011).  This group examined the infant 
observation papers that had come out of the original project, the interviews 
conducted, and the notes taken during the original discussions.  This working group’s 
discussion then followed the same process: listening to data read aloud, allowing time 
for reflection on the emotions this stirred up and then a close reading of the text. 
 
There are several similarities between these two, very different, studies.  Firstly, the 
commitment to using emotional responses as part of the research data and therefore 
allowing time and space for these to receive due consideration.  Secondly, the 
emphasis on listening:  Marks & Mönnich-Marks (2003) highlight the connection 
between the German words Stimme (voice) and Stimmung (mood, atmosphere, 
feeling) and argue that the feelings in the data are better accessed through listening.  
Urwin’s group, though they used written notes, stress the importance of reading aloud 
in order to listen as a group.  Thirdly, both studies emphasise the need for 
containment: they argue that using emotional responses as data meant that researchers 
needed assistance in containing these; this is the function of the group. 
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These two studies drew my admiration for being so creative, both in their use of 
counter-transference, or emotional response, and in their use of a group to help think 
about this.  Like these thorough studies, I have made careful use of listening to the 
recorded material, noting down my emotional response, and have also used ‘close 
reading’.  The notable difference, however, is the resources available to these 
projects, which are clearly not available to an individual researcher.  Elliott (2011), 
working alone, sought regular individual supervision for exploring her data, akin to 
clinical supervision, which goes beyond what is offered as academic supervision.  I 
have, unfortunately, not done the same.  One possible limitation of the study is 
therefore whether I have sought adequate containment in my exploration of the data 
and my reactions to it.  I did, however, present my findings to peers and colleagues in 
July 2016: I argue that this does not serve so much to provide ‘containment’ as to 
share opinions, with a view to including a ‘multiplicity’ of opinions (Auestad, 2015). 
 
‘Overstretching the Clinic’ 
There has been considerable debate within Psychosocial Studies about the validity of 
psychosocial research methods specifically.  These disagreements appeared to be 
dying down (Frosh, in Willig 2012), but have recently been revisited (Thomas, in 
press). 
 
A key line of argument is that certain features of the psychoanalytic situation do not 
‘travel well’ or that the clinical concepts become ‘overstretched’ (Hook, 2008).  Here, 
the claim is that psychoanalysis is in itself a form of research (Thomas, in press) and, 
as such, has its own ways of validating knowledge.  Crucially, it is the ongoing, ‘live’ 
relationship between therapist and patient that allows interpretations to be tested out, 
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thought about, amended, accepted or rejected over time (Hook, 2008; Frosh & 
Saville-Young, 2008; Thomas, in press) or a ‘becoming-real’ of the interpretation for 
the patient (Habermas, 1987 [1968]).  The problems of validity in psychosocial 
research occur when the use of counter-transference and psychoanalytically-informed 
styles of interpretation are removed from this context (Thomas, in press; Habermas, 
1987 [1968]) and applied to ‘dead’ text (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). 
 
Thomas (in press), in his discussion of validity within psychosocial research, draws 
the analogy both of supervision and the use of clinical seminar groups within the 
psychotherapeutic professions.  Thomas argues that there is a fundamental, un-fixable 
problem with validity in psychosocial research, which cannot be addressed through 
the use of a group. He argues that the validation of psychoanalytic knowledge lies not 
in the learning taking place in clinical groups, valuable though this may be, but in the 
ongoing relationship between therapist and patient – something, I suspect, that 
therapists would broadly agree with.  In order to illustrate this argument, Thomas took 
a brief excerpt from a session to three different groups and asked them to free-
associate to the material in order to find the ‘hidden meanings’.  Unsurprisingly, he 
found three very different sets of ideas and reactions: he then uses this to conclude 
that groups have little to offer to the problem of validity.   
 
I agree with Thomas’ basic argument that, from an epistemological standpoint, the 
problem of validity in psychosocial research is insoluble.  The bold claim he makes 
for the validity of psychoanalytic knowledge could however be subjected to this same 
scrutiny.  However, Thomas’ illustration was somewhat artificial – a clinical group 
does not examine small fragments to find hidden meanings, but hears whole sessions 
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over a period of time, such that the group comes to ‘know’ the work and offer 
reflections on this.  The use of a group is therefore not to be dismissed out-of-hand 
and I have cited Marks & Mönnich-Marks (2003) and Urwin (2007) as particularly 
interesting examples. 
 
Given the impossibility of achieving true ‘validity’ in psychosocial research, I suggest 
that a researcher is better advised to consider Smith, Harré & Van Langenhove (1995) 
emphasis on the practicality of the research process.  I wonder whether there might be 
such a thing as a ‘good enough’ research project along the lines of Winnicott’s (1960) 
concept of ‘good enough’ mothering.  Here, I would argue that like those analogies 
with the ongoing analytic relationship (Frosh & Saville-Young, 2008; Thomas, in 
press), Winnicott conceives of an ongoing relationship between mother and child, 
where mis-steps can be survived, repaired and added to with good experiences – the 
‘good enough’ therefore comes out of the whole context.  
 
Clearly, when conducting single interviews, there is not an ongoing relationship 
between researcher and interviewee, in which to explore emerging findings or any 
developing subjective feelings.  However, I believe that the controversy in 
psychosocial studies about whether psychoanalytic methods can usefully contribute to 
a qualitative research process (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013) or whether taking them 
out of context undermines their validity (Frosh & Saville-Young, 2008; Thomas, in 
press) has become stuck in an either-or debate that itself rests on a confusion.  Here, I 
argue that the primary relationship of the researcher is not to the participant, but to the 
data.  The process of research is lengthy and involves many iterations of interviewing, 
listening to recordings, close readings of transcripts, noting thoughts and feelings 
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arising at every stage, reviewing all these many times over, sifting through many 
possible themes and sub-themes.  All this represents a complex and ongoing 
relationship with the data over a significant period of time (years).  As such, it is 
possible to allow themes to come to mind and others to be rejected, as this process 
develops over time (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  I stress that this project involved both 
the listening emphasised by Marks and Mönnich-Marks (2003) and the ‘close 
reading’ emphasised by Urwin (2007).  Hollway & Jefferson (2013) and Urwin 
(2007, 2011) describe a many-layered approach with multiple opportunities to 
‘notice’ the data.  My own approach has similarly afforded me multiple opportunities 
to ‘notice’ the data (and my reactions to it). 
 
If one understands the primary relationship in the research setting as being between 
researcher and data, rather than researcher and participant, it is possible to take up a 
position in which psychoanalytic methods can inform and inspire the research 
process, but are not directly transplanted from one context to another.  I believe this to 
be an important distinction and an opportunity to move away from the binary either-or 
debate that has rumbled on in psychosocial studies for the past decade. 
 
Gee argues: 
““Validity” is communal: if you take risks and make mistakes, your 
colleagues will help you clean up the mess – that’s what they’re for.  The 
quality of research often resides in how fruitful our mistakes are, that is, in 
whether they open up paths that others can then make more progress on than 
we have” (Gee, 1999, p.9) 
Unlike Gee, I would not seek to label the above as ‘validity’, but certainly concur that 
the ultimate purpose of research is to open up new areas for debate, or bring new 
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ideas to debate: I argue that the findings of this project are sufficiently robust to do 
just that. 
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PROCESS 
 
Interviewing 
I conducted my study by means of carrying out interviews and studying these in 
recorded form and in written transcripts.  In so doing, I follow a long line of 
qualitative researchers and claim interviewing as a legitimate way of generating 
research data (Emerson & Frosh 2004; Kvale, 2007; Willig, 2012). 
 
Kvale’s (2007) assertion that interviews are capable of generating data and therefore 
new knowledge is widely accepted.  Taking a psychosocial approach, I used an ‘open’ 
interview style (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013), in order to give more space to the 
participants’ free associations in their answers. 
 
Participants 
I conducted eight interviews with child psychotherapists.  Participants were recruited 
in a number of ways: the first four were all approached directly (mostly by email) 
after they taught or gave papers on cultural issues or related subjects; the following 
two were recruited on the recommendation of other participants and the final two 
interviewees were volunteers, who responded to an email that I sent to the entire 
membership of the Association of Child Psychotherapists (ACP). 
 
Of the participants, five were female and three male.  Four were born in the countries 
of the UK; four grew up abroad.   Five participants had English as their mother-
tongue and three were native speakers of other languages.  There were different 
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ethnicities within the group, but I have chosen not to comment on these further, as 
some participants preferred not to define their ethnic backgrounds. 
 
All eight participants were qualified child psychotherapists and members of the ACP.  
The participants ranged from those who had been qualified for approximately five 
years, to those who had had long careers and were now retiring.  All were based in 
Greater London. 
 
Exclusion criteria 
There are many institutions that train professionals who practice psychotherapy with 
children.  However, I chose to interview only those who were qualified as child 
psychotherapists (not those still in training), who had trained in ACP-recognised 
training institutions and who were registered members of the ACP.  This was partly in 
order to give some definition of ‘child psychotherapist’ for the purpose of the study, 
but mainly because I wished the research project to make a contribution to my own 
professional group. 
 
A further exclusion criterion concerned ethical approval: I interviewed therapists 
employed in private practice or in charitable institutions.  This was purely for 
practical reasons as the NHS has its own ethics procedures for research.  However, all 
of the participants had worked in the NHS at some point in their careers.  This project 
was given ethical approval by Birkbeck, University of London in 2011. 
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Data Collection 
I emailed each participant with some details of the project, to outline the purpose of 
the interview and the length of time it was likely to take; one interviewee requested 
(and was given) the questions in advance of the interview.  Interviews were arranged 
at times and places convenient to the participants (usually their own homes or places 
of work).  Participants were given an information sheet and asked to sign a consent 
form: this covered consent for the storage and eventual deletion of the voice 
recordings and consent to use of anonymised transcripts. 
 
I treated the first interview as a pilot and made alterations to the schedule of questions 
as a result, as these were found to be repetitive.  In all subsequent interviews, the 
schedule of questions was used only as a guide, as some interviewees covered the 
subjects before I could ask about them directly.  Also – considering my own 
emotional experiences of the research here – there were some occasions on which I 
skipped questions as, depending on how the interview seemed ‘to be going’, some 
questions ‘felt’ too intrusive, provocative or foolish.  The interview schedule is 
included in the appendices. 
 
In all cases, the questions were open-ended, with a view to eliciting ‘narrative’-style 
answers (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013).  The length of the interviews varied greatly, 
depending on how much the participants chose to say.  All interviews lasted between 
30 and 90 minutes. 
 
A transcription service was used to transcribe the interview data.  I then went through 
each transcript carefully, in order to familiarise myself with the data in written form, 
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and also to correct any errors in transcription and to disguise identifying features, in 
order to render the transcripts anonymous.  Identifying features were all given simple 
codes, in order that the transcripts should still be easily ‘readable’. 
 
Transcription 
Through recording and transcribing the interviews, the data is given visual, written 
form and, as such, lends itself to closer analysis (Kvale, 2007).  Marks & Mönnich-
Marks (2003) advise working with recordings only, arguing that listening better 
attends to the emotional dimension of the data.  I argue that data analysis need not be 
either-or: indeed, my own approach combines close, repeated listenings to the 
recordings and a ‘close reading’ (Urwin, 2007) of the transcribed interviews.   
 
There are obviously many ways of transcribing an interview and the form the 
transcription takes informs the subsequent analysis of the data.  In acknowledgement 
of the role of the researcher in co-constructing knowledge arising in the interview 
(Kvale, 2007), I included my own questions, comments and interjections in the 
transcripts, such that they represent as complete a record of the interview as possible.  
Details such as pauses, laughter and false-starts were all included, but use of linguistic 
code or symbols were not, in the interests of the accessibility and ‘readability’ of the 
finished texts. 
 
Data Analysis 
From the outset of this project, I proposed to use two methods of textual analysis.  
Firstly, a thematic analysis in order to explore the breadth of the data and then 
discourse analysis in order to explore emerging concepts or features in more detail.   
 79 
Step One – Thematic Analysis 
Thematic analysis is a means of exploring an entire data set, to identify patterns of 
similarities and differences in the data.  Braun and Clarke (2006) argue that thematic 
analysis allows the breadth of data set to be examined, whilst still allowing findings to 
be reported in rich detail.  A thematic analysis is a recursive process, involving 
several steps and a back-and-forth movement between individually coded data items 
and the data set as a whole (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  The individual codes are 
gradually ordered into over-arching themes and corresponding sub-themes. 
 
Thematic analysis is a highly effective way of producing a rich and detailed account 
of the data across the data set as a whole (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and, as such, is my 
chosen method for exploring the data.  It cannot, however, offer a means for exploring 
aspects of the data in more detail (Willig, 2012), particularly within a single data item 
(in this case, within one interview) and, as such, I used a second method – discourse 
analysis – in order to examine two ideas in more detail. 
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) list some potential pitfalls for the researcher to avoid when 
carrying out a thematic analysis: these are the possibility of failing to carry out an 
‘analysis’ at all, by remaining too close to the interview questions and failing to go 
‘beyond’ the text.  I argue that there is therefore a balance to be struck between 
analysing the data sufficiently ‘deeply’ in order to produce new insights, whilst 
remaining close enough to the text for the interpretation to be considered to be 
‘rooted’ in the text.  Braun and Clarke also emphasise the researcher’s active 
involvement in the process of organising the data: the themes are actively decided 
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upon by the researcher; they do not ‘emerge’ from the data.  I have endeavoured to 
heed these warnings. 
 
Following Braun & Clarke’s recommendations, then, I carried out the thematic 
analysis through a number of steps: by noting down my thoughts in a research diary 
immediately after the interviews; through annotating the transcripts both during close 
listening to the recorded interviews and subsequent close readings of the transcripts in 
text form.  These allowed me numerous opportunities to “notice” the data (Urwin, 
2007, 2011) and to observe my developing thoughts.  I then gathered these notes for 
each interview – and across all eight interviews – and sought to organise them into 
sub-headings and headings, such that as many as possible of the features I had 
identified could be captured by these headings and in order to give as much coherence 
to these groupings as possible.  
 
Step Two – Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourse analysis allows concepts to be examined in greater depth and is best suited 
to text where the ‘language-in-use’ is political (Gee, 1999).  Discussion of ‘cultural 
difference’ is necessarily political and discourse analysis therefore allows for aspects 
of that discussion to be analysed in more detail. 
 
There are many different forms of ‘discourse analysis’ (Wetherell, 2001; Willig, 
2008), ranging from highly formal analyses of language within Linguistics, to the 
Foucauldian discourse analyses that are commonly used within the social sciences.  
My own use of the term ‘discourse’ differs from these.  Arribas-Ayllon and 
Walkerdine (2017) suggests that Foucauldian analyses are characterized by three key 
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features (with the caveat that Foucauldian approaches seek to avoid formalization), 
namely: a historical enquiry (the ‘genealogy’); an analysis of the mechanisms of 
power; and an analysis of ‘subjectification’, that is the signifying practices that 
construct subjectivity.  Authors who make use of Foucauldian approaches often make 
the distinction between his concepts of ‘archaeology’, broadly the investigation of the 
history of systems of thought (Young, 1981), including their relation to practices, and 
‘genealogy’, namely tracing the history of the use of a concept (Foucault, 1970); 
however, some argue that this distinction is in fact vague (O’Farrell, 2005) and there 
are disputes as to what constitutes a Foucauldian approach (Hook, 2007). 
 
I chose Gee’s approach to discourse analysis as he advocates for its flexibility: though 
Gee’s background is in linguistics, his less rigid approach fits well within a 
psychosocial methodology. Gee views discourse as a type of narrative, where this is 
necessarily political in nature.  His approach seeks to identify repeating patterns, to 
examine the construction of meaning.  Burck’s (2005) approach, which draws on 
Gee’s, is to look for repeating ‘refrains’ within stanzas: it is these refrains that form 
the detail of the research findings; she successfully used this method within the field 
of research in systemic family therapy. 
 
Step Three – Subjective responses 
Having examined the data as a whole through thematic analysis and chosen concepts 
to examine in more depth through discourse analysis, my final step was to look at my 
own subjective responses to the data and emerging findings.  To do so, I analysed my 
field-notes or research diary, both those made immediately after each interview, and 
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those written in the margins of transcripts as I listened to the recordings and 
encountered the data in written form for the first time. 
 
Lastly, I drew together the findings from all three steps in order to look for 
convergence (Gee, 1999) in the data, in consideration of the validity of the findings.  
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DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
Introducing the data 
Before presenting and exploring my findings specifically, I thought it worth giving a 
‘flavour’ of the interviews more generally.  I was struck by the willingness of the 
participants to take part in the project and the amount of time and thought they gave 
to it: most spoke for around forty-five minutes to an hour. 
 
The interviews varied widely in how the participants engaged with the topic: some 
appeared to enjoy thinking about it; some considered it a topic that it would be politic 
to think about more, or that one ‘ought to’ consider; and one participant appeared to 
find my questions somewhat pointless.  Many of these comments were made after the 
dictaphone was switched off, but some appear in the interview material.  For example, 
two interviewees rather politely expressed the hope that I might find the topic 
interesting (as though it were not already so): 
 
 Interview 4, p.110 
 “Well, I hope it’s an interesting subject” 
Or: 
 Interview 3, p. 83 
“I hope something, you find that something interesting and 
useful comes of it” 
 
Others expressed a view that this was a subject matter one ‘ought perhaps’ think 
about more; in some cases it appeared to be the interview process itself that put this in 
mind: 
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 Interview 6, p.141 
“it’s not something that is thought about a lot in an everyday 
kind of way I don’t feel, and probably not reflected on enough 
in a way, and I’m not sure, I’d need to think about it more 
really.” 
 
Or: 
Interview 2, p.56 
“I’m really quite ashamed of the fact that, you know, well I’ve 
done all this without too much in the way of consultation” 
 
One participant appeared to find the topic and questions irritating: 
 Interview 7, p.149 
“So I was raised in one culture as – going back to the first 
question you had –  
 Yeah 
 - if there is such a, er, such a concept at all” 
 
Other participants seemed to find the subject exciting: 
 Interview 1, p. 30 
“That one [question] about the fantasies was a real zinger.  I 
think that’s a really important one, actually.  I’d be 
fascinated to know how people answer that.”  
 
In other respects, however, there were commonalities across all eight interviews that 
are worth noting, though they do not constitute the ‘themes’ generated by the data 
analyses. 
 
Commonalities 
Defining ‘Culture’ 
Firstly, it is striking that all eight participants gave a thoughtful, broad and detailed 
definition of what constitutes “culture”.  However, when asked to define their own 
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cultural background, all interviewees defined themselves by just one or two key 
characteristics.  These varied, with some participants choosing their nationality or 
language, their social class, religion or ethnicity, but all tended to define culture as a 
concept broadly and their own culture narrowly.  I initially understood this to be 
because the question about culture as a concept came second, giving the participants 
more time to reflect on it: I switched the order of these questions around for the later 
interviews, but in fact this feature of defining culture theoretically or personally held 
true regardless of how the questions were asked. 
 
For example, defining culture as a concept: 
 Interview 1, pp.7-8 
“Well it’s a difficult one, isn’t it?  I mean there are a 
thousand definitions, but I think it’s fundamentally a system 
of values, assumptions, beliefs, ways of doing things {pause} 
that uh, that particular cultural group conforms to, agrees to- 
 
Mm-hmm. 
 
-enjoys, gets sustenance from, gets some sort of sanity from 
really, because it’s a wide open world and there are myriad 
possibilities and I think one’s culture helps one to shape 
one’s life in it.  It’s limiting because it precludes the 
possibilities of going outside or beyond all of those 
assumptions and beliefs and so on.  On the other hand it’s um, 
it uh, it’s reinforcing and uh, fortifying and um, um, {pause} 
it kind of lifts you up really, helps you deal with the 
complexities of everything really so- 
 
Mm-hmm. 
 
-it’s a very amorphous thing but it’s, paradoxically it’s 
amorphous, but almost tangible really.  Like I know where I am 
on a particular issue really.” 
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Or again: 
 Interview 4, p.93 
“Ah-ha, interesting one!  I actually think it’s broader than, 
it’s to do with your beliefs, um, family background, your 
belief systems, which includes religion, how you understand the 
world, how you make sense of the world, and all of that can be 
quite specific to a particular culture.” 
 
 
And: 
 
 Interview 6, p.136 
“Well, I, I guess I’ve never thought of trying to define 
culture before, but I suppose I would think of it as, um, a set 
of, of kind of, er, practices and, um, traditions, language, 
er, shared history with a, a group of people.  Um, I guess that 
would be the kind of broad definition in my mind.  That’s 
probably missed some things out, but yeah.” 
 
 
Culture as a concept was therefore seen broadly, encompassing beliefs, practices, 
ways of life, traditions, family and community groups.  On a more personal level, 
however, answers tended to be more simple: 
 Interview 2, p.35 
 “I’m extremely English.” 
 
 
Or:  
 
 Interview 8, p.163 
“Well, [Religion 1] lower middle class!  I was the first person 
in my family to go to university, so yeah, yes.” 
 
 
There therefore seems to be something to consider about our ability to use the same 
concept both broadly, when thinking abstractly, and narrowly, when personal feeling 
or experience comes into play.   
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Fakhry Davids (2011) begins his discussion of racism and difference with anecdotes 
about personal experiences (his own, or those reported by others) to comment on the 
powerful, even maddening, feelings evoked by personal experiences of difference.  
Davids describes the powerful grip these personal encounters with racism, or culture, 
or ‘cultural difference’, have on us: he describes paranoia, suppressed rage, impotence 
and concludes that, where the outside, external, social milieu interferes with personal 
thinking, feeling and choices, the individual experiences “nothing short of a psychotic 
moment.  A rupture in the continuity of his being – that ongoing sense we all have of 
being more or less in control of our insides, of what uniquely sets ‘me’ apart from 
‘them’, which underpins our capacity to be with others – has taken place, allowing 
the other to march in and take possession of the self” (2011, pp.2-3).  Davids also 
links these personal experiences to the immobilization of the normal capacity to think.  
I would therefore argue that the answers given in the interviews touch upon these 
extraordinary experiences in the internal world: a question about the definition of 
culture engages with the ordinary capacity for abstract thought, while a question about 
one’s own cultural roots touches on something deeply rooted in the self, with the 
potential to mobilize the sorts of experiences and feelings described by Davids – 
perhaps we find safety in defining our own culture in a few terms, or perhaps the 
question itself triggers a restriction of the capacity for abstract thought, through the 
need to defend against these intrusions on the self. 
 
Davids’ (2011) argument about the insertion of the external world, or the views, 
expectations and experiences of others, chimes with Fanon’s (2008 [1952]) 
descriptions of how the white (or the clinician, or another holding a powerful 
position) might insert the ‘imago’ they hold of the other into the mind of the other.  
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Here it would be useful to use Davids’ term “the racial other” (or, for my purposes, 
perhaps, the ‘different other’) because both Fanon and Davids are describing 
specifically the unconscious expectations we hold of those who are racially different.  
Fanon, however, makes a similar point to Davids in that he argues that the imagos that 
we hold about the racial other control inner life to a great extent (Nissim-Sabat, 
2010).  Here, both Davids and Fanon are highlighting the unconscious dimension to 
our relationship to our own culture and that of others.  Rustin (2007), discussing 
culture and the unconscious, reminds us of the many forms of disguise that the 
unconscious takes when expressing itself.  It seems possible that interviewees might 
answer questions so differently when considering culture as a theoretical construct, 
compared to their own experience of their own culture, because the latter has the 
potential to tap into deeply unconscious and well-defended parts of psychic life. 
 
Lewis (2009, 2012), not unlike Davids, gives a very personal account of cultural 
experiences and, particularly, the complexities of how ‘cultural difference’ is 
experienced within the family.  She, too, describes the affects involved in the cultural 
life of the family – love, ambivalence, attachment, hatred, fear – and to this she also 
adds the bodily contact of family relationships.  Lewis also reminds us of the cultural 
phenomena that carry meaning for a family (and its cultural community or 
communities), such as food, songs, stories, programmes, commercials.  Lewis argues: 
“Whether a children’s story, a scholarly text, or a small musical clip, as 
cultural artefacts they symbolise a double movement, simultaneously 
materialising social life in the meanings that condense around them whilst 
also having the potential to become the object cathexis across which an 
individual’s psychic dramas are manifest.”  (2009, p.2) 
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 Lewis’ very personal accounts remind us of the variety of different ways an 
individual, or family, might have of cathecting their own culture and the artefacts they 
associate with it.  It should therefore not come as a surprise that the respondents in the 
interview used such different definitions for their own cultural background, compared 
to how they defined culture as an abstract, theoretical concept: a question about the 
interviewees’ own cultural background must surely touch upon the complex family 
meanings and interactions, and the affects these evoke, that Lewis describes. 
 
Several authors remind us that identity is not static (Keval, 2016; Lewis & Phoenix, 
2004), but fluid, hybrid and changing over time.  I suspect that the narrower 
definitions of ‘culture’ found in the interviewees’ personal accounts of cultural 
identity reflect something of that particular moment, and that perhaps at other times, 
they might define their cultural selves or cultural backgrounds quite differently. 
 
Ambivalence and contradictions 
Another ever-present feature of the interviews was the participants’ ambivalence 
about the topic.  Most tended to express both how interesting and important it is to 
think about ‘cultural difference’ in child psychotherapy, whilst at other times 
expressing hostility or contradicting this. 
 
Most participants expressed very positive views on culture and ‘cultural difference’.  
These included ideas that one can broaden one’s mind and understanding through 
encounters with ‘cultural difference’: 
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 Interview 3, p.73 
“Certainly, I think it’s very, it’s enlightening for the 
therapist 
 
 Mm-hmm. 
 
 You learn a lot” 
 
Or: 
Interview 4, p.101 
“The advantages, um?  I think the society we’re living in is no 
longer a typical white British society that subscribes to some 
notion of normality.  Um, in my own caseload I think I was, I 
was just so surprised, there were just so many different 
combinations of, of families, um, what was the question?! 
 
The advantages - 
 
The advantages: that you learn a lot as a therapist.  If you’re 
open to listening to people, and actually learning from them 
and taking on board that you don’t have all the answers, I 
think is the most fantastic way of working.  Um, it may not fit 
all that easy with how we were taught to be child 
psychotherapists.” 
 
 
 As in the above example, many interviewees found it difficult to stay with the topic 
of what one might gain – quickly moving on to think about disadvantages – or to 
think in any depth about what might be learned.  I believe that Khanna’s work might 
help us to make sense of this: where something is brought out into unconcealment, 
something else must be banished and lost.  Morgan (2008) and Keval (2016) also 
emphasise the loss involved in acknowledging difference – for Keval, this is the loss 
of the sense of the familiar.  Morgan turns to Bion’s concept of K and the need to 
know the ‘different other’ in an emotional sense, rather than knowing about them.  
Here, I am raising whether it is difficult for child psychotherapists to articulate what is 
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gained from working with ‘cultural difference’ because these gains fall into the realm 
of emotional learning, rather than abstract or explicit knowledge, and are therefore 
hard to put into words.  Or (and/or) whether, following Khanna, it is difficult to think 
about the gains because with them something must also be lost, and to engage with 
this would be painful.  Khanna’s point takes us further, even: that which is lost is 
‘earthed’ out of the realm of language and cannot therefore be articulated in words.   
 
In contrast, as in the extract above, the possibility of finding ‘cultural differences’ 
liberating, of shaking up or challenging our usual way of thinking and working came 
up frequently. 
 
This last example also suggests other fantasies present: that our society was once a 
“typical” white British society.  This interviewee also suggests that society did, and 
no longer does, subscribe to a notion of ‘normality’.  I come back to fantasies relating 
to ‘normality’ and ‘neutrality’ later.   Keval (2016) discusses the fantasy of a pure, 
mythical ‘homeland’ and suggests that this is a regressive yearning for a fantasized 
‘pure’ maternal space, which is not intruded into by complexity, hybridity and 
difference.  I believe that references to a “typical white British society that subscribes 
to some notion of normality” is an example of this.  Keval holds such fantasies to be 
universal. 
 Interview 8, p.171 
“Well I have found it very enlivening and, er, you know, it has 
changed my way of working and, er, you know, I think you have a 
less stuffy approach somehow or other that, you know, er, you 
know, people can be quite matter of fact about things that, you 
know, you might throw your hands up in horror about if you 
were, you know, abiding by the kind of ideas of psychology or 
psychotherapy and so, er, I think they do that, that’s okay, 
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they live their lives, it’s, they’re managing, why, it’s not so 
bad.” 
 
Or: 
 Interview 1, p.22 
“Well, if one’s open enough to the whole um, domain of 
difference within one’s mind there’s immense advantage because 
you start to really look critically at all of your theories and 
all of your ideas really.  Um, I mean I, the way I defined 
culture earlier on was, it’s something that is, it, {pause} 
it’s comforting.  It gives you a framework and it helps you to 
be sane.  On the other hand it is limiting uh, in how you see 
the world.  So if you’re open to other possibilities, then I 
think it can be quite liberating really, or liberating is 
probably the wrong word but I think there’s, you know, there’s 
a great potential to learn more” 
 
However, this idea of liberation seemed to come at the cost of diluting theory or 
boundaries.  Davids (2011) comments on the tendency within the profession to see 
work across difference as being ‘applied’ psychotherapy.  Blackwell (2005), takes this 
view (discussing, specifically, psychotherapy with refugee or asylum-seeking clients): 
he argues that differences in the frequency of sessions, in the use of the transference 
and in the need not to foster a regression within the transference when working with 
vulnerable clients all justify the view of this as ‘specialist’ or ‘applied’ work.  These 
debates seem to create a feeling within therapists, even very experienced ones, that 
their way of working with ‘cultural difference’ means that the therapy is ‘not the real 
thing’.  I expand on this fantasy later; however, Blackwell also argues that, though the 
profession is thinking and writing more about ‘cultural difference’, there continues to 
be a lack of engagement with political and cultural issues on trainings and in training 
analyses.  This is a crucial point, and one to which I mean to return: it appears that, in 
the interview data, a split is beginning to emerge between the reality of working with 
 93 
‘cultural difference’ – which is experienced as both tricky and immensely liberating – 
and the expectations that therapists have of their own practice, their boundaries.  This 
reflects a difference between the teaching and training of child psychotherapists and 
their actual thoughts, feelings and clinical practice.   
   
‘Culture’ was also seen by the participants as a good thing: one that gave comfort or 
sanity.  One participant described culture as something that brought sustenance, shape 
and sanity to life. 
 
 Interview 1, p.8 
 “I rather love it, frankly.  I like my culture”. 
 
However, participants moved very quickly between making positive statements about 
culture and ‘cultural difference’ and then contradicting these.   
 
There was an idea that culture does not matter, or that cultural issues get taken too far 
(presumably by researchers like me!): 
 
 Interview 4, p.93 
“I also don’t like people to get too bogged down with this idea 
about culture” 
 
 
And: 
 
 
 Interview 1, p.29 
“It’s uh, in whatever that would be the case so I think it does 
matter.  How far one can change it, is very difficult really 
and if somebody accuses me of being racist or my organisation 
is called, is accused of being institutionally racist, you 
know, what am I going to do?  Say sorry or fuck off?”  
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Or: 
 Interview 4, p.103 
“Sometimes I think, um, we can also go down the road of 
difference all the time and not look at sameness.” 
 
 
Many participants also argued that psychoanalysis formed a culture of its own and 
that this rendered matters of ‘cultural difference’ irrelevant: here the fantasy begins to 
emerge that psychotherapy is universal and should be able to transcend difference. 
Interview 7, p.150 
“My view is that if one looks at it in a microscopic way in 
terms of clinical practice, and by clinical practice I mean the 
axis of what we do i.e. transference, counter-transference, 
projection, projective identification and the rest of it, I am 
actually not convinced that there is, um, er, er, a, such a 
concept of culture.”   
 
This participant went on to say that psychoanalysis forms a “pure” culture of its own: 
Interview 7, p.150 
“Um, so I suppose my view is that sociologically speaking, er, 
there is of course, um, such a thing as a culture and a 
cultural background, but my view is that the intimacy of 
psychoanalytical exchange, um, is of such order that, and I am 
again stressing when one looks at a key, key concept of 
psychoanalytical thinking, um, but particularly I have in mind 
projection and projective identification, that these processes 
are, if you like, pure culture, and by pure culture I don’t 
mean culture in sociological way, but in biological way, as it 
were” 
 
 
Other participants also used this concept of ‘purity’ in psychotherapy, both arguing 
for and against it, making ambivalent feelings quite plain: 
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Interview 1, p.12 
“you could say you know, anybody could, the culture doesn’t 
come into it at all but one has a pure sort of stance, pure 
sort of approach and a clean kind of focused interest on the 
internal world.  But I think culture seeps in in all sorts of 
ways.  Um, we do make judgments as child psychotherapists.”   
 
 
The mixed feelings of participants about the topic came across quite strongly, as they 
both seemed to enjoy speaking about the topic, particularly their own experience of 
culture, but at other moments found it irrelevant. 
 
This idea of purity in psychoanalytic technique can be traced all the way back to 
Freud.  Freud discusses the state of mind that the analyst needs to be in, in order to 
receive the material from the patient: he emphasises both the need for an “open mind, 
free from any presuppositions”(1912, p.114) and the need to be thoroughly in tune 
with one’s own unconscious – to listen both to and with the unconscious – in order to 
hear the unconscious communications of the patient.  Here, Freud emphasises a 
thorough training analysis: “It may be insisted, rather, that he should have undergone 
a psycho-analytic purification” (1912, p.116).   
 
The word ‘purity’ here seems particularly strong: as though one could expect a 
training analysis to allow the psychotherapist to transcend or surpass their flaws and 
achieve a higher being, not unlike Nietzsche’s concept of an Übermensch (Nietzsche, 
2006 [1883], Magnus, 1988).  Berman (2000, 2017) refers to this as the ‘New Person’ 
fantasy, labels it utopian and expressly links it to various religious and political 
philosophies, including fascism.  Khanna (2003) emphasises the colonial, 
Enlightenment context to Freud’s writings and specifically highlights the comparisons 
he draws between the mental processes of pathology and those of ‘primitive’ peoples 
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in Totem and Taboo (Freud, 1913).  In Khanna’s reading, Freud’s discussion of the 
primitive is directly contrasted with ‘culture’ or ‘civilization’, which she describes as 
“highly charged” terms (2003), belonging as they do to ideas of a higher level of 
intellect, thinking and mental health: colonial values.  Fanon (2008 [1952]), too, 
critiques notions of ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’ and highlights the colonial racism in 
privileging one form of culture over another; Fanon also stresses the fantasy involved 
here, in the idea of the superiority of European education and thinking over those in 
the Colonies. 
 
I argue that this notion of a “purity” of culture in psychotherapy has its links in racist, 
colonial thought.  Moreover, though it is critiqued as such (Fanon, 2008 [1952], 
Khanna, 2003), these critiques are little considered in psychotherapeutic trainings, 
where these fantasies of a ‘pure’ technique persist, despite the fact that child 
psychotherapists readily admit to enjoying the ‘freedom’ of other ways of working.  
There is therefore a split in the profession between how child psychotherapists choose 
to practice and the fantasies they hold about a pure, universal and correct form of 
technique: these fantasies appear to be perpetuated in the child psychotherapy 
trainings.  The notion of ‘purity’ recalls Keval’s (2016) description of a racist fantasy 
of a ‘pure maternal space’, which is uncontaminated by difference.  Though Keval 
links this fantasy largely to geographical boundaries and fantasies about a mythical 
‘homeland’, I suggest that the same could be argued here of the profession: a fantasy 
about a ‘pure’ psychoanalytical space within the consulting room, uncontaminated by 
issues of difference belonging to the ‘outside’ world.  Using Bourdieu’s terms, there 
is a fantasy of a psychoanalytic ‘habitus’, with its own signifying practices, in which 
the outside social world becomes irrelevant.  This thinking should ring alarm bells for 
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child psychotherapists as Keval links this fantasy to regressed, two-dimensional 
thinking.  He contrasts this with the three-dimensional thinking that is made possible 
by the Oedipal situation and which allows for spontaneous thought and curiosity 
about the other, both of which are clearly desirable! 
 
Fantasies 
Before moving on to explore the fantasies that I found to be present in the data, I 
thought it of interest to consider how the participants responded when asked about 
these directly.  I asked a number of questions relating to thoughts and fantasies about 
work with ‘cultural difference’.  Broadly, these were: 
• How do you think ‘cultural difference’ is viewed within the child 
psychotherapy profession? 
• What fantasies, perhaps unconscious, do you think circulate among child 
psychotherapists about working with ‘cultural difference’? 
 
I deliberately avoided asking directly about their own fantasies as I felt this was too 
intrusive.  However, I did ask about the impact of fantasy on clinical work: 
• How, if at all, do you think these fantasies impact on the work, or the child? 
In early interviews, I also asked: 
• What fantasies, if you are willing to share them, did you have early in your 
career, compared to now? 
 
However, I tended to skip this question in the later interviews, as it generally did not 
elicit any new information. 
 
For the purposes of this study, I have used a very broad definition of ‘fantasy’, to 
include both conscious and unconscious fantasies, and more broadly still, to include 
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also thoughts, feelings, and attitudes.  I have tried to indicate this broader use of the 
concept through the spelling ‘fantasy’, rather than the more traditional, 
psychoanalytic term, ‘phantasy’, which refers to unconscious material.  Though I 
certainly did not seek to exclude any data relating to unconscious fantasy, those 
fantasies that arise in my findings were spoken about directly and explicitly and are 
therefore manifest in the data. 
 
Interestingly, when asked about fantasy, many participants simply could not answer 
the question: 
Interview 3, p.74 
“I don’t think I can answer that.  Erm.  [Pause] I would have, 
I would have thought that different people have, have different 
fantasies.“  
 
Or:  
 Interview 7, p.156 
 “I don’t know.  I don’t know what, what other people think” 
 
And:  
 Interview 8, p.170 
 “Fantasies? I’ve got no idea.” 
 
Or some participants thought that there were simply no longer fantasies about 
‘cultural difference’ within the child psychotherapy profession:  
 
 Interview 4, p.104 
 “I don’t know if they [fantasies] still do [circulate]” 
 
And:  
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Interview 5, p.125 
“Uh-huh.  I don’t know.  I don’t, I don’t, I don’t, I don’t 
think that, um, my experience is that there has always been, 
er, an atmosphere of tolerance, you know, to, to cultural 
differences within child psychotherapy, that is the impression 
I have” 
 
It is striking that participants found it so difficult to think about what fantasies might 
be held about ‘cultural difference’, given that child psychotherapists have a long 
professional training precisely in order to be able to think about fantasy and the inner 
world.  This raises the question whether the considerable difficulty, or reluctance, that 
many participants had in thinking about our fantasies about ‘cultural difference’ might 
indicate a conflict about thinking about this.  Morgan describes why this is such a 
difficult topic to explore: 
“It raises feelings of guilt, shame, envy, denial and defiance, all of which are 
hard enough to face in the privacy of one’s own life.  To explore it publicly 
can bring up in me a fear of getting it wrong, of saying the unforgiveable and 
of exposing a badness in me”. (2014, p.65) 
 
Morgan discusses Hoggett’s (1992) assertion that in order to move from a colonial, 
uncritical form of thought, one needs first an act of aggression in order to break free 
from one’s assumptions, and then – in order to sustain the movement of thought – this 
act of aggression must be followed by an act of play.  Here, Morgan responds: 
“For me to think differently about my place in the world and the privileges it 
has brought me requires an undoing of a well-laid system of assumptions 
about myself.  The fact that those assumptions existed and continue to exist 
does not make me an inherently bad person, but to break through their 
limitations is hard work.  For Hoggett to then suggest that I am required to 
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take it further into the area of play is asking a lot.  This is not an easy subject 
to ‘play’ with”.  (2014, p.65) 
 
It seems likely that the interview situation not only provides exposure of the public 
sphere that Morgan described in the first quote – and with it all the accompanying 
anxieties she lists – but that my invitation to speculate about fantasy in the interviews 
was akin to an invitation to play with ideas, and might have been accompanied by all 
the difficulty and ambivalence that this must bring up. 
 
Morgan (2014), in the quote above, also makes an important point and one to which I 
return often: that having these well-laid systems of (racist) thought, does not make her 
a bad person.  I reassert that I hold the same view about the interviewees, and indeed 
about myself: that the difficulties engaging with the subject – and those fantasies that 
did emerge in the interview data and in the research diary or field-notes – reflect our 
society and the institutions in which child psychotherapists train, rather than 
constituting a judgement upon our own selves. 
 
Some participants, however, gave explicit and sometimes shocking answers to the 
question: 
Interview 1, p.26-27 
“What are our fantasies?  Oh gosh. {Pause} Well I’m going to be 
a bit uh, {pause} sort of unacceptable things coming into my 
mind now.  {Pause}  Well, uh, I’ll just splodge on.  I think 
the fantasies are somewhat colonial, if I can put it that way. 
 
Mm-hmm. 
 
In the sense that here are these people and uh, they’re very 
different and they have different ways but, uh, really, our 
 101 
understanding, our assumptions, our values and all the rest of 
it are really true and so we’ll bring them round to it.  So 
almost colonial missionary. 
 
Yeah. 
 
If the truth be known, everybody will deny that, yeah?  But 
actually we have it in our mind how a human being is 
constructed and all the rest of it and you’ve got to see things 
our way. 
 
I mean, taking the missionary metaphor a bit further, it’s not 
only bringing the truth but bringing the truth to rescue them 
isn’t it, to save them? 
 
Yes indeed, indeed, absolutely.  To bring them to salvation, to 
a proper cure.”   
 
Several participants explicitly named sex and violence as the most common forms of 
fantasy about difference: these I discuss more fully below, in the thematic analysis. 
 
Another fantasy explicitly named was that of ‘neutrality’: 
Interview 6, p.143 
“Well, I think there is the kind of, um, as I said, something 
about, I don’t know if this is quite a fantasy, but I think 
there is often the kind of position of somehow the therapist 
being on the neutral ground. 
 
Yeah. 
 
That they’re the one who’s sort of, I don’t know quite how to 
put it, but in the middle, in the neutral position, kind of 
majority position, and the, and that the, the cultural other is 
the other, is the, the patient.”  
 
The idea of the therapist’s being ‘neutral’ is present in psychoanalytic literature , yet 
has long been a contested concept (Greenberg, 1991); it is therefore interesting to see 
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it in the interview data.  Just as with the related idea of ‘pure’ technique, that came up 
earlier in the overview of the interview data, the concept of a ‘neutral’ therapist is 
very closely allied to a position of colonial mastery (Khanna, 2003).  Here, in the 
interview data, the idea of ‘neutrality’ seems to function as some kind of defence 
against ‘cultural difference’.  The concept of ‘neutrality’ in psychotherapy was 
discussed more fully earlier; I also chose to examine this particular idea in greater 
depth later, through discourse analysis. 
 
FINDINGS 
Data Analysis: Principal Findings 
Due to the rich nature of the interview data, the data analysis involved three 
processes: a thematic analysis allowed the breadth of all eight interviews to be 
explored and led to two principal themes.  Two further themes were chosen to be 
explored in more depth, through discourse analysis: these were ideas that arose in the 
fifth and sixth interviews and which struck me as particularly interesting.  Finally, an 
analysis of my subjective feelings and field-notes did not yield any new themes, but 
did inform the four generated by the first two stages of data analysis. 
 
The findings were as follows: 
Stage 1: Thematic Analysis: 
(a) Difference as Dangerous 
(b) A Profession in Peril 
Stage 2: Discourse Analysis 
(c) Neutrality of the Therapist 
(d) The Location of Difference 
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Stage 1: Thematic Analysis 
(A) DIFFERENCE AS DANGEROUS 
Questions about ‘cultural difference’ prompted many clinical anecdotes about patients 
from different cultures.  These were so often negative that they came together as a 
theme that difference is dangerous.  Difference was associated with violence, rape, 
paedophilia, sexual abuse, child abuse, cheating and dishonesty; it was also often 
associated with madness, disorders or deformities.  I felt there was sometimes an 
implication that, in ‘cultural difference’, the ‘bad’, violent or perverse sexual practice 
of the cultural ‘others’ produced damaged offspring.  This is a fantasy discussed at 
length by Sinason (1992) in her writings on disability; here, however, it seems to be 
attributed specifically to the sexuality of the ‘culturally different other’. 
 
These associations to ‘cultural difference’ call to mind Fanon’s (2008 [1952]) 
descriptions of colonial racism.  Fanon describes the Negro as a “phobogenic object”, 
by which he means “a stimulus to anxiety” (p.151).  Fanon goes into great detail 
about the sorts of anxieties – fantasies – aroused by the idea of the Negro: 
“This object is endowed with evil intentions and with all the attributes of a 
malefic power.  In the phobic, affect has a priority that defies all rational 
thinking. […] If an extremely frightening object, such as a more or less 
imaginary attacker, arouses terror, this is also - for most often such cases are 
those of women - and especially a terror mixed with sexual revulsion. "I'm 
afraid of men" really means, at the bottom of the motivation of the fear, 
because they might do all kinds of things to me, but not commonplace 
cruelties: sexual abuses - in other words, immoral and shameful things.” 
(p.155-156) 
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Fanon describes the violent and sexual fantasies that racial difference triggers.  
Elsewhere, he also details fantasies about intellectual inferiority, cultural inferiority 
and psychopathology – madness. 
 
For Fanon, these fantasies are not born of racism on an individual level, but belong to 
a collective unconscious: the fact of being part of a racist, colonial society instils these 
fantasies and anxieties in its members –  
“The question that arises is this: Can the white man behave healthily toward 
the black man and can the black man behave healthily toward the white man? 
A pseudo-question, some will say. But when we assert that European culture 
has an imago of the Negro which is responsible for all the conflicts that may 
arise, we do not go beyond reality.” (p.169). 
 
Hall (1996) reminds us, when discussing Fanon’s work, to bear in mind the cultural 
and historical context for this: that is, Fanon discusses specifically race relations 
within the colonial situation, and not racism or ‘cultural difference’ more generally.  
Hall (1997) also argues, however, that these historical contexts continue to lend 
meaning to social identities such as race, class, gender and, though social identities 
change, their historical legacies persist.  The legacy of colonialism therefore persists 
in our understanding of culture, difference and social identities. 
 
Khanna (2003) goes further: she argues that the development of psychoanalysis, and 
psychoanalytic theory, can only be understood in the context of the Enlightenment 
interest in the development of the self – this is specifically a national self, built in the 
context of nationalism, nation-statehood and colonialism.  For Khanna, 
psychoanalysis is dependent on colonial thought for its very existence.  Her critique is 
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that, in that psychoanalytic colonial context, ‘cultural difference’, race and gender 
(femininity) always come to be associated with the primitive and psychopathology. 
 
In the interview data that follows, some shocking fantasies – such as those described 
by Fanon and suggested by Khanna – emerge in explicit detail.  I examine my feeling 
of shock later, in the analysis of my subjective responses to the data.  I would here 
reiterate my respect for the participants and that I view the emergence of these 
fantasies as revealing much about modern society and, specifically, the professional 
trainings and institutions of child psychotherapy. Kovel (1995) reminds us that a 
‘racist society’ is one that has come to be shaped by and organised around racism.  In 
such a society (such as ours), all institutions arrange themselves around racism and 
every individual mind is touched by it: the data that follows therefore speaks volumes 
about our child psychotherapy institutions (and broader society).  Whilst several 
authors assert the universality of racist thought processes (Davids, 2011; Keval, 
2016), it is important here to acknowledge Morgan’s (2008) point about the 
importance of being able to bear this, whilst also being able to retain a sense of a 
benign self: this is what I have in mind when examining the responses of the 
interviewees. 
 
 
Sex, violence and disability 
One interviewee spoke of the disabled children from a Muslim marriage: 
 Interview 2, p.38 
“I’m supervising or keeping an eye on work with somebody from I 
think [Country 3] [mispronounces] at the moment where there’s 
a, erm, a marriage which has produced two hugely handicapped 
children … How did it happen?  Was she knocked about?” 
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Interview 2, p.39 
“One of them I think is probably, God knows what’s the matter 
with him.  I mean he’s in school I know which takes dreadfully 
bad damaged children and you know, I’ve worked with somebody in 
that school to try and help the school to er, have a bit more 
of an open mind about the kids in it ‘cause they sort of write 
them off” 
 
In clinical anecdotes, Muslim fathers in particular were portrayed as dangerous, 
violent or perverse: 
Interview 2, p.43 
“the reason that the [Muslim] dad lost his job was because he 
was accused of rape” 
 
And: 
Interview 3, p.72 
“And the other thing that was an issue er, with this child, or 
it came to light erm, that the, the child’s [Muslim] father, 
you know the mother had divorced the child’s father, but the 
child visited- 
 
Mm-hmm. 
 
-the father and er, you know, regularly and spent time there 
and it emerged eventually that er, on one of her visits to her 
father’s, she had seen the, I think he had left her playing 
around on his, you know, his equipment er, she saw some 
pornographic movies that he’d er, he’d left in a way that was 
accessible to her.” 
 
Again, disability and difficult sexual development are associated with Muslim 
families: 
Interview 6, p.139-140 
“I mean I’m thinking for instance of, um, working through an 
interpreter with, um, er, a, a religious, um, Muslim family, 
um, where, er, there was a lot of resistance to taking on board 
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that their adolescent son was learning disabled, um, and it was 
very, and he, he was really struggling with his kind of 
sexuality and how to find a way of expressing that, and it was 
a very difficult situation.” 
 
 
Sinason (1992; 1999) discusses this common fantasy – that disability, deficit or 
deformity are the product of a ‘bad’ or violent sexual union – and also highlights the 
powerful hatred and even “unremitting” (1999) murderous feelings that these unions 
and the offspring they produce elicit in others.  Sinason’s view is that the ‘damaged’ 
baby is seen in fantasy as a punishment for unhealthy, bad sexuality.  She associates it 
with “unbearable” affect, including shame, and powerlessness: the terrible pain at 
seeing damage and being unable to repair it.  Sinason links this fantasy very explicitly 
to disability, but also emphasises social class issues involved in it (giving the example 
of prostitution as a fantasised ‘bad sex’ resulting in punishment).  The fact of these 
images being so readily connected to discussions of ‘cultural difference’ begs the 
question of whether it is hatred of this scale that is mobilised in the discussants.  This 
would suggest that the splitting into good and ‘bad’ that ‘cultural difference’ might 
trigger involves not merely something negative, but very powerfully hostile indeed, to 
the extent of being murderous.   
  
Kovel (1988) argues that sexuality is an ever-present feature of racism and discusses 
the ubiquity of rape fantasies in racial prejudice.  He links this, like Fanon (2008 
[1952]), to a fantasy linking whiteness with purity, blackness with virility and sin.  
Keval (2016) is, in my view, able to take these fantasies of ‘bad’ sexuality a step 
further, as he describes what follows from these imagined violent couplings.  He links 
these fantasies to a ‘racist scene’, like the primal scene, in which a potent couple are 
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felt to be responsible for creating change, interlopers and intrusions.  The interlopers 
rob or deplete what is felt to belong rightfully to the individual, causing huge hurt, 
anxiety, and feelings of injury.  Keval asserts that, like the primal scene, this racist 
scene might be benign or malignant – such as in primal scene fantasies where the 
couple’s sexual act is imagined to be terribly violent.  For Keval, the outcomes of this 
fantasy can also be benign, sparking curiosity and concern for the other, or malignant, 
sparking terrible hatred and the need for revenge.  These more malignant elements of 
violence and hatred are associated with regressed, ‘two-dimensional’ forms of 
thinking, where a more benign experience of the fantasy requires ‘three-dimensional’ 
thinking.  In the latter, the individual is forced to face the loss and mourning that are 
forced by a recognition of the Oedipal situation (Britton, 1989).  
 
In these anecdotes, this violence, perversion and resulting disturbance was always 
attributed to Muslim families.  Muslims were even associated with murder and death: 
 
 Interview 4, p.105 
“I said I’m very aware that you’re coming to see me at a time 
when there’s been all the news about Muslims blowing up, um, 
trains and people being killed” 
 
Davids (2002) discusses Islamophobia in the wake of the September 11th attacks.  He 
comments on the depth of Islamophobia now present in Western society and suggests 
that its pervasiveness restricts our ability – here he is deliberately including 
psychotherapists in his argument – to keep an open mind.  Davids argues that it has 
long been known that racism involves splitting and projective identification, but that it 
is nevertheless striking how highly complex situations (such as the political situation 
around September 11th), when anxiety-provoking, are so easily reduced into simplistic 
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distinctions between good and bad.  Davids describes how Muslims have become a 
bad object in the Western world.  Moreover, he argues that psychoanalysis has much 
to offer in understanding the complexity of individual’s motivations, in understanding 
the effects of trauma, and the states of mind involved in despair, hopelessness, 
revenge and fundamentalist thinking.  Despite Davids’ plea that psychoanalysts make 
their contribution in this way, it is clear from the interview data – as he predicted – 
that we are hardly immune, as a profession, to the current political and social 
situation.  Davids (2016b) describes how powerful Islamophobia can reduce a 
complex social-political situation to the dynamic of an us-them duality: he argues this 
makes both sensitive observation and critical thinking extremely difficult.   The extent 
to which Muslims are portrayed in the interview data as bad objects, though on one 
level disturbing, is anticipated in the literature. 
 
Speaking about other cultural groups, too, child psychotherapists tended to use 
clinical anecdotes about sexual violence: 
 
Interview 8, p.166 
“I mean I remember a [Nationality 2] woman I saw, who, you 
know, she was persecuted by these men, I mean she’d been raped 
several times and she was persecuted by these men who were 
always coming after her” 
 
 
I was initially shocked by the number of references to sex, perversion, rape, 
pornography and so on that came up in the anecdotes told in the interviews.  
However, this should have been anticipated for two reasons.  The first being that 
several participants, at the outset, named sex and violence as being the most frequent 
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fantasies held about ‘cultural difference’: this was therefore already manifest and 
openly present in the data. 
 
 Interview 2, p.44 
“[Sighs] Is there something about violence in some cultures?  
Erm, sexuality in some cultures.” 
 
And: 
Interview 4, p.104 
“I think the whole idea about sex and violence comes up quite a 
lot, um.” 
 
 Secondly, following Fanon (2008 [1952]), and the more recent works of Kovel 
(1988) and Keval (2016) it really should come as no surprise whatsoever that ideas of 
difference immediately elicit sexual fantasies and, specifically, that perverse or 
dangerous sexual practices and desires are attributed to a ‘different’ other.  This begs 
the question of why it did shock me so much to find these ideas in the data.  Morgan 
(2008) describes our powerful defences against our own racism, which allow us to 
avoid the shame involved in owning racist thought.  It seems possible that my shock 
at finding violent, sexual material in the data – that is, the absence of any ability to 
have anticipated it – might allude to such a defence, such as the disavowal of any such 
fantasies in me.  Shame, however, was more readily accessible in the researcher’s 
subjective responses: I believe this has played a role in my decision to quote from 
field-notes, but not to make them accessible in full in the appendices.  Nevertheless, it 
remains disturbing that these fantasies are so readily expressed, as this surely has 
implications for the clinical relationship, where the fantasies form part of the counter-
transference.  This is especially troubling when one considers the lack of space given 
to this in child psychotherapy trainings (Lowe, 2014) and the tendency for them to go 
unanalysed (Morgan, 2008). 
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Neglect & Child Abuse 
Elsewhere in the interviews, the speakers focussed on parenting in other cultures, 
where this conjured up ideas of deprivation, neglect, violence and abuse. 
  
 Interview 3, p.77-79 
“I’d only had this sort of one rather er, traumatic experience 
related to Jewish culture … She was an unmarried mother and er, 
the er, people she was working with didn’t want to have the 
baby, didn’t want her to have the baby there, so he was 
fostered out and he was fostered with our family and er, his 
mother early on she used to, she used to visit regularly at- 
 
Mm-hmm. 
 
-weekends and you know, be in touch with the baby and so on er, 
but then she stopped visiting, she stopped visiting quite a 
long time, hardly ever turned up and then some years later, er, 
suddenly er, she wanted to remove the baby who, you know by 
this time didn’t recognise her anymore- 
 
Yeah. 
 
-and was, when she came er, he sort of yelled and screamed and 
held on, hung on to my mother and didn’t want to go with her” 
 
 
Several participants emphasised the need to not to conflate cultural practice with child 
abuse: 
 
Interview 4, p.94-95 
“And the other thing that I say about culture is, um, don’t say 
things are cultural when they might be something else - 
 
Okay.   
 
- if they be abusive.  And that is about a child, my baby 
observation, the mother used to do some awful things with that 
child and she used to say ‘well this is how I was treated and 
this is going to give the child backbone and help him to get 
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through work and live in a racist society’.  Well she was 
talking about herself and how she was treated, yeah. 
 
Yeah. 
 
But, um, anybody looking at that couldn’t just go down the road 
of saying that is cultural and that’s fine, because really it 
was abusive.”   
 
Other participants argued that child abuse is “normal” in other cultures: 
 Interview 8, p.166 
“I was talking to, er, this [Nationality 7] girl today and of 
course I’ve come across this before, in certain cultures it’s 
quite normal to beat your children, I mean everyone does it, 
you know.”   
And: 
 Interview 8, p. 167 
“And I’ve come across it in other cultures where, you know, 
it’s perfectly normal for them to tie the children up even and 
beat them, you know, so, so that was in, um, where was that, 
was it [Country 3], it was a little girl had been playing with 
the boys and she wasn’t supposed to do that and, you know, she 
got tied up and beaten as a result.”   
 
Generally, both parents (mothers as well as fathers) were portrayed as neglectful or 
abusive: 
Interview 8, p.168 
“quite often you’re working with a child from a very, and in 
[City 1] even more so, you know, children from very deprived 
backgrounds whose, whose father was almost inevitably in prison 
and, er, whose mother was probably alcoholic, and er, you know, 
so there was a divide there” 
 
However, as a point of contrast, there were instances where women were portrayed as 
good or helpful; men were only ever portrayed as bad.  This splitting perhaps links to 
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Keval’s theorization of the ‘racist imagination’ as a regressive fantasy of a pure 
maternal space, unintruded upon by difference. 
 
Interview 2, p.44-45 
“Though one of the very important things that I learned in 
working with somebody who was working with the most traumatised 
African woman I think I have ever heard about and maybe just 
more awful than anything else, but she had had a good mum and- 
 
Yeah. 
 
-a good grandma and rather than caving in under the most 
dreadful experiences, she was able to work with it” 
 
 
Though the above example does provide a counter-example, where mothers are 
portrayed as helpful, it also serves to illustrate the idea of ‘trauma’, which frequently 
cropped up in the interviews, in relation to ‘other’ cultures.  Children and women 
were most often seen as the victims of trauma; trauma was also associated with 
madness, hallucinations or hearing voices:  
 
 Interview 8, p.166 
“It was, they, they [the hallucinations] ceased to persecute 
her, but I didn’t think she was psychotic.  I think it was an 
expression of her trauma and, um, you know, she, she was, you 
know, she had a lot of difficulties because she had some really 
terrible experiences and that was her way of managing them” 
 
Cheating, Dishonesty and Secrets 
Other representations of ‘cultural difference’ included references to it being normal to 
swindle and cheat; or the idea that other cultures kept shameful secrets. 
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Interview 1, p.14 
“You see, I think a lot of the other cultures have perverse and 
delinquent elements in it, you know.  There are ways in which 
you do things and you, you finagle and uh, you do a little bit 
of wink, wink, wink here and a little bit of you know, deal 
here and, you know, there are different ways of doing things 
which are normal I think in other cultures.” 
 
Dishonest dealings were also portrayed as coercive: 
 Interview 3, p.78 
 “So they sort of blackmailed me that way” 
 
References were made to the keeping of dangerous secrets: 
 Interview 3, p.80 
“and probably she didn’t want to, this er, murky secret from 
her past to come out.”   
 
Taken together, I have called these many, frequent references to perverse sexuality, 
violence, madness, deformity and disability, cheating, lying and so on to form a theme 
that difference is dangerous.  As I detailed when introducing the data, there were 
references to culture as a good, comforting thing and even protective of, or giving, 
sanity.  However, these references to goodness were both far more scarce in the 
material and were all references to ‘culture’ in and of itself: all discussion of 
encounters with a culturally different ‘other’ generated anecdotes involving some sort 
of badness or danger.  It therefore appears that it is not culture, per se, that is 
perceived as bad, but that forms of difference between people are felt to be dangerous.  
Lewis (2007) discusses how ordinarily culture is racialised and how historical 
processes pervade the social.  I would therefore argue that this splitting into good and 
bad in the face of ‘cultural difference’ is a process with strong ties to racism and 
colonial histories. 
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Morgan (2008) reminds us of our need for defences to maintain the sense of a benign 
self: I would argue here that there is a need to maintain a feeling that one’s own 
culture is both good and normal.  Lewis (2000, 2007) argues that whiteness becomes 
“de-ethnicized”: it is stripped of ‘ethnicity’ in fantasy, setting it up as a category for 
normality and neutrality.  An encounter with “difference” sets up an us-them 
dynamic, which not only pervades fantasy and thinking, but becomes enacted in 
social and professional institutions (Lewis, 2000).  Davids (2016b) describes the 
powerful effect this us-them dynamic has on hindering sensitive observation and 
critical thinking – both crucial for psychoanalytic work to take place.  Lewis (2007) 
also reminds us of how racism pervades all of these processes – the setting up of 
whiteness as the norm, the splitting that follows an encounter with differences.  I 
argue here that the extraordinary fantasies of badness that are so readily present in the 
interview material are thus intimately linked with the need to establish and maintain a 
fantasy of whiteness as the norm, and a fantasy of cultural ‘neutrality’. 
 
 
A Note on the Researcher Experience  
Reviewing my research diary, I noticed that I experienced the interviews as ‘good’ or 
having gone ‘well’ when the participants expressed views that were similar to my 
own; I experienced them as ‘bad’ interviews when the participants expressed views 
that were different.  Indeed, in my subjective experience, I felt that participants either 
‘had not answered’ my questions or had misunderstood them when they expressed 
views that were not my own.  I quote from my notes in the following table: 
 
 116 
Text Researcher experience Note 
Interview 8 
Field notes: I feel disappointed 
– surely they would have had 
more interesting things to say. 
Difference – I experience 
interviews as “good” 
(interviews 1 and 6, for 
example) when they largely 
chime with my own views.  I 
experience them as “bad” 
when they are different 
Disappointment. 
Shock when I notice 
my own struggle with 
admitting a different 
point of view. 
I seem to experience 
splitting interviews into 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ according 
to whether or not they 
resonate with my own 
views.  This is a caveat to 
be borne in mind when 
analysing the data. 
 
My understanding of these field-notes is that it is possible to see the fantasy of 
‘difference being dangerous’ active here: as the seventh interviewee noted, it is not 
just ‘cultural difference’ that is felt to be difficult, but any difference of opinion: 
 
Interview 7, p.156-157 
I think that the profession is burdened by not being able to 
accept different ways of thinking, generally speaking. 
 
Moreover, I experienced the differences of opinion as straightforwardly ‘bad’, which 
is suggestive of the kind of good-bad splitting that is key part of this theme and 
fantasy: difference is dangerous. 
 
 
(B) A PROFESSION IN PERIL 
A fantasy identified in the data was that of some sort of danger to the profession.  
This theme has various strands – the thoughts came in various guises.  Among them 
was a clear link between ‘cultural difference’ and the danger to psychotherapy: this 
was an idea that acknowledging difference would force child psychotherapists to 
change their practice and that their work would no longer be ‘real’ psychotherapy.  
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Strong existential anxieties were also expressed: the fear that the profession has no 
future and might be obliterated from without; there were also views that the 
profession cannot cope with difference more generally and might somehow self-
destruct from within. The anxiety of being destroyed from within links to a fantasy of 
‘purity’ in the profession, pure technique, analytic neutrality, which I discuss in more 
detail below. Anxieties about being obliterated from without contain echoes of 
prevalent social and political anxieties about our society being overwhelmed by 
migrants – a racist discourse that was so dominant during the campaigns for the recent 
Brexit referendum and the election of President Trump in the United States.  Keval 
(2016) discusses this common anxiety and links the geographical borders of the 
‘mythical homeland’ with the fantasised, pure, maternal space of a regressed (pre-
Oedipal) space that is uncontaminated by the intrusions of difference, of the 
generational and sexual differences of the Oedipal situation, and the realities of the 
external world.  Keval argues that this fantasy is powerful as it provides a longed-for 
simplicity in thinking and a comforting sense of the familiar. 
 
 Participants expressed derogatory views about colleagues, feeling that they were 
‘out-of-touch’ or that their working practice was being eroded.  Sexual fantasies also 
arose again here, with some participants making explicit reference to malpractice 
within the child psychotherapy profession.  Taken together, I saw a theme of a 
profession that was imperilled both from without and from within: that encounters 
with difference both between colleagues and between clinicians and other members of 
society were felt to place the child psychotherapy profession under great threat. 
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Eroding clinical practice 
The clearest examples of direct links made between engaging with ‘cultural 
difference’ and a threat to the profession were made around the topic of the erosion of 
our clinical practice. 
 
Interview 5, p.125-126 
“But then I also think that maybe there is another issue which 
could be that, um, er, with cultural differences come different 
ways of doing things and that maybe that can dilute and can 
modify a way of doing, a way of working as a child 
psychotherapist.  But I, I think that er, I think going back to 
my previous answer, I really think that there is something 
about, er, not losing from sight the, the psychoanalytic 
setting and how the setting, er, is a very basic one and should 
be applied from, from any different cultural background you 
come from really 
 
Yeah. 
 
You know, so, I imagine that there must be, um, benign 
fantasies about what difference can bring and maybe some more 
and more paranoid fantasies about, er, how destructive it could 
be – 
 
Okay. 
 
- for the discipline, but again I think it, to me it goes back 
to the setting.” 
 
 
Several interviewees expressed a feeling that they had changed or adapted their 
approach in order to work with ‘cultural difference’ – this was generally seen as a 
good, liberating, necessary change, but all expressed an anxiety that it would be seen 
as ‘applied’ work, ‘unboundaried’ or somehow not ‘real’ psychotherapy by other 
members of the profession.   
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 Interview 1, p.23 
“That’s what he talked about.  Um, fortunately, dare I say, I 
wasn’t being supervised by anybody {laughs} because I’m sure 
somehow or other that would have been questioned.” 
 
Or:  
 Interview 4, p.101 
“It [working cross-culturally] may not fit all that easy with 
how we were taught to be child psychotherapists”. 
 
Ryan (2017) argues that the distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ work within 
psychoanalysis serves to perpetuate a hierarchy within the profession and that this 
process is a form of symbolic violence, which serves to maintain class divisions. 
 
Others expressed a view that, should working practice change too much, the 
profession could cease to exist. 
 
Interview 6, p.145 
And I, I feel anxious about, like everyone, about the future of 
the profession, but I don’t think it’s just about whether we 
survive in the NHS or not, I think it’s about whether, um, the 
training survives as a psychoanalytic training, yeah.  Um and I 
guess, you know, we’re talking about cultural shifts, other 
people might put it in more positive terms of, er, necessary 
adaptions and developments, but I see a great many, kind of, 
losses and I guess that’s true in any kind of cultural shift. 
 
The fantasy that working with ‘cultural difference’ is somehow not ‘real’ 
psychotherapy suggests a continued, and unviable, fantasy of neutrality in the analytic 
situation in our theoretical framework as child psychotherapists.  This speaks to an 
urgent need for the trainings to change. 
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There was also a return to the fantasy that psychoanalysis forms a ‘pure’ culture of its 
own, free from intrusion by difficult encounters across cultural difference: 
 
 Interview 7, p.153 
“However, I think that the fundamental work, psychoanalytic 
work and I think here all, um, of key theoretical concepts 
posed by key theoreticians of psychoanalysis and in my line of, 
um, of education that would be Freud, Klein, Bion and neo-
Kleinians, that the concept that, er, they put forward, that 
are part of my own, are actually, er, defined in such a way 
that, um, that is free, er, from “contamination”, and I use 
that word advisedly and in inverted commas of course - 
 
Yeah. 
 
- as possible.  I am talking yet again of transference, 
countertransference, projection, projective identification.” 
 
The interviewee here makes clear that their use of the term “contamination” is 
qualified; it is, nevertheless, a strong word to have chosen.  This relates to a fantasy 
that engagement across cultural difference could erode professional standards and that 
the theoretical basis of the profession is therefore defended against this.  Morgan 
(2008) makes a similar point she asserts that psychoanalytic theory is universal and 
robust enough to withstand ‘external attack’ in the form of engaging with critique and 
also the ‘internal angst’ of the profession: I have earlier argued that this reveals a wish 
for psychoanalysis to form a “master discourse” (Auestad, 2015). 
   
The profound existential anxieties present in these interviews about the survival of the 
profession give expression to points raised by Dalal (2011) about our contact with 
difference and experience of change.  Dalal argues that any genuine engagement with 
difference (with other viewpoints that it brings) must be terrifying as it involves the 
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possibility that I might change and thereby become other to myself.  Though he sees 
this as a hopeful process – bringing as it does the possibility of growth and 
transformation – the anxieties it raises are profound, a fear of the total loss of the self.  
Dalal describes this as a “profound loss” and, indeed, the scale of this sort of anxiety 
is given expression in this interview data.  Keval’s (2016) descriptions of the anxiety 
about change focus more on fears of being robbed and depleted by different others:  I 
believe that both of these points are relevant here, as interviewees appeared to express 
fears of the profession being destroyed both from within and from without. 
 
 
Coping with difference within the profession 
Several interviewees felt that the child psychotherapy profession has difficulty 
tolerating difference, more generally speaking, between colleagues.  This topic arose 
both in relation to cultural or racial differences: 
 
 Interview 4, p.109 
“Increasingly black therapists come into the profession and 
they struggle with a whole lot of things to do with how they’re 
received by their colleagues, whether they’re seen to be at the 
same level, whether their own cultural background, whether my 
[Nationality 1]-ness interferes with how I can be a proper 
child psychotherapist.  I don’t think it does, I think it 
enhances it.  But if you have that stereotype or that fantasy 
that this black child psychotherapist in training is not as 
good as you in terms of this, you’re repeating the whole 
process of racism.” 
 
However, several interviewees also expressed an idea that the profession is unable to 
tolerate differences more generally: 
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Interview 4, p.103 
But the profession I think is still struggling to acknowledge 
difference and the important of difference.   
 
Or:  
Interview 7, p.156 
“I think that our profession is burdened with struggles in 
terms of, er, of its ability to accord a difference, er, of any 
kind really, and by that I don’t really mean, you know, the, 
um, cultural differences in terms of, er, er, er, language, 
background, ethnicity, race, er, I, I also think that, I also 
by that mean and I suppose most importantly that the profession 
is very burdened with an ability to accept, accept, er, a 
difference in, er, thinking more broadly, which I think is more 
pernicious.  I have to be careful about it, but that it is very 
pernicious to the pr-profession” 
 
Putting it even more bluntly: 
 
 Interview 7, p.157 
“I think that the profession as a group has a tendency, er, to 
accept what it recognises as familiar and finds it greatly 
difficult to accommodate what it does not recognise as 
familiar” 
 
From the interviews, it would appear that quite a complex dynamic exists within the 
child psychotherapy profession, where child psychotherapists feel an external threat 
of posts being cut and that their skills are no longer welcome; however, there also 
seems to be a sense of attack between professionals, whereby child psychotherapists 
see members of the profession as being both victims and aggressors. 
Interview 6, p.144-145 
“I’m thinking of something else which is about, um, the real, 
the, the, the real, you know, that there’s so much existential 
anxiety in the child psychotherapy profession at the moment 
[Mm-hm] and there’s such a kind of sense of being embattled and 
I think there’s a real difficulty in finding a kind of position 
where, um, one can hold on to and feel the value in our, um, 
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psychoanalytic culture, as it were.  And I feel that there’s 
such a, my own feeling, I mean there’s, you know, there’s the 
kind of temptation to denigrate any other sort of, um, 
approach. 
 
Yeah. 
 
But I also feel that there’s a great, er, sort of, in my own 
view a kind of, um, self-denigrating, overly compromising 
abasement, as it were, you know.  That there’s a kind of, um, I 
don’t know, maybe this is just my own bee in my bonnet, but I 
think there is something about a way in which we take on - I’m 
finding my way here with this answer - but that we, we take on 
perhaps the deprived, um, mistreated identity, you know, and 
that, that we end up somehow this, er, embattled, um, weakened 
sort of, er, pushed out presence, having to greatly adapt our 
way of working because otherwise, you know, if we don’t agree 
to, um, you know, do an outcome measure at the end of each 
session then we won’t be able to prove our worth and we’re 
going to be kicked out.” 
 
Being ‘out-of-touch’ 
Many participants expressed anxieties about clinical practice, which took the form 
either of worrying that they might not be able to make a ‘connection’ with a patient 
across ‘cultural difference’, or a more derogatory view that colleagues within the 
profession were out-of-touch.  There were examples of moments during interviews, 
where the interviewee suggested (and I, in my subjective response, agreed) that older 
members of the profession were particularly out-of-touch: I found myself wondering 
whether this was an example of the profession being threatened from within, through 
hostility between professionals, or whether this might be an instance of projection, 
where both the interviewee and I projected our own prejudice and intolerance into 
others.  Morgan (2008), emphasises how difficult it is to own one’s own prejudices, 
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due to the terrible shame this causes, as well as the need to hold onto a sense of a 
benign (not racist) self. 
 
Child psychotherapists’ anxieties about their own clinical practice and ability to make 
connections took the form of feeling useless, inadequate or redundant: 
 
Interview 8, p.171 
“I think it is sometimes a feeling of, of uselessness really 
that you’re, you’re never going to get through and that they’re 
suspicious of you because you’re a different culture and, and 
you’re not going to be able to make contact.  I don’t know that 
it’s a fantasy; it’s a reality, but yeah.” 
 
This feeling of uselessness led clinicians to doubt their clinical practice: 
 
Interview 5, p.128-129 
“I do think there is something about being different, you know, 
which triggers a series of anxieties, you know, and I think it 
puts your unconscious in a particular frame, you know.  I 
think, er, I think you question yourself a lot more, er, if you 
are going to be able to understand someone who is very 
different from you, culturally different from you, and I think 
if you are questioning consciously yourself it’s because 
probably unconsciously, er, there is something that you fear 
might not connect, you know, with the patient.” 
 
Other participants expressed more derogatory views about their colleagues’ abilities 
to connect to the patient: 
 
 Interview 1, p.13 
And I think they’re quite judgmental really. 
I don’t think they really understand culturally where an awful 
lot of these kids are coming from. 
 
Mm-hmm. 
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And being more explicit: 
Interview 1, p.14 
“I think child psychotherapy predominantly is filled with, with 
middle class women really. 
 
Yeah. 
 
And women comes into it here because I think that middle class 
and women create a particular kind of judgmentalist, that make 
them particularly judgmental. There’s something about, I don’t 
even know what I’m talking about but I, I know I’m talking 
about something important. {both laugh}  […] And then they 
fortify themselves with uh, concepts of perverse and perversion 
or delinquent or, all these terms which they’re not comfortable 
with.  They’re not comfortable with delinquency. They’re not 
comfortable with perversions.  Um, they’re very happy with 
little babies because that doesn’t offend their sensibilities.” 
 
It is interesting that the interviewee here named “middle-class women” and neglected 
to say white middle-class women.  This speaks to Lewis’ (2000, 2007) arguments that 
the majority becomes de-ethnicized and experiences itself as the norm, without 
‘ethnicity’, which then belongs only to others.  The interviewee’s last point here, of 
being “very happy with little babies” concords with Raphael-Leff’s (2010) assertion 
that the profession has idealised the mother-infant dyad and that psychoanalytic 
theory is distorted as a result; Brooks (2014) raises a similar point about the 
profession’s tendency toward idealizations and the distortions of theory that ensue. 
 
The interviewee also describes these ‘middle class women’ as: 
 Interview 1, p.14 
 “somewhat repulsed by the common qualities of people”. 
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Here, there is an acknowledgement both of how dominated the child psychotherapy 
profession is by the middle classes, but also of social class hatred.  Ryan (2017) 
argues that class evokes “extremely charged and difficult emotions” (p.1); she also 
reminds us of the complex intersection between class and culture and argues that 
psychoanalytic institutions have been slow to engage with issues of social class.  In 
the above example from the interview, this class hatred is attributed to other members 
of the profession – that is, neither to the interviewee, nor to myself, the researcher. 
 
As well as more benign discussions of ‘feeling useless’, some participants made 
reference to dangerous practice within the profession, such as malpractice.  This 
echoed the views expressed in the earlier theme of ‘difference as dangerous’, as ideas 
about sex and exploitation arose again: 
 
 Interview 1, p.17 
“We have a, a consulting room upstairs which I don’t use 
actually anymore, interestingly because I just found it, became 
aware, because in, when I start, this is slightly off subject, 
when I first practised there, you know, uh, sex abuse and uh, 
uh, malpractice and all this sort of stuff, then, you, you 
know, uh, uh, and there were some therapists having it off with 
their patients” 
 
 
A Note on Researcher Subjectivity 
An exploration of my research diary, or field-notes, shows some anxieties about my 
professionalism as a researcher.  These, I believe, echo the fantasies raised by the 
interviewees about ‘feeling useless’. 
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Text Subjective Feeling Comment 
Interview 4 
Field notes: “Problems 
with the dictaphone – I 
feel like a fuckwit” 
Shame.  I feel ignorant, I 
feel as though I am 
wasting the participants’ 
time.  I am acutely aware 
of their status as a senior 
member of the profession 
 
Ignorance and shame are now 
located in me 
 
 
Interview 8 
Field notes: “Am I at 
fault?  Perhaps I did 
not ask the right 
questions to tap into 
their expertise? 
Tried to make small 
talk after and felt 
foolish” 
 
I worry that I am 
inadequate as a 
researcher. 
I feel foolish 
 
I am anxious about my 
professionalism, my abilities as 
a researcher. 
 
 
 
In these examples, I feel foolish, stupid even, and anxious about my ability to carry 
out the research.  This is reminiscent of the anxieties raised by the interviewees about 
their own skills as professionals and the future of the profession more broadly.  I 
believe the fantasies identified in the interviews to be active in the research process 
itself (that is, in me). 
 
I also notice, here, that the word I used in my research diary when describing my 
feelings of inadequacy and foolishness after the fourth interview was “fuckwit”.  
Here, I note Keval’s (2016) discussion of the use of the word “fuck” in derogatory, 
racist language: he links this to a ‘racist scene’, a primal scene in which a potent 
couple are felt to produce interlopers, who rob or deplete what belongs to the 
individual.  Sinason (1989, 1992) discusses the many euphemisms we employ to 
describe ‘stupidity’ and discusses a fantasy present in the disabled child, their parents, 
and society at large, that intellectually damaged offspring are produced of a bad or 
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violent sexual coupling – another primal scene fantasy.  My word is suggestive of this 
fantasy – that someone’s (my) wits have been damaged or depleted by a bad sexual 
act/coupling.  I believe that this apparently casual choice of words in my research 
notes might actually signal the presence of these (derogatory) fantasies. 
 
 
Stage 2: Discourse Analysis 
(C) THE NEUTRALITY OF THE THERAPIST 
Burck (2005), in her research in systemic family therapy, uses an adaptation of Gee’s 
(1999) approach to analysing discourse.   Gee suggests breaking a text into poetry-
like ‘stanzas’, in order to draw out the detail of concepts more clearly.  Gee’s method 
is to limit each line to one grammatical clause or one main idea.  Burck’s approach to 
this style of data analysis is to highlight the ‘refrain’ in the discourse.  I have done 
likewise. 
 
I chose two extracts to examine using discourse analysis: these were two ideas in two 
interviews that particularly struck me and stuck in my mind.  This might be seen as an 
instance of using the researcher’s subjectivity, or counter-transference, to guide the 
process of data analysis, insofar as these feelings led me to choose these particular 
themes to examine more closely.   
 
The first of these ideas was the fantasy that the therapist is ‘neutral’ and was 
discussed by the sixth interviewee: 
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Interview 6, p.140-143 
 
Um, so sometimes it’s more obvious, 
but I think often it’s played out 
in a much more subtle way 
and one of the things 
is to kind of not assume,  
I guess, 
that you’re, you’re somehow on neutral ground! 
… 
Yeah, well it’s interesting isn’t it,  
because one always gives that example 
and it, it shows how much your default position 
is to think of  
the neutral therapist  
and the other sort of patient,  
and all of these examples, it’s always, you know, 
the white therapist 
working with the black patient,  
you know, and it’s, I mean that’s why,  
and I did give that example  
and I think it points  
to a kind of prejudice.  
… 
Um, so, yeah 
there’s something to manage there 
in terms of one’s own position 
that can feel quite different, 
um, and, um, and also in terms of, you know, 
when you say power relations 
I think that’s true as well 
that, er, it can feel very different 
when you, and, when you  
work with a family  
where you do feel  
the parents are powerful 
and I’ve also had that experience,  
people who are prominent 
or wealthy in a way,  
and it can be very, 
um,  
anxiety provoking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Refrain) 
 
 
 
 
(Refrain) 
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when things perhaps don’t go smoothly. 
It can be hard to manage 
one’s kind of paranoia.  
… 
  
Well, I think  
there is the kind of, 
um, as I said,  
something about, 
I don’t know if this is quite a fantasy,  
but I think there is often 
the kind of position 
of somehow the therapist 
being on the neutral ground. 
 
Yeah. 
 
That they’re the one 
who’s sort of,  
I don’t know quite how to put it, 
but in the middle, 
in the neutral position, 
kind of majority position,  
and the, and that the,  
the cultural other 
is the other,  
is the, the patient.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Refrain) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Refrain) 
 
 
This interviewee makes explicit not only the fantasy that the therapist is able to be 
somehow “neutral”, but also refers to the flip-side of this idea, which is that the 
patient is the “other”, that is a ‘different other’. 
 
Here, it is useful to think of Khanna’s (2003) argument a person (therapist) cannot 
occupy a particular position without ‘banishing’ the other into its inverse.  To put it in 
her terms, for something to be in unconcealment, in the ‘world’, the other is ‘earthed’.  
Following her thought, one could go so far as to say that in order for the therapist to 
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feel normal, or to hold a fantasy of being on neutral ground, all the badness and 
difficulty associated with difference must be projected into the patient and 
‘concealed’ within him or her.  
 
Like Khanna (2003), Davids (2011) holds that unwanted parts of the self must be 
contained by the ‘different other’, and never allowed to be seen for what they are.  
Davids (2011) uses the term “the racial other” throughout his discussion of internal 
racism and chooses to do so both to avoid confusion with the first ‘other’, the not-me, 
the mother, and with the second ‘other’ of the father in the Oedipal configuration – an 
other to the mother-child dyad.  However, he uses the term in an exploration of “the 
internal relationship between self and “other” of social stereotyping” (p.15) and I 
argue that that is consistent here with the paired positions of normal/ neutral self and 
‘different other’. 
 
Davids (2011) writes about racial differences, but does state that his model of internal 
racism could be applied to other forms of difference.  He holds that there exists an 
organised internal template of racism – a defensive organisation – which serves to 
defend against massive anxiety.  This governs the relationship between the self (rid of 
all split-off unwanted aspects) and the other (now containing these).  This 
organisation dictates that the object must be seen as different and never as normal. 
 
I argue that this mechanism could equally be true of ‘cultural differences’, which are 
‘picked up on’ even if they are less visible than differences of race.  I believe Davids’ 
model to be the most appropriate for making sense of the findings of this study: where 
the self must always be preserved as normal and the other as containing all difference, 
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and, more specifically, where this difference is perceived to be something bad.  Since 
my first finding in this study was that difference is seen as dangerous and is variously 
associated with madness, deficiency, violence, sexual perversion and lies, it follows 
that for the therapist to enjoy ‘neutrality’, they rid themselves not just of being 
‘different’, but of everything this stands for: all the madness and badness detailed 
earlier.   
 
Davids (2011) holds that this defensive us-them organisation will redouble its efforts, 
should the other be glimpsed – even momentarily – as ordinary, for under the 
organisation, the other must always be seen as different; Davids argues that this is the 
case as the defensive organisation is needed to defend against overwhelming anxiety.  
I suggest that seeing the other as ordinary causes such massive anxiety because it 
threatens one’s own sense of normality.  A further question is to consider the nature 
of the anxiety raised.  Considering the thoughts child psychotherapists had about how 
to define culture – “The air you breathe” (Interview 8, p.163) – I would go so far as 
to suggest that it might sometimes be annihilatory anxiety: I believe this is what is 
expressed in the fantasy that the child psychotherapy profession is in peril.  At other 
times, seeing the other as ordinary might cause anxiety because it could threaten the 
role the other has in containing split-off parts of the self: I speculate that one’s sense 
of normality is threatened by having to own any madness or badness.  Morgan (2008) 
writes the need to maintain a sense of a benign self can prevent us from recognising 
our own racism; I speculate that this need for a “benign” self includes one that is both 
broadly ‘good’ and ‘sane’ and that this is why it is so difficult to take back the split-
off parts of the self that are projected into, and contained within, the culturally 
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different other.  Putting it differently, the fantasy of a benign self is an important part 
of feeling that the self is “normal”. 
 
Discourse in Context 
Gee (1999), whilst acknowledging that discourse analysis allows the researcher to 
examine the text in detail, emphasises the need to consider the wider context of the 
material.  I therefore present this same material in its original context below and have 
highlighted in grey the extracts used in the discourse analysis: 
 
Interview 6, p. 139-145 
Yeah.  Um, what about clinical practice, either with the child or 
with their parents, how do you think cultural, cultural difference 
impacts on that? 
 
Well I think that, um, inevitably it does.  Er, again I, I sort of 
feel the question is, um, [pause] quite vague in a way. 
 
Yes it is. 
 
I mean I’m just thinking, you know, maybe that’s deliberate, but that 
how, I mean, in any kind of exchange there’s going to be all sorts of 
questions about what people are bringing from their own kind of wider 
social context.  Um, so, I mean sometimes that’s really in your face 
and you have to kind of figure out ways of saying things across what 
you feel is a kind of gulf.  I mean I’m thinking for instance of, um, 
working through an interpreter with, um, er, a, a religious, um, 
Muslim family, um, where, er, there was a lot of resistance to taking 
on board that their adolescent son was learning disabled, um, and it 
was very, and he, he was really struggling with his kind of sexuality 
and how to find a way of expressing that, and it was a very difficult 
situation.  And, um, there, er, there was something about finding a 
way of speaking to his mother in particular, where she was able to 
say, well, God made him this way, is that what you’re trying to tell 
me, that God made him this way.  And that I kind of said yes to that, 
because I felt it was, it was like, um, what I was trying to get at 
was, you know, this is a young man who came to the world in a kind 
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of, with certain difficulties.  It was very likely from his history 
he’d always had these learning difficulties and always would.  And so 
in that sense sometimes you feel, you know, you need to kind of adapt 
how you’re speaking. 
 
Um, so sometimes it’s more obvious, but I think often it’s played out 
in a much more subtle way and one of the things is to kind of not 
assume, I guess, that you’re, you’re somehow on neutral ground! 
 
Yeah. 
 
You know, that you, you know, as if you don’t represent something to 
them, being, you know, I’ve talked about my very mixed background, 
but, you know, I’m a white man, that’s going to mean something to 
someone, um, yeah. 
 
Okay, um, do you think there are any particular advantages to working 
across cultures, [pause] or disadvantages? 
 
Um.  Well, I guess there can certainly be an advantage in terms of 
understanding when two people share a certain kind of background, I 
suppose that’s true, um.  And I, I think working across cultures, one 
always has to be very aware of the kind of, er, extent of one’s 
potential ignorance, um, and of the kind of relationships, the, the 
kind of historical background that might become part of the 
relationship, as it were.  And I’m thinking particularly about 
histories of oppression, of power relationships between cultures, you 
know, and I, and I, I’m thinking of that both in terms of racial 
relations but also class. 
 
Mm-hmm. 
 
So I think if, you know, if you’re working with someone from a 
working class northern background and you’re speaking in a well-
spoken middle class southern voice, that’s got a particular kind of 
meaning. 
 
Yes. 
 
Yeah.  Yeah and there’s a history behind that and, and a present 
obviously as well. 
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Yeah. 
 
Yeah.  Yeah.   
 
What advice would you give to a colleague who was going to take on a 
case that was going to be working across some kind of difference? 
 
Um, well, it’s interesting you’re asking these questions, um, and 
it’s making me reflect, because of course in a setting like this 
you’re doing that all, all the time, for, I mean, you know, I guess 
in a way I feel, um, with my own cultural background, it’s always 
across cultures, and, and maybe that’s true for everyone to some 
extent, um, and I think it’s certainly true, yeah, here and in my 
private practice, everywhere I work really.  Um, I guess I would, you 
know, if, and it’s not something that is thought about a lot in an 
everyday kind of way I don’t feel, and probably not reflected on 
enough in a way, and I’m not sure, I’d need to think about it more 
really.  I think I’d try to use some of the reflections that I’ve 
been doing in this interview, I guess. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Yeah.  Yeah.  Yeah. 
 
You, you mentioned social class. 
 
Uh-huh. 
 
Um, I was, I mean you, you mentioned also, um, sort of historical 
power relations and the example you gave was a sort of a southern 
middle class therapist potentially with a northern working class 
family.  What about when it happens the other way around. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Do you encounter in your private practice people from more upper 
class backgrounds or not? 
 
Yeah, well it’s interesting isn’t it, because one always gives that 
example and it, it shows how much your default position is to think 
of the neutral therapist and the other sort of patient, and all of 
these examples, it’s always, you know, the white therapist working 
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with the black patient, you know, and it’s, I mean that’s why, and I 
did give that example and I think it points to a kind of prejudice.  
Um, yes, it has been very interesting because, um, in my private work 
I do sometimes work with very wealthy, um, I guess, upper class kind 
of families.  Sometimes upper class in sort of thinking aristocratic 
background, sometimes people who’ve made a lot of money, sure, but 
yes, and it is very different, because when you’re, um, in a, in a 
setting where often you’re, the families you work with, your patients 
or whatever are from much more deprive-deprived backgrounds from your 
own, you’re managing one set of issues, but you don’t have to manage 
your own envy in the same way 
 
Yeah! 
 
that you do when working say with someone who, you know, say with 
children who, you know, don’t have to work and will never have to 
work in their whole life, who will have access, esp-especially having 
children of one’s own for instance and working perhaps with children 
from families where they can access all sorts of things that one 
can’t.  A private education and amazing trips, experiences, things 
that you, you feel that you’ve never had and never will have and that 
your children won’t have.  
 
Um, so, yeah there’s something to manage there in terms of one’s own 
position that can feel quite different, um, and, um, and also in 
terms of, you know, when you say power relations I think that’s true 
as well that, er, it can feel very different when you, and, when you 
work with a family where you do feel the parents are powerful and 
I’ve also had that experience, people who are prominent or wealthy in 
a way, and it can be very, um, anxiety provoking when things perhaps 
don’t go smoothly.  It can be hard to manage one’s kind of paranoia.  
Yeah.  Yeah.  So it is interesting. 
 
Yeah.  Um… 
 
And it, and it’s interesting sometimes, you know, on occasion to 
really be treated like [clicks fingers], you know, the stable boy or, 
you know, and it’s obviously part of the, the psychotherapeutic 
relationship, but it’s a different position to kind of manage. 
 
Yeah. 
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Yeah.  Yeah. 
 
Um, I wanted to ask you a, a bit about fantasies, conscious and 
unconscious.  Um, I was wondering how you think cultural difference 
is viewed within the profession? 
 
Fantasies? 
 
Hmm. 
 
So you’re asking me how cultural differences are viewed within the 
profession, but, but, but wanting a reply in terms of what sort of 
fantasies there might be? 
 
Or, yeah, what you, what sort of fantasies you think circulate within 
the profession about it, either consciously held ones or unconscious 
ones. 
 
Yeah. [Pause] Hmm.  Hmm.  Well, I think there is the kind of, um, as 
I said, something about, I don’t know if this is quite a fantasy, but 
I think there is often the kind of position of somehow the therapist 
being on the neutral ground. 
 
Yeah. 
 
That they’re the one who’s sort of, I don’t know quite how to put it, 
but in the middle, in the neutral position, kind of majority 
position, and the, and that the, the cultural other is the other, is 
the, the patient.  I think often with a lot of the profession working 
in context where, um, where the patients are so deprived and, um, and 
yeah, I don’t know, I was going to say - I find that a difficult 
question to answer though in terms of what sort of fantasies.  I mean 
I think there’s a way in which one has to, in which everyone is a - I 
mean I think there are, in a way, are kind of fantasies that operate 
through a society, you know, that, that, so, you know, that, and 
which child psychotherapists, like everyone else, are kind of 
interacting with, you know 
 
Yeah. 
 
um, and certain kind of cultural stereotypes within our society that 
you are having to think of, well, or should be reflecting on and 
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thinking about in your work, like, I don’t know, the violent young 
black man, you know! 
 
Yeah. 
 
Or, or, um, but, I mean I think, to, to slightly add a - to put a 
different kind of angle on the question as well and maybe, I don’t 
know if this is - I mean I’m also thinking about therapeutic cultures 
which is, you know, because your questions are quite vague, and I’m 
thinking of something else which is about, um, the real, the, the, 
the real, you know, that there’s so much existential anxiety in the 
child psychotherapy profession at the moment [Mm-hm] and there’s such 
a kind of sense of being embattled and I think there’s a real 
difficulty in finding a kind of position where, um, one can hold on 
to and feel the value in our, um, psychoanalytic culture, as it were.  
And I feel that there’s such a, my own feeling, I mean there’s, you 
know, there’s the kind of temptation to denigrate any other sort of, 
um, approach. 
 
Yeah. 
 
But I also feel that there’s a great, er, sort of, in my own view a 
kind of, um, self-denigrating, overly compromising abasement, as it 
were, you know.  That there’s a kind of, um, I don’t know, maybe this 
is just my own bee in my bonnet, but I think there is something about 
a way in which we take on - I’m finding my way here with this answer 
- but that we, we take on perhaps the deprived, um, mistreated 
identity, you know, and that, that we end up somehow this, er, 
embattled, um, weakened sort of, er, pushed out presence, having to 
greatly adapt our way of working because otherwise, you know, if we 
don’t agree to, um, you know, do an outcome measure at the end of 
each session then we won’t be able to prove our worth and we’re going 
to be kicked out.  And so I, I feel that there is something, a, a 
kind, it’s - I don’t know.  I don’t know whether that’s in your 
remit, but I feel… 
 
It is in my remit, yeah. 
 
Yeah.  Yeah.  Yeah.  So, I guess that’s something that I think, you 
know, this kind of being in the deprived position somehow or the, the 
kind of, the real struggle to feel the value of what we do, I think, 
not to kind of just fold and become something else. 
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Uh-huh. 
 
Yeah. 
 
And do you think that that is impacting on the work that we’re doing 
at the moment? 
 
Yeah, I’m sure it is.  I’m sure it is.  And I, I feel anxious about, 
like everyone, about the future of the profession, but I don’t think 
it’s just about whether we survive in the NHS or not, I think it’s 
about whether, um, the training survives as a psychoanalytic 
training, yeah.  Um and I guess, you know, we’re talking about 
cultural shifts, other people might put it in more positive terms of, 
er, necessary adaptions and developments, but I see a great many, 
kind of, losses and I guess that’s true in any kind of cultural 
shift. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Yeah okay, um, that’s, sort of, brought me to the end of my 
questions.  Is there anything else that you want to mention? 
 
I don’t think so, no. 
 
 
Here we see that the interviewee referred to a fantasy of “neutrality” four times in a 
short space of time during this interview. 
 
Given that the concept of analytic neutrality is largely discredited in the literature 
(Balint & Balint, 1939; Goldstein & Goldberg, 2004; Greenberg, 1991; Renik, 1995, 
1996), it is interesting that the interviewee invoked it on several occasions. 
 
 
 140 
First extract 
This follows a description of a difficult piece of clinical work.  The interviewee 
suggests this is difficult work in a number of ways: 
Difficult clinical work 
• “sometimes that’s [the ‘wider social context’] really in your 
face” 
• “you have to kind of figure out ways of saying things across 
what you feel is a kind of gulf” 
• “working through an interpreter” 
• “there was a lot of resistance” 
• “he was really struggling” 
• “it was a very difficult situation” 
• “there was something about finding a way of speaking to his 
mother” 
 
 
The interviewee then also names a number of areas of difference in this particular 
case, namely: 
Areas of ‘difference’ 
• “a religious, um, Muslim family” 
• “their adolescent son was learning disabled” 
• “his kind of sexuality” 
 
Here, we are reminded of intersectionality (Ahmed, Castañeda, Fortier & Sheller, 
2003; Crenshaw, 1989; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; Marriott, 2007): that the many 
axes of difference are inextricably linked.   
 
Finally, examining the resolution of this clinical vignette: 
“…is that what you’re trying to tell me, that God made him this 
way.  And that I kind of said yes to that” 
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I would suggest that there are several factors here that might provoke intense anxiety: 
a difficult piece of clinical work; an encounter with several different kinds of 
‘difference’; and a clinical ‘interpretation’ that might have felt outside the boundaries 
of more ‘orthodox’ clinical practice (‘God made him this way’). 
 
Second Extract 
Before the second mention of ‘neutrality’, there are a couple of references to 
ignorance, or perhaps to a situation of ‘not knowing’: 
Ignorance/ ‘Not Knowing’ 
• “one always has to be very aware of the kind of, er, extent of 
one’s potential ignorance” 
• “probably not reflected on enough in a way, and I’m not sure” 
 
Historical context 
• “I’m thinking particularly about histories of oppression, of 
power relationships between cultures, you know, and I, and I, 
I’m thinking of that both in terms of racial relations but also 
class.” 
 
Whiteness  
• “I’m a white man” 
 
 
Third and Fourth Extracts 
Social Class 
• “I do sometimes work with very wealthy, um, I guess, upper 
class kind of families” 
• “Sometimes upper class in sort of thinking aristocratic 
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background, sometimes people who’ve made a lot of money” 
• “on occasion to really be treated like [clicks fingers], you 
know, the stable boy” 
 
Envy 
• “but you don’t have to manage your own envy in the same way” 
• “children who, you know, don’t have to work and will never have 
to work in their whole life, who will have access, esp-
especially having children of one’s own for instance and 
working perhaps with children from families where they can 
access all sorts of things that one can’t.  A private education 
and amazing trips, experiences, things that you, you feel that 
you’ve never had and never will have and that your children 
won’t have.”  
 
Examining the wider context suggests that there are various elements in this 
conversation that might be anxiety-provoking.  This then begs the question of whether 
the notion of ‘neutrality’ or a ‘neutral therapist’ is invoked defensively to ward-off 
this anxiety: I am, however, wary of “overstretching the clinic” (Hook, 2008) and 
interpreting the interview material beyond the ethical and methodological remits of 
the research.  It is, nevertheless, helpful to note the context of this discourse on 
neutrality, as it draws our attention to issues of social class, which remain under-
examined and under-theorised in psychoanalysis (Ryan, 2006, 2014, 2017), of 
historical, colonial relations (Khanna, 2003) and the possibility of ‘whiteness’ being 
set up as the neutral category (Lewis, 2000, 2007).  Moreover, it gives a real flavour 
of how anxiety-provoking it can be to think about issues of ‘cultural difference’. 
 
Putting this idea into slightly different terms, it is possible to wonder whether – in the 
face of the complexities of ‘cultural difference’, the interviewee invokes a fantasy of 
neutrality, despite this having been widely argued against in the psychoanalytic 
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literature, in order to invoke some sort of psychoanalytic ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977 
[1972]).  As other interviewees described culture as something that gave comfort or 
sustenance, it might be argued that a retreat into a psychoanalytic ‘habitus’ is more 
comfortable experience than those described above by the interviewee. 
 
A Note on Researcher Subjectivity 
An exploration of my field-notes, kept both in the form of a research diary and 
comments in the margins of the first-draft transcripts of interviews, shows this fantasy 
of the therapist, self (or researcher) as ‘neutral’ to be operative through the research 
process.  I list some of these in the table below: 
 
Text Researcher Subjectivity Comment 
Interview 1, p.7 
Um, I’m white, 
obviously.  English. 
(…) 
Lower middle class 
background up to 
whatever kind of 
professional middle 
class I am now 
I come to notice that I 
do not disguise 
whiteness, Englishness 
or middle class-ness in 
the interview texts.  I 
disguised all other 
ethnicities and 
languages in the 
interviews. 
I saw whiteness and 
Englishness (and being 
middle class) so much as 
the norm, that it did not 
occur to me that these 
might need to be 
disguised. 
White Englishness is 
therefore “neutral” 
 
Interview 1, p.13 
And I don’t think they 
really understand 
culturally where a lot 
of these kids are 
coming from. 
Mm-hmm 
And I think they’re 
quite judgemental 
really 
I agree with this, in my 
heart 
We are both locating 
prejudice in others  
(here in older, female 
members of the 
profession) 
This allows us both to 
have the fantasy that we 
are both somehow non-
prejudiced or neutral 
 
Interview 2 
Field notes (post-interview): 
We talked at cross-purposes.  
We have talked for an hour 
without saying anything 
I am cross. 
I feel nothing 
(interesting?) has been 
said 
I feel the participant has 
not engaged with my 
topic 
I am locating ignorance 
and prejudice in the 
participant, allowing me to 
hold my fantasy that I, as 
the researcher, am neutral, 
knowledgeable and open-
minded 
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Interview 3 
Field notes: 
(pre-interview) 
I am humbled by their 
willingness to participate 
(makes me rethink my own 
preconception that they are 
old-fashioned, out-of-touch 
and closed-minded) 
 
I am ashamed of my 
prejudice 
I am ashamed as I have 
been confronted with my 
habit of locating ignorance 
and prejudice in others, so 
that I can maintain my 
fantasy that I am a neutral 
researcher 
Interview 3 
Field notes: (post-interview) 
Frustration: I feel they have 
not actually answered the 
questions 
I feel they have not 
engaged with the topic. 
I now locate ignorance and 
prejudice in the participant 
once again and regain my 
fantasy that I, both as a 
therapist in training and as 
the researcher am neutral. 
 
 
I believe that the field-notes reveal this fantasy of ‘neutrality’ to be active, not just in 
the child psychotherapy setting, but in the research process, too: there were clearly 
times at which I held the fantasy that I could be a ‘neutral’ researcher.  Moreover, my 
slip in disguising some identifying features, but not others, suggests that I have a 
strongly held fantasy that being white, English-speaking and middle-class (as I am), is 
the ‘norm’.  Lewis (2000, 2007) notes how whiteness becomes “de-ethnicized” such 
that ethnicity is seen as belonging only to racially different others, allowing whiteness 
to be set up as a universal human category, a neutral norm.  I believe that I enacted 
this fantasy in my failure to disguise whiteness in the data.  In the discourse analysis, 
we see that the interviewee specifically named “the white therapist” when discussing 
neutrality. Both in the discourse, and in the analysis of my subjective responses, we 
see not only that the fantasy of a ‘neutral’ therapist persists within the profession, but 
that this neutrality has been claimed as a white prerogative. 
 
At those moments where, in the field-notes, I am able to notice my prejudices, I 
experience shame.  Morgan (2008) often writes about the shame involved in 
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confronting one’s prejudice.  Indeed, I found this to be a more accessible counter-
transference feeling than anxiety, which Davids (2011) sees as the predominant 
driving force of internal racist organisations.  Davids builds his argument about a 
defensive structure operating in the unconscious, to defend against overwhelming 
anxiety, which provides one explanation for the relative absence of anxiety here – 
perhaps it is simply too strongly defended to be readily accessible and examined in 
my subjective research experience.  
 
 
(D) THE LOCATION OF DIFFERENCE 
The second idea I chose to examine more closely through discourse analysis came 
from the fifth interview and was the idea that difference moves and is located in 
someone: I felt this shifting back and forth through the interview.  Where the 
interviewee described feeling foreign, I felt normal, whereas when they spoke about 
feeling less different nowadays, I suddenly felt very much so.  This is therefore 
another example of allowing the researcher’s subjective experiences to guide the 
process of data analysis. 
 
 
Interview 5, p.126-127 
I guess I,  
at the start of my training 
I felt very foreign, 
you know, 
and I felt very different, 
so perhaps when working 
with cultural differences 
I felt very comfortable 
maybe, er, 
as if there was something 
that some of these chil –  
 
 
 
 
 
‘I used to be different’ 
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I could empathise a lot more 
with some of these children 
I was working with, 
you know, 
but I think as the, 
as my profession has developed, 
I, I feel a lot less foreign 
in a way, 
so I feel a lot less different, 
culturally different now, 
which I don’t think it’s only 
because I have had more experience 
of work,  
I think it’s also  
because I have been here for longer,  
you know. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Um, so I think at the beginning 
I felt very different 
and in a way, 
er, 
identified with patients 
who were culturally different 
as well, you know, 
and maybe a little bit 
more intimidated 
by a family that was English 
for example, you know - 
 
Yeah. 
 
- and coming to see someone 
who is not English 
and all the possible fantasies 
they could have about, 
is this person going to understand me, 
is this person going to, 
to really get me 
or not 
and, and who is he, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Refrain: 
‘I am not different now’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘I used to be different’ 
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What is striking in this discourse is the interviewee’s feeling of having been different 
at the start of their career: that is, a foreign-born psychotherapist with an accent.  This 
participant emphasised how they felt less different as their career progressed – that is, 
as they completed not just one, but two professional trainings.  Elsewhere in the 
interview, this participant made several references to the psychoanalytic setting and 
the importance of maintaining this in cross-cultural work.  It seemed that this 
participant ‘felt different’ when employing their identity as a foreigner in the UK; 
however, as their identity shifts to that of their professional identity, the interviewee 
recovers a sense of being ‘normal’. 
 
Exploring this passage through discourse analysis reveals a fantasy that feeling 
‘different’ can shift.  I would make this more explicit, however.  As I noted in my 
field-notes, my own subjective feeling in this interview was to feel ‘normal’ (in this 
case, native, English-speaking and British) whenever the interviewee spoke of feeling 
what is he doing here, 
and all the different fantasies  
you can have  
about why is he here.   
Um, so at the beginning  
I felt insecure, 
anxious,  
er, with people 
who were, er, local  
you could say, you know. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Um, but I think 
that is something  
that’s changed quite a lot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Refrain: 
‘I am not different now’ 
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foreign.  However, when they spoke of the psychoanalytic setting or their two 
trainings, I felt ‘different’ (that is, still in training, unqualified, not undertaking a 
second training).  I therefore argue not just that the feeling of being ‘different’ or not 
can shift, but that it shifts between people.  This is suggestive of a fantasy that 
difference can and will be ‘located’ somewhere.  In this fantasy, ‘cultural difference’ 
does not exist as a ‘differential’ between people, but as a ‘difference’ that can be 
located in one person.  Or putting it slightly differently, a ‘difference’ is not imagined 
as a feature of a dynamic between people, but becomes a thing in itself, a feature of 
just one person in a pairing. 
 
Davids (2016b) gives a personal reflection on his experience at a group relations 
conference, whose task was to explore the legacy of the Holocaust for Germans and 
Israelis: 
“With hindsight it is possible to see that my stance at the time was particularly 
defensive: quite early on I had taken refuge in my identity as a professional in 
order to avoid the powerful emotions involved in being present as a very 
particular other – Muslim, felt to be in sympathy with the Palestinians, and 
unwanted” (p. 52) 
 
Davids here raises two points that I believe to be relevant here: the first is that he used 
his identity as a professional to avoid the feelings associated with being a ‘different’ 
other.  Putting it slightly differently, he was able to use his professional identity to re-
establish his feelings of ‘normality’ after being made to feel ‘different’ by the group.  
I believe this same process to be highlighted by the ‘refrains’ in the discourse above.  
This establishment of normality through the professional (psychoanalytic) identity is 
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suggestive of the fantasies discussed earlier: that the psychoanalytic profession is felt 
to have a ‘pure’ or ‘neutral’ culture of its own.  The second point is that the group 
was, at that moment, locating a feeling of ‘difference’ in Davids.  The very particular 
instance of ‘difference’ in that setting was one of being affected by the Holocaust (the 
German and Israeli members of the group) or not ‘counting’ as affected (in this 
instance, Davids, as he was associated with Islam).  I believe this to be consistent with 
the refrains in the discourse above: that where people come together, difference must 
be located in a ‘different other’ in order that the remaining person or people might 
claim normality for themselves.  Thus, difference is not felt to be a dynamic or 
differential, but is felt to be located in a person.   
 
In his exploration of his own personal experience of this, Davids (2016b) argues that 
it is the physical presence of the other that brings these issues powerfully to the fore 
and it is only in the physical presence of the other that they can be worked through.  
He argues that this work requires containment – in his example, the work took place 
the following year in the event’s staff group.  Davids’ point raises particular issues 
here: if it is the physical presence of the other that causes these issues to surface, we 
might anticipate that the reality of the clinical situation will cause it to arise (or in the 
example above, the physical reality of a face-to-face research interview).  Moreover, 
he stresses the containment needed in order to explore these powerful feelings 
adequately.  In his example, the staff group of the group relations conference were 
meeting as colleagues (equals).  How then, do we expect these issues to be explored 
satisfactorily in a training analysis, where training analyst and analysand are not on an 
equal footing and exist as a pair and not as a group?  Whether the setting of the 
training analysis would be able to provide adequate containment to work through the 
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feelings aroused by being made to own ‘difference’ is an interesting point.  Morgan 
(2008) certainly does not believe that issues of difference are adequately addressed in 
training analyses or in clinical supervision; yet, the question remains of whether our 
training structures are such that these issues could be worked through, or whether they 
require a group ‘thinking space’ (Lowe, 2014) to provide the necessary containment.  
Zagermann’s (2017) collection of papers brings together various authors who all 
argue that the training analyst system, and the power dynamics that go with it, limits 
the scope of the training analysis and stunts the psychoanalytic profession in various 
ways. 
 
The discourse above hints at other themes discussed earlier: the participant mentions 
feeling anxious – “I felt insecure, anxious” – when they describe their feeling of 
being ‘different’; and, indeed, at those moments of ‘shift’ when they discussed their 
professional identity, I began to feel anxious, insecure or somehow ‘lesser’ – inferior 
– in my own subjective experience.  Feeling different here is associated with feeling 
anxious and this is no wonder given that difference was variously associated with 
even extreme forms of madness and badness throughout the interview material.  
Furthermore, there is a power dynamic at play.  The instances where I felt ‘different’ 
(as a less educated, unqualified member of the profession), I felt inferior.  Similarly, 
there is a power dynamic at play between the interviewee-as-foreigner and the (white, 
British) social majority (which I identified with during the interview).  Auestad 
(2015) and Dalal (2011) both argue that social power dynamics are insufficiently 
theorized in psychoanalytic writing.  Here, I can only try to describe how anxiety-
provoking and uncomfortable it was to be in the inferior position, even if only for 
short periods of time. 
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In the interview above, the participant did also suggest that there were some 
advantages to feeling “different”, such as having greater empathy for patients.  
However, on the whole, the discourse reads as though feeling different brought 
discomfort and not feeling different any more comes as an achievement. 
 
The flip-side of this is that feeling ‘normal’ is associated with feeling comfortable: “I 
felt very comfortable”.  This idea also appeared in other interviews, when participants 
defined “culture”: 
   
 Interview 8, p.163 
“Well I suppose it’s the air you breathe, it’s the, the sea you 
swim in, it’s the, you know, it’s the way everything is 
defined” 
 
This seems to express both the idea that one is immersed in one’s own culture, 
surrounded by it, but also dependent on it.  That is, both dependent on it for survival 
(‘the air you breathe’) and dependent on it to make sense of the world. 
 
Another participant expresses this same idea slightly differently, that culture is 
something a group: 
 Interview 1, pp.7-8 
“-enjoys, gets sustenance from, gets some sort of sanity from 
really, because it’s a wide open world and there are myriad 
possibilities and I think one’s culture helps one to shape 
one’s life in it.  […] It’s reinforcing and uh, fortifying and 
um, um, {pause} it kind of lifts you up really, helps you deal 
with the complexities of everything really so- 
 
Mm-hmm. 
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-it’s a very amorphous thing but it’s, paradoxically it’s 
amorphous, but almost tangible really.  Like I know where I am 
on a particular issue really. 
 
[…] 
 
But it’s there and uh, I rather love it, frankly.  I like my 
culture. 
 
Mm-hmm. 
 
I like my culture, that I’m in.”  
 
Again, here, there is a sense that culture is something one is in, that makes sense of 
the world, makes one feel fortified and normal and that this brings comfort and 
pleasure.  This is reminiscent of Lewis’ (2009, 2012) exploration of cultural artefacts 
in family life: the food, songs, television programmes and other ‘things’ that build up 
a sense of a family’s normality and their ordinary way of life.  This perhaps links to 
that which Keval (2016) terms the ‘sense of the familiar’.  He emphasises how crucial 
this is: where this sense of the familiar is threatened or lost, huge anxieties arise, 
bringing into play defensive racist states of mind. 
 
Discourse in Context 
 
Again, examining the discourse whilst bearing in mind the wider context of the 
interview (Gee, 1999): 
Interview 5, p. 123-127 
Er, if you were going to give advice to a colleague who was about to 
work with a, a difference of culture, is there anything in particular 
that you would advise them? 
 
Uh-huh.  Hmm.  Well, I think that, er, er, the only thing I can think 
of, er, which is what I try to do is, er, to always keep in mind in 
as much as possible, um, the, the very fundamental basics of the 
psychoanalytic setting, um, because I think that sometimes, er, or I 
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think that with-without the setting one is lost, you know, and I 
think sometimes because of, um, a fantasy that you have to 
accommodate maybe a bit more to certain people in one way or another, 
um, you do not, you lose that aspect of the setting or you lose the 
setting and, and I think that that is what, er, can create a lot of 
complications and problems, you know, because I think if you don’t 
have this, I think clearly established, it’s very hard to work, you 
know. 
 
Yeah. 
 
So your psychoanalytic stance, er, the, the boundaries, um, about 
times and all those basic things, I think sometimes, and I am saying 
this again coming from a place where things are very informal and 
times are not respected, you know, and it’s very easy, for example, 
for a [Nationality 3] patient to come late and to expect to stay in 
the session for 10 more minutes, 15 more minutes, and if you don’t do 
it you become this very horrible person. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Um, and if you talk about this for example with a [Nationality 3] 
analyst or a [Nationality 3] child psychotherapist, they will say, oh 
but what’s the issue, you know, you, you can be, you can give a few 
minutes at the end if they were a few minutes late at the beginning 
of the session, why not?  But I think that when you, when you lose 
those things, because then it becomes endless, you know, because 
maybe there will be a, a different issue with, I don’t know, maybe a 
Jewish family where you, I don’t know, you should behave in a 
particular way or only talk to dad and not talk to mum, or, but if 
you have a good clear stance and you are always aware of it with 
whomever you are working with - 
 
Yeah. 
 
- I think that’s when you will always be doing psychoanalysis 
depending on, on the cultural differences.  Now that’s what I do, I 
try to do, so that’s what I would recommend, you know. 
 
Okay.  Um, I wanted to ask you a bit about, more about fantasies and 
possibly unconscious fantasies that we hold within the profession. 
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Uh-huh. 
 
Um, how do you think that cultural differences are viewed within the 
child psychotherapy profession? 
 
Wow, [Pause] I, er, [Pause] within the profession? 
 
Within the profession, yeah. 
 
Uh-huh.  I don’t know.  I don’t, I don’t, I don’t, I don’t think 
that, um, my experience is that there has always been, er, an 
atmosphere of tolerance, you know, to, to cultural differences within 
child psychotherapy, that is the impression I have, er, but I am not 
entirely sure about how much space it’s been given to think about it, 
you know. 
 
Okay. 
 
So, so I wouldn’t be able to say that much.  My, my, my experience 
has been, er, that it is open and, and, and that there is a lot of 
tolerance, but really I don’t know.  I don’t know, I, I don’t know 
how much, how much space there actually is to, to think about it and 
to, to, an awareness about it and, and if it is valued or not and if 
there is an interest in it or not, I, I don’t know, but, um, yeah. 
 
Sure, um, and what sort of fantasies and maybe unconscious fantasies 
do you think circulate within the profession about cultural 
difference? 
 
Uh-huh. Mmm.  [Pause] I think that there, there is probably, um, a, a 
fantasy which is, er, mainly, you know, about, er, cultural 
difference as something that might, er, well yeah, let’s say on the 
one hand something that could enrich the profession, you know, that, 
um, cultural differences can bring, er, something new or a different 
perspective, you know, um, and in that sense it is welcomed.  I think 
that’s one thing.  But then I also think that maybe there is another 
issue which could be that, um, er, with cultural differences come 
different ways of doing things and that maybe that can dilute and can 
modify a way of doing, a way of working as a child psychotherapist.  
But I, I think that er, I think going back to my previous answer, I 
really think that there is something about, er, not losing from sight 
the, the psychoanalytic setting and how the setting, er, is a very 
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basic one and should be applied from, from any different cultural 
background you come from really. 
 
Yeah. 
 
You know, so, I imagine that there must be, um, benign fantasies 
about what difference can bring and maybe some more and more paranoid 
fantasies about, er, how destructive it could be - 
 
Okay. 
 
- for the discipline, but again I think it, to me it goes back to the 
setting. 
 
Sure, um, I’m not sure if, you know, if you remember at all and if 
you’re willing to say.  Do you know what sort of fantasies you had of 
working with difference at the start of your career compared to now? 
 
Uh-huh.  I guess I, at the start of my training I felt very foreign, 
you know, and I felt very different, so perhaps when working with 
cultural differences I felt very comfortable maybe, er, as if there 
was something that some of these chil - I could empathise a lot more 
with some of these children I was working with, you know, but I think 
as the, as my profession has developed, I, I feel a lot less foreign 
in a way, so I feel a lot less different, culturally different now, 
which I don’t think it’s only because I have had more experience of 
work, I think it’s also because I have been here for longer, you 
know. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Um, so I think at the beginning I felt very different and in a way, 
er, identified with patients who were culturally different as well, 
you know, and maybe a little bit more intimidated by a family that 
was English for example, you know - 
 
Yeah. 
 
- and coming to see someone who is not English and all the possible 
fantasies they could have about, is this person going to understand 
me, is this person going to, to really get me or not and, and who is 
he, what is he doing here, and all the different fantasies you can 
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have about why is he here.  Um, so at the beginning I felt insecure, 
anxious, er, with people who were, er, local you could say, you know. 
 
Yeah. 
 
Um, but I think that is something that’s changed quite a lot. 
 
 
 
Before this extract, in which refrains of having been different and not being different 
now are identified, it is possible to see that the interviewee spoke at some length 
about the psychoanalytic setting: 
The Setting 
• “to always keep in mind in as much as possible, um, the, the 
very fundamental basics of the psychoanalytic setting” 
• “I think that with-without the setting one is lost” 
• “you lose that aspect of the setting or you lose the setting 
and, and I think that that is what, er, can create a lot of 
complications and problems” 
• “So your psychoanalytic stance, er, the, the boundaries, um, 
about times and all those basic things” 
 
 
Here, the idea of the ‘setting’ and its boundaries appears to be contrasted with 
problems: 
 
Difficulties 
• “if you don’t do it you become this very horrible person” 
• “when you lose those things, because then it becomes endless, 
you know” 
 
And, again, the idea of the setting is invoked in relation to a hypothesised (fantasy) 
difficult piece of work across cultural difference: 
 
 Interview 5, p. 124 
“But I think that when you, when you lose those things, because 
then it becomes endless, you know, because maybe there will be 
a, a different issue with, I don’t know, maybe a Jewish family 
where you, I don’t know, you should behave in a particular way 
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or only talk to dad and not talk to mum, or, but if you have a 
good clear stance and you are always aware of it with whomever 
you are working with - 
 
Yeah. 
 
- I think that’s when you will always be doing psychoanalysis 
depending on, on the cultural differences.  Now that’s what I 
do, I try to do, so that’s what I would recommend, you know.” 
 
 
The idea of the psychoanalytic setting is invoked again here, in order to ensure that 
this difficult piece of work nevertheless constitutes “doing psychoanalysis”.   This 
appears to refer back to the fantasy discussed earlier that to work with cultural 
difference threatens the profession, its standards or ‘dilutes’ the work.   
 
Using Bourdieu’s terms, the interviewee appears to establish a psychoanalytic 
‘habitus’ in which to locate themselves.  Moreover, this discussion also appears to 
relate to Bourdieu’s notion of ‘capital’: arguably, what is valued here are the 
traditional boundaries of the setting and established ways of clinical practice – 
whether these exist in reality or refer to a fantasy. 
 
Examining the context of the discourse – with its refrains of being different 
previously and not being different any more – it appears that ‘being different’ can be 
associated with extreme difficulty, namely being “a very horrible person” and having 
to bear “more paranoid fantasies about, er, how destructive it could be”.  In this case, 
it is no wonder both how uncomfortable the subjective feelings experienced during 
the interview were, nor the preference for the relative safety of the psychoanalytic 
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setting as ‘habitus’:  Bourdieu describes the ‘habitus’ and its practices as “enabling 
agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations” (1977 [1972], p. 72). 
 
A Note on Researcher Subjectivity 
Examining my research diary, or field-notes, I found various examples of feeling that 
difference had been located in one particular person – either by me, or in me by the 
interviewee – and that the other was therefore able to appear ‘neutral’.  These seemed 
to me to be instances of this fantasy being played out in the research experience and 
are listed in the table below: 
Text Subjective Feeling Comment 
Interview 4 
Field notes: I did not 
like the smell of the 
house – prejudice? 
I felt there was a foreign 
stink. I later found out 
this cooking smell was 
[typical British dish]. 
I am then ashamed. 
I am locating difference and its 
badness (foreignness, 
stinkiness) in the other, which 
allows me to preserve the 
fantasy that I am ‘normal’ 
(neutral).  When I see this 
process, I am ashamed, which 
highlights a fantasy that it is 
possible to be entirely without 
prejudice, totally neutral. 
 
Interview 5, p.116 
“So I think I, I 
consider my-myself 
[Continent 1] and 
within [Continent 
1] probably I 
belong to the white 
group.” 
 
Surprise.  I realise I 
might not have 
considered this 
participant ‘white’.  I 
quickly censor this 
thought, assuring myself 
‘But of course they are 
white’. 
 
In fantasy, I wish to 
monopolise the ‘white’ position 
(associated with neutrality) and 
make the participant into the 
different ‘other’.  I locate 
difference in them and 
neutrality in myself. 
Interview 7 
Field notes: Shocking – 
they were so scary and 
I find my questions 
idiotic from the 
beginning of the 
interview.  I therefore 
keep it short. 
I feel awkward, ignorant 
and much lower status 
(being a trainee, where 
the participant is a senior 
member of the 
profession).  This feeling 
of idiocy is very 
powerful, despite the fact 
that the initial mix-up 
Difference in the form of 
ignorance and idiocy have been 
located in me.  I am different, 
the participant occupies a 
neutral, purely psychoanalytic 
stance. 
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about the time of the 
interview was their 
mistake, not mine. 
I feel I am treated like 
their patient, not their 
interviewer. 
 
My notes suggest a pairing – that where one person occupies a neutral or normal 
position, the other is made to contain or own being ‘different’, that is, ‘difference’ is 
located in a person at that moment.  This, as I experienced it in the research process, 
was a deeply uncomfortable and unpleasant experience. 
 
Drawing the Findings Together 
Examining the themes together, various fantasies have emerged in the interviews: that 
difference is dangerous; that a threat is posed to the child psychotherapy profession; 
that the therapist is able to be neutral and that difference can be located in a person (in 
the ‘other’).  I argue that these latter two are paired positions: the flip-side to the 
therapist’s being ‘neutral’ is that all ‘difference’ is located in the ‘other’ (in the 
patient) – these are two linked positions and one cannot be occupied without the 
‘other’. 
 
I cannot argue for the universality of my findings, given the subjective nature of 
qualitative and psychosocial research, but Davids does argue that his model is a 
normal and permanent defensive organisation in the mind.  I would therefore go so far 
as to suggest that I consider it likely that the fantasies that emerged in this study are 
common features in the minds of child psychotherapists, even if not present all of the 
time: Keval (2016) holds that we are all capable of a ‘racist imagination’ and that this 
is a state of mind that we ordinarily move in and out of. 
 
 160 
I am aware that I have sometimes used the terms ‘normal’ and ‘neutral’ as 
interchangeable, yet there is something about the concept of a neutral therapist that 
goes beyond ‘normal’: a concept of normality encompasses something of an idea of 
social norms, to which one might conform or deviate from, and the altogether more 
personal ‘sense of the familiar’ (Keval, 2016).  However, the idea of ‘neutrality’ 
seems to convey something of a featurelessness: as though a therapist could somehow 
transcend the social order and place themselves above both norms and differences, in 
a ‘pure’ clinical setting, where psychoanalysis were able to form a culture of its own.  
This is akin to Auestad’s (2015) description of the wish in psychoanalysis to take up a 
‘view from nowhere’. 
 
Despite these ideas of a neutral therapist and a neutral setting having been challenged 
early on (Balint & Balint, 1939), a debate persists in the literature concerning whether 
or not it is possible for the analyst to find what I shall term a ‘clinical’ state of mind, 
whilst acknowledging themselves as a culturally and socially positioned individual 
(Renik, 1996) or whether an admission of the impossibility of neutrality, and the 
acknowledgment of cultural situatedness, leads to an abandonment of the boundaries 
that safeguard the analytic setting.  This same anxiety is expressed in the interview 
data in the theme I called ‘a profession in peril’. 
 
It is striking that, despite so many arguments about the impossibility of analytic 
neutrality (Goldstein & Goldberg, 2004), ideas about ‘classical’ neutrality persist in 
the literature and also here in the interview data.  There are instances, however, where 
interviewees appeared aware of this fantasy of neutrality – and the reality of its being 
a fiction: 
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 Interview 1, p.12 
“Um, you know, we go in ostensibly with an open mind and a non-
judgmental attitude and focus ourselves on the internal 
workings of the child and in that sense you could say you know, 
anybody could, the culture doesn’t come into it at all but one 
has a pure sort of stance, pure sort of approach and a clean 
kind of focused interest on the internal world.  But I think 
culture seeps in in all sorts of ways.  Um, we do make 
judgments as child psychotherapists.  We have a clear, well, we 
have a def-, an idea of normality.” 
 
And:   
Interview 4, p.100 
“So, as you sit in a room as a child psychotherapist with 
children and families from all over the place, you must never 
leave your curiosity hat off.  Right, you should never be so 
sure of your theory that you’re pushing it into other people 
without getting a sense of what they understand about it.” 
 
This last quote strikes me as particularly important as the participant mentions the 
possibility of the therapist’s ‘pushing something into’ other people.  Fanon (2008 
[1952]) cautions the therapist against inserting the ‘imago’ they hold of the racially 
different other into the patient’s mind.  Davids (2011) discusses instances where 
people experience this – having something ‘pushed into’ them by someone else – and 
the effect on the recipient’s internal world:  
“It becomes clear that we are dealing with nothing short of a psychotic 
moment.  A rupture in the continuity of his being – that ongoing sense we all 
have of being more or less in control of our insides, of what uniquely sets 
“me” apart from “them”, which underpins our capacity to be with others – 
has taken place, allowing the other to march in and take possession of the 
self.” (pp.2-3) 
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Davids describes this as “a serious matter”.  However, in the fantasies that appear in 
the interview data – namely, that difference is something dangerous, that the 
profession is in peril, that the therapist is neutral and difference located in the other – 
there appears to be a real possibility that there are instances where a ‘neutral’ therapist 
must evacuate all the badness and madness of difference and locate them in the 
patient.  This would be not just a ‘serious matter’, but one that raises profound 
questions for the child psychotherapy profession.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Reflecting Upon the Findings 
In July 2016, I presented my findings at the IPCAPA (Independent Psychoanalytic 
Child & Adolescent Psychotherapy Association) research event at the British 
Psychotherapy Foundation (BPF).  Present were members of the child & adolescent 
psychotherapy training committee, graduands and their families: there were therefore 
both many members of the child psychotherapy profession and also members of the 
general public; one of the interviewees was present and participated in discussion.  I 
presented the four fantasy structures outlined in the previous chapter: the fantasies 
‘difference as dangerous’, of ‘a profession in peril’, of ‘neutrality’ and ‘the location of 
difference’, with illustrations from the interview material and opened this up for 
discussion. 
 
The discussion was rich, interesting and helpful: my research and findings were 
discussed at length.  Minutes were taken by a colleague and are included in the 
appendices.  Broadly, the fantasies identified in this project drew a great deal of 
recognition, particularly the fantasy of ‘the profession in peril’.  Strong shock was 
expressed at the fantasy of ‘neutrality’ with child psychotherapists commenting that it 
was astonishing that anybody still believes in this: this was discussed as a “residue of 
difficulty” within the profession.  
 
The theme ‘difference as dangerous’ received two-fold reactions.  In the public 
discussion, it triggered many clinical anecdotes, usually relating to black patients, and 
also memories of a deceased colleague.  I would argue that these sorts of comments 
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reinforce this fantasy as the associations offered were those in which difference was 
linked to danger (death, the dead colleague) and in which it was the (black) patient 
who was ‘othered’.  Privately, however, after the discussion closed, several colleagues 
commented on how uncomfortable the data relating to this particular theme had been 
to hear and “That is the sort of thing I would probably say”, which I believe relates to 
the shame that these fantasies trigger, and which we are at pains to be rid of (Morgan, 
2008; Auestad, 2015). 
 
There were two comments from the discussion on that day, however, that I wish to 
address here in more detail.  The first was the suggestion that perhaps, in the clinical 
session, there might be ‘moments of meeting’, (Stern, 2004) in which it might be 
possible to transcend the normal-different dynamic (the location of normality in one 
person and of difference in the other).  In Stern’s work, a ‘moment of meeting’ is one 
in which “the therapist made an authentic personal response beautifully adjusted to 
the situation immediately at hand” (p.169).  For Stern, this represents a ‘nodal’ point 
in the therapy and marks a change in the progress of the treatment.  At first, I took this 
comment to be another expression of the fantasy that the clinical setting might offer a 
‘pure’ space, free from the intrusion of ‘cultural difference’.  This is reminiscent of 
Keval’s (2016) discussion of the “racist scene”, in which a fantasized ‘pure’ maternal 
space is felt to be free from the impingements of ‘difference’.  In Stern’s work, he 
appears to refer to an instance – even if just for a moment – when the therapist is 
perfectly attuned to the patient.  However, in the discussion in July 2016, Stern was 
not referred to directly.  I have since come to wonder whether the discussant’s 
comment might express something else, akin to Gadamer’s (2004 [1975]) idea of 
Horizontverschmelzung.  In Gadamer’s view, people are embedded in their culture 
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and their history and, in order to enter into dialogue, must seek to understand the 
viewpoint of the other and what might be of value in it (Rustin, 2011).  They must 
therefore open themselves up to the possibility of changing their minds, entering a 
communion of minds with the other – in which their horizons ‘melt’ together – 
become different as a result of this encounter, and therefore no longer are what they 
were.  In other words, the possibility of a genuine encounter with a ‘different other’, 
resulting in a change to the self.  Dalal (2011) asserts that, on opening ourselves up to 
other points of view, we encounter the possibility of real change: here, he emphasises 
the extreme anxiety that must be tolerated in order for this change to take place.   
Similarly, Lewis (2007) argues: 
“[Our identificatory] investments are social, political, economic, cultural and 
psychic  and  facing  up  to  them  is  part  of  a  project  that  has  the 
potential  to connect  us individuals  and  collectivities to  our  pasts  and  
each other  in new ways. But it is a painful, difficult and contradictory process 
and we need help to do it.” (p.884) 
 
 My understanding of the discussant’s comment, therefore, is that it might express a 
wish for psychotherapy to offer a space in which ‘outside’ differences do not matter – 
this would be a reiteration of the fantasy that psychoanalysis forms a ‘pure’ culture of 
its own; alternatively, this comment might point to something more hopeful – the idea 
that, in allowing the viewpoint of another to change our own, we might expand our 
own mental horizons. 
 
The second question that particularly struck me concerned methodology, and 
particularly the inclusion of my subjective experience in the research method.  A child 
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psychotherapist asked: “How do you know if this is a ‘theme’ becoming live in an 
interview or just an uncomfortable meeting between individuals?”.  This question 
relates to the validity of my findings and to the psychosocial methodology used.  The 
answer, surely, is that one cannot possibly know for certain: ‘fact’ here cannot be 
established in anything like the way it might be in the natural sciences.  However, I 
would argue that the two areas I chose to focus upon in detail, through the discourse 
analysis, namely the fantasy of ‘neutrality’ and the idea that difference can be 
‘located’ in one person of a pairing, were aspects of the data that I noticed gradually.  
I argue that, in this research, I had an ongoing engagement with the data – a 
relationship to the data, so to speak – over a number of years, and my thinking about 
it developed over time.  This involvement was an iterative process and included: 
thorough analysis of all the interviews and the themes emerging from them; 
considerations of my subjective experiences, which were recorded in a research diary; 
the development of ideas through consultation with others, both through academic 
supervision and the opportunity for a larger discussion at the IPCAPA research event; 
and, finally, through ongoing consideration of the interview data in the light of theory.  
Thus, the development of the findings of this study, including the example which 
prompted the question above, was the result of many years of careful involvement 
with the data and related literature, not the feeling of a fleeting moment in the 
interview. 
 
Summing Up – Strengths of the Study 
A psychosocial methodology, here, had at its core the bringing together of a 
consideration of the inner world, using psychoanalytic understandings, whilst using 
concepts and ideas from the social sciences to theorize and critique this.  In using a 
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psychosocial method, I drew upon psychoanalytic work through use of an ‘open’ 
interview style and through reflections upon my own subjective experience of 
carrying out the research throughout the processes of data collection, data analysis 
and discussion of the findings with others.  I have deliberately avoided the term 
‘counter-transference’ here, in acknowledgement about the ongoing debate within 
psychosocial studies (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013) about the status that counter-
transference should have in research.  However, like the psychotherapist’s use of his 
or her counter-transference within the clinical setting, I argue that reflecting upon the 
subjective experience in research adds depth and richness to the research process and 
findings.  Moreover, in making the subjective feelings explicit, the psychosocial 
researcher is able to make transparent processes that take place in qualitative research 
ordinarily, such as the choice to include or exclude aspects of the data (Willig, 2012).  
In drawing on the social sciences, psychosocial methods are able to examine and 
define the terms of a study in a nuanced way and use these in consideration of the 
findings.   
 
I set out to look at how child psychotherapists work with ‘cultural difference’ and 
came to focus on the fantasies identified in the interview data, through thematic and 
discourse analyses.  These fantasies were ‘difference as dangerous’ and that it is 
variously associated with sex, violence, abuse, neglect, cheating and shame; a fantasy 
of ‘a profession in peril’, that working with difference might erode or dilute technique 
or that differences within the profession might destroy it; a fantasy of ‘neutrality’, 
whereby the therapist is able to transcend differences; and a fantasy of ‘the location of 
difference’, where ‘difference’ and all its associated meanings are located within one 
person, allowing the other to be ‘normal’.   
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Psychosocial methodology allows for a two-way exchange between Clinic and 
Academy.  What is striking in the findings of this study is just how fantasy-laden 
‘cultural difference’ is.  Appreciating just how much is activated in our inner world 
when encountering ‘cultural difference’ should now contribute to the theorization of 
‘culture’ and ‘difference’ within the social sciences, allowing for more nuanced 
discussions of these concepts.  For the child psychotherapy profession, it draws 
attention to an area of clinical work which is under-developed in all areas of training, 
namely in supervision (Dalal, 2002), teaching (Lowe, 2014) and training analysis 
(Morgan, 2008).  As issues of ‘cultural difference’ become increasingly explosive in 
the current political climate, they are bound to enter the consulting room more and 
more: it is therefore a matter of some urgency that child psychotherapists think more 
deeply about their own racist or hostile projections into the patient. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
There are methodological limitations implicit in undertaking small-scale projects as a 
sole researcher.  Qualitative research studies aim to deliver a more focussed form of 
research, allowing the richness and subtleties of data to be explored.  As such, 
qualitative studies such as this one do not lend themselves to the generalizability of 
findings or the establishment of ‘fact’ (Willig, 2012).  The sheer scale and complexity 
of data generated by open-style qualitative interviewing necessitates a small sample 
size.  I do not believe that the lack of generalizability in studies such as these relates 
directly to the sample size: the small sample is a necessary feature in order to 
accomplish the in-depth analysis of a rich, complex data set.  Generalizability is 
limited instead by the nature of qualitative research itself: that is, research that is 
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interested in the rich subjectivity of individual opinion and experience cannot lead to 
the sorts of findings that are easily generalised; I argue, however, that these findings 
are nonetheless interesting and informative. 
 
A more pertinent question relates to the nature of undertaking research in an 
individual project.  This is sometimes used to question the validity of research 
findings (Thomas, in press).  I do not believe, however, that questions of validity 
follow directly from the fact of undertaking a research project as a sole researcher: I 
have argued that in qualitative research, exploring subjectivities, validity must depend 
on the nature of the researcher’s engagement with, or relationship to, the project and 
data.  Questions of validity are not automatically ‘solved’ by taking a group approach, 
given that groups might find that they cannot reliably reach agreement (Hadge, 2012) 
and cannot ‘automatically’ identify unconscious material in discourse (Frosh & 
Saville Young, 2008; Thomas, in press).  However, I find my interest drawn to those 
studies that have used a ‘working group’ approach, such as those conducted by Marks 
and Mönnich-Marks (2003), Urwin (2007), Phoenix et al (2016), not because the 
findings of such studies are necessarily more ‘valid’, but because the opportunity to 
learn from fellow researchers must enrich the research process.  Indeed, the ‘working 
group’ might offer an opportunity for multiple voices, or the pluralism, emphasised 
by Arendt (1958) and Auestad (2015).  Keval (2016) stresses the loss and mourning 
involved in opening oneself up to new ways of thinking, or to learning, and I argue 
that this is also involved in conclusion of a project, in recognising that the project 
cannot reach beyond its limits. 
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Finally, an important caveat comes from Brooks (2014), who argues that when 
thinking about racism, there is a risk that we are not thinking at all, but that the 
creation of theory can easily become a defensive means of evading thoughtful 
engagement with the concepts of ‘race’, ‘culture’ or ‘difference’, allowing us to 
protect our own ways of thinking and being.  In particular, Brooks gives the example 
of a colleague who says, ‘I know it is not politically correct to say this, but I’m going 
to say it anyway’.  For Brooks, this sort of exposition of one’s thinking is not true 
thinking, but instead reveals one’s vain self-regard as ‘free-thinking’.  I hope very 
much that my inclusion of my own subjective reactions to the interview process and 
data, including thoughts or comments that I felt to be exposing, does not fall into this 
category.  Instead, I hope that the two-directional nature of psychosocial research, 
bridging both Clinic and Academy, moving fluidly between interview data and 
literature, and with an explicit examination of the researcher’s subjective responses, 
helps to protect against this form of defensive thinking.  However, it remains a 
warning to be borne in mind. 
 
Questions for Future Research 
The findings and discussion of this study lead to various further questions for future 
research; moreover, the duality of this psychosocial project, with its two-way flow 
between clinical and academic concerns, and between interview data and literature, 
means that the questions it gives rise to are clinical, methodological and conceptual. 
 
1. The fantasies identified in this study, in relation to thinking about working with 
difference, raise further questions about how child psychotherapists work with 
‘cultural difference’ clinically, and what preconceptions we bring with us into the 
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consulting room.  Future research might ask, Do these fantasies impact upon the 
clinical work of child psychotherapy and, if so, how?  Can this be worked through, 
and how?  What are the consequences for the experience of the patient?   
 
2. Methodologically, how might we develop psychosocial methods further?  Is it 
feasible to accommodate the multiplicity or plurality emphasised by Auestad (2015) 
and Arendt (1958) in psychosocial research?  This would, by definition, lead to more 
than one set of ‘findings’ and greater ‘messiness’ of theory. 
 
3. Conceptually, how might we understand ‘cultural difference’ now?  I argued that 
Bourdieu’s thinking about culture offered a framework that could accommodate both 
broader and narrower definitions of culture, without making the concept so general as 
to become meaningless.  However, the findings of this study show just how fantasy-
laden the idea of ‘cultural difference’ is and, as such, how much slippage there is 
between the concepts of ‘culture’, ‘difference’ and ‘racism’ and how easily we 
conceive of ‘cultural difference’ one way in one instant and another way in the next.  
This study sheds some light on this ‘slippery’ concept, saturated by fantasy, and I 
therefore ask how we might think about ‘cultural difference’ now in our theoretical 
engagement with, and employment of, these terms. 
 
Implications 
There is a rapidly growing body of literature indicating an increasing engagement of 
the psychotherapy professions with ‘cultural difference’.  These recent publications 
(Auestad, 2015; Davids, 2011; Keval, 2016; Lowe, 2014) have greatly assisted me in 
conceptualising ‘cultural difference’ and in critiquing the findings from this study.  
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For the child psychotherapy profession more broadly, this recent literature can help us 
think about the implications of issues of difference on our clinical work.  As issues of 
‘cultural difference’ become increasingly politically explosive, it becomes ever more 
urgent that we think about them in our clinical work. 
 
At the outset of this project, I felt that Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of ‘culture’ might 
offer child psychotherapists a framework for thinking about ‘cultural difference’ in 
clinical work; this view has been argued before (Litowitz, 2003; Krause, 2014), but 
has yet to be taken up either in the child psychotherapy training or in the literature 
more broadly.  I felt that Bourdieu’s theory was a natural ‘fit’ for the way child 
psychotherapists think: his emphasis on different ‘fields’ and their ‘capital’ is easily 
applied to our understanding of the many different settings in which children find 
themselves, and the norms and value systems that operate in each of these; Bourdieu’s 
‘habitus’ and ‘doxa’ are consistent with psychoanalytic understandings of the ‘sense 
of the familiar’ (Keval, 2016), and the unconscious workings of the internal world.  
As I reach the conclusion of this project, I continue to consider Bourdieu’s 
understanding of ‘culture’ a natural fit.  However, in the findings of this study, it is 
striking how our concept of ‘cultural difference’ is laden with fantasy, and the extent 
of the ‘slippage’ of this term.  ‘Culture’ and ‘cultural difference’ have proved 
‘slippery’ concepts, easily sliding into the concepts of ‘race’ and ‘racism’: this has the 
effect that ‘culture’ might be employed and understood very differently from one 
moment to the next.  This slippage is illustrated in the varied ways in which the 
individual interviewees used the term, and my own engagement with the term in 
discussion.  I argue that our conceptualisation of ‘cultural difference’ needs now to 
encompass an understanding both of the slipperiness and its saturation with fantasy. 
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Despite the increasing engagement with issues of ‘culture’ and ‘difference’ in the 
psychotherapy professions, and the rapidly growing body of literature in this area, 
there is some catching-up to be done in practice.  There continues to be a lack of 
committed engagement with this in the child psychotherapy trainings, with teaching 
(Lowe, 2014), supervision (Dalal, 2002) and training analyses (Morgan, 2014) all 
highlighted as areas where our thinking about ‘cultural difference’ is neglected.  Lowe 
stresses the tendency, where teaching takes place at all, for this to be in the form of 
one-off events, and therefore tokenistic.  Berman (2017) argues that training – and 
particularly the training analysis – are dominated by what he terms the ‘New Person’ 
fantasy, in which the analysand is “fully” analysed.  The continued dominance of 
these tendencies within the professional training allows the “silent social consensus” 
of prejudice to be perpetuated (Auestad, 2015, p.lxiii) and prevents us from engaging 
with issues of ‘cultural difference’ in a more creative way.  For Kirsner (2017), it is in 
the recognition and respect for difference, “even robust differences” (p.176), that a 
mental space is established, enabling real thinking.  For Arendt (1958), it is in 
dialogue with an ‘other’ that we are made truly human. 
 
This study shows how deeply fantasy-laden our conception of ‘cultural difference’ is.  
This has a number of implications, in terms of our conceptualisations and training.  
Firstly, it is a matter of some urgency that the excellent literature in this area, from the 
now classical texts of Fanon, to the recent developments (Davids, 2011; Keval, 2016; 
Lowe, 2014) be taught on the child psychotherapy trainings.  A greater theoretical 
framework for thinking about ‘cultural difference’ should enrich the clinical practice 
of child psychotherapists.  It is greatly encouraging that the British Psychoanalytic 
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Council (BPC) has produced recommended readings for its members, in the form of a 
comprehensive reading list, but this must become part of the structure of training and 
supervision, and not left to those wishing to develop a ‘special’ interest: as Lewis 
(2007) reminds us, “We need help to do it” (p.884).  
 
Secondly, our fantasies about ‘cultural difference’ have conceptual implications.  
Psychosocial methodology enables a two-way exchange between the Clinic and the 
Academy, or between the psychotherapy professions and the social sciences.  The 
fantasy-laden nature of ‘cultural difference’ should now feed in to a more nuanced 
conceptualisation of this term within the social sciences.  For psychotherapists, there 
is a need to acknowledge, in the long debate about the nature of counter-transference 
(Holmes, 2014) that these fantasies about ‘cultural difference’ enter the consulting 
room with us. 
  
Lastly, I return to Keval’s (2016) discussion of the “sense of the familiar”, which, 
when threatened by change, or by a need to give up immature ways of thinking, 
arouses great anxiety and painful feelings of loss.  I argue that this ‘sense of the 
familiar’ is closely tied to our own subjective experiences of ‘normality’ and that the 
concept of ‘normality’ has played an important role in child psychotherapy, closely 
related as it is to a concept of ‘normal development’.  Anna Freud (1966) emphasised 
the need for child psychotherapists to “assess the degree of a young child’s normal 
progress” (p.54) and for this, she called for trainings to increase the “study of the 
normal” (p.55): 
“The analyst of adults has little concern in his clinical work with the concept 
of normality, except marginally, where functioning (in love, sex, and 
successful work) is concerned.  In contrast, the child analyst, who sees 
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progressive development as the most essential function of the immature, is 
deeply and centrally involved with the intactness or disturbance, i.e., the 
normality or abnormality of this vital process.” (p.54) 
 
Music (2017), in his review of development and attachment theories and child 
psychotherapy research, is at pains to highlight the many different forms that 
childrearing takes across different cultures and the different beliefs that inform these; 
he stops short, however, of discussing the implications of this multiplicity for the 
theories underpinning child psychotherapy. 
 
Auestad (2015) argues the need to ‘put aside’ theories of normality and pathology in 
psychotherapy, in order to foster understanding.  This study has found that thinking 
about ‘cultural difference’ fuels many fantasies involving the idea of ‘normality’ and 
moreover that these are implicated in splitting and projections into a ‘culturally 
different other’, who might be the child patient.  Our sense of ‘normality’ is highly 
subjective and of huge importance to the individual, arousing primitive fantasies and 
powerful anxieties (Morgan, 2008, 2014; Keval, 2016).  I am here reminded of Karl 
Ove Knausgaard’s (2014) memoir of his childhood, Boyhood Island, in which he 
observes that “All the houses apart from ours had their own smell” (p.26).  Here, he 
is noticing the differences between his friends’ home environments, which smell 
unfamiliar, and his own, which is so normal to him that he cannot perceive (smell) its 
‘smell’.  I argue that our own sense of normality, of our own cultural norms, our 
‘sense of the familiar’ is so deeply rooted in our inner worlds and cultural lives that 
we fail to perceive it, we take it for granted, and are unlikely to explore it in a training 
analysis except when it becomes threatened or ruptured.  Our use of the concept of 
‘normality’ in the clinical work of child psychotherapy, however, means that it is 
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worth reminding ourselves of the cultural, and highly individual, dimensions of this 
concept, its fantasy-laden nature, and the consequences it can bring, in the form of 
racist projections. 
 
Despite arguments in the literature about the impossibility of neutrality (Balint & 
Balint, 1939; Goldstein & Goldberg, 2004; Greenberg, 1991; Renik, 1995, 1996), this 
study has shown that powerful fantasies about the neutrality of the therapist still 
operate in the child psychotherapy profession.  This is a real issue for the profession, 
and a clear split between the academic writings of psychotherapists and their clinical 
practice, which cannot continue to be ignored.  I have shown how powerful fantasies 
about ‘cultural difference’ get into the consulting room, and therefore also into 
people.  Unless we, in the child psychotherapy profession, are able to see ‘cultural 
difference’ and think about it, we will continue to reproduce bourgeois, colonial, 
prejudiced, racist stances (Auestad, 2015; Brooks, 2014; Khanna, 2003; Kovel, 1988; 
Morgan, 2008).  I argue, however, that psychoanalysis offers a powerful theory of the 
unconscious and, as such, we are well-equipped to interrogate our professional blind-
spots: it is now high time we did so. 
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ETHICAL APPROVAL 
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British Association of Psychotherapists 
Child & Adolescent Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy Training 
 
 
 
Information for Participants 
 
 
Department of Psychosocial Studies 
BIRKBECK  
University of London 
Malet Street,  
London WC1E 7HX 
020 7631 6000 
 
 
On Working with Cultural Differences in Child Psychotherapy 
 
Anna Fleming 
 
 
About this study 
The study is being done as part of my DPsych degree in the Department of 
Psychosocial Studies, Birkbeck, University of London.  
 
The study has received ethical approval from the Birkbeck School of Social Sciences, 
History and Philosophy Ethics Committee.  (Approval reference number: 2011-21) 
 
This study aims to explore psychotherapists’ views and thoughts about working with 
cultural difference. 
 
Your participation 
If you agree to participate, you will agree to my interviewing you for about an hour; 
the interview will be held at a place and time convenient to you. You are free to stop 
the interview and withdraw at any time. 
 
The interview you give will be fully confidential: a code will be attached to your data 
so it remains totally anonymous.  Any identifying features, such as names, that you 
might mention in the interview will be disguised or removed from the written 
transcript. 
 
Ethical approval has been granted only for an interview relating to your private 
practice; if you have additional employment in the NHS, please do not refer to this 
work in the interview. 
 
The interview will be recorded; this recording will be kept in a safe (locked and 
password protected) place and used only by the researcher.  It will be kept until 
completion of the project, then destroyed. 
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The analysis of our interview will be written up in a report of the study (thesis) for my 
degree. You will not be identifiable in the write-up or in any publication which might 
ensue. 
 
 
 
 
 
Advice 
Please be advised that the interview – discussing cultural difference – might touch 
upon difficult, sensitive or personal subjects.  Should you wish to discuss any matters 
arising from this interview, please contact the research supervisor, Dr Amber Jacobs, 
at Birkbeck.   Alternatively, you may contact Mrs Lydia Tischler at the British 
Association of Psychotherapists; your contact with them will be confidential and not 
used for any part of this study. 
 
Your written consent will be sought, should you wish to participate in this study; 
please ask the researcher if you have any queries relating to the study. 
 
 
 
 
Contact details 
Should you wish to discuss any aspect of the research, please feel free to get in touch. 
 
Researcher:  Anna Fleming 
  [CONTACT DETAILS] 
 
Supervisor:  Dr Amber Jacobs 
Birkbeck Department of Psychosocial Studies, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet 
Street, London, WC1E 7HX 
[CONTACT DETAILS] 
 
Tutor:  Mrs Lydia Tischler 
BAP British Association of Psychotherapists, 37 Mapesbury Rd, London, NW2 
4HJ 
  [CONTACT DETAILS] 
 
 
  
 195 
 
British Association of Psychotherapists 
Child & Adolescent Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy Training 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
 
Title of Study:  On Working with Cultural Differences in Child 
Psychotherapy 
 
Anna Fleming 
 
 
 
I have been informed about the nature of this study and willingly consent to 
take part in it.  
 
I understand that the content of the interview will be kept confidential. 
 
I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
I am over 16 years of age. 
 
 
 
 
Name  
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Signed  
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Date  
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
There should be two signed copies, one for participant, one for researcher. 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Revised following pilot interview  
 
 
 
 
(1) Professional context 
- their training, their previous professional background, the context of their 
psychotherapy work. 
 
(2) “Culture” & Background 
- how they define “culture” 
- their mother-tongue and how they define their own cultural background 
 
(3) Culture & Psychotherapy 
- how do they think culture impacts on child psychotherapy? 
o In theory? 
o In practice – particularly private practice? 
o Working with the child? 
o And the parents/ carers? 
- Are there any particular difficulties that spring to mind? 
- What, if any, are the advantages of culturally diverse work in psychotherapy? 
- What advice would they give to a colleague working with cultural diversity? 
 
(4) Thoughts and fantasies 
- How do they think cultural difference is viewed within the child 
psychotherapy profession? 
- What fantasies, perhaps unconscious, do they think circulate among child 
psychotherapists about working with cultural difference? 
- What fantasies, if they are willing to share them, did they themselves have 
when early in their career?  And now? 
- How do these fantasies impact upon them?  The child?  The work?  The child 
psychotherapy profession more generally? 
 
(5) Any other thoughts?  Anything else they would like to mention? 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
 
 
Stage Analysis Findings Features, Refrains, Sub-
themes 
 
1 Describing the data   
  Attitudes towards the 
project 
Interest, ambivalence 
  Defining culture Broad and narrow 
definitions 
  Ambivalence  Contradictions 
  Fantasies Denial, confusion 
   Sex and violence 
   Colonial missionary 
   Neutrality 
    
2 Thematic Analysis   
  Difference as 
Dangerous 
Sex, violence and disability 
   Neglect and child abuse 
   Cheating dishonesty and 
secrets 
    
  A Profession in Peril Eroding clinical practice 
   Coping with difference 
within the profession 
   Being ‘out-of-touch’ 
    
3 Discourse Analysis The Neutrality of the 
Therapist 
Refrain: 
“The neutral therapist  
and the other sort of 
patient” 
  The Location of 
Difference 
Refrain: 
‘I used to be different; I am 
not different now’. 
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MINUTES 
 
Discussion of Findings – IPCAPA Research Event – 17th July 2016 
Taken by Eva Crasnow 
 
 
 
Difference as Dangerous 
• Internal divisions within psychoanalysis – feels dangerous 
• Colleague (now deceased) learnt BSL in order to work with deaf children 
• Affect: how do you hold onto yourself? 
 
 
A Profession in Peril 
• Many analysts train in other countries: an outsider being an outsider 
• Loss of ‘nice neurotic children’ – an adaptation of technique – fear that one 
will stop being analytic 
• Exposure of self/ profession 
 
Neutrality of the Therapist 
• Residue of difficulty for analysts 
• Ideal of neutrality – a myth, exposed by cultural dimension 
• Shocked ‘gasp’ at idea of neutrality 
 
Locating Difference 
• CAMHS setting very different from private practice with adults 
• Brexit  - insiders and outsiders changing 
• In clinical room: can moments of meeting transcend the normal/ different 
dynamic? 
• Note the difference in culture/ setting between BAP & Birkbeck 
 
Process of Interviews 
• How to work out the transferential aspects – re: research diary 
• Some interviews much more uncomfortable than others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
